For two decades, Israel has been pressuring the United States to assist it in a military operation aimed at destroying Iran's nuclear program. Israel's advanced air force did not have the range and safe transit lines to support a large volume of strikes deep inside Iran on its own.
On June 13, the IDF launched its large-scale air strike on Iran, which, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said, is expected to last at least two weeks. Why, after so many years, did the Israeli leadership decide that it could launch this attack on its own?
Certainly, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) has improved its capabilities over the years: it has long-range missiles such as Golden Horizon, long-range drones, more stealth (and modified) F-35I fighters, as well as enhanced air defense systems to intercept Iran's ballistic missiles.
Nevertheless. a crucial event happened 7 months earlier: the fall of the Assad government in Syria.
Geographically, Iran and Israel have been difficult to engage in direct military conflict. Iran was protected from the roughly 600 miles of hostile airspace of Syria and Iraq. On the other hand, Tehran gradually developed and began to accumulate medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles that could strike Israel.
Fighter jets carrying heavy weaponry and spare fuel cannot fly as far as the maximum range specifications for "clean" aircraft provide. But the IAF could carry out long-range raids using the seven KC-707 Re'em aircraft (all seven KC-130H), as it has repeatedly done in 2024.
Iraq's air defenses were destroyed by the U.S. in 2003, but Israeli aircraft had to pass through Syrian airspace to reach Iraq. And the alternative routes over Jordan and Saudi Arabia may not have been treated amicably by those states that have more significant air defense capabilities.
The fall of the Assad regime may seem insignificant, given that Damascus' air defense system has been unable to halt Israeli strikes for 14 years, shooting down only one Israeli F-16 in 2018. The Israeli Air Force "taught" how to destroy enemy air defences when it dismantled Syrian surface-to-air missiles in Lebanon in 1982.
However, having to constantly bypass, neutralize or destroy Syrian air defences was a risky and wasteful mission for the Israeli Air Force that saw its performance "decline" in the face of a potential conflict with Iran.
Moreover, Israel could not risk sending its KC-707s into Syrian airspace as long as Damascus had active long-range and high-altitude missile systems, such as the S-200 and S-300.
That changed when Bashar al-Assad's government was overthrown by rebel forces last December. Assad's army collapsed, Syria's air and air defense were completely inactivated. Although the new government was hostile to Iran, Netanyahu ordered the IAF to bomb Syria's abandoned warplanes and remaining air defense systems, "forbidding" the new government in Damascus to claim sovereignty of its airspace.
This opened a safe corridor for Israeli warships to escort Israeli fighter jets and refuel them to the edges of Iran's air defense zone – in effect, Israeli fighters significantly expanded their range.
Not having to suppress the air defences of Syria and Iran at the same time was an advantage for Tel Aviv. The safe corridor gave Israel more options for searching for and rescuing pilots or for special forces to invade Iranian territory and, more importantly, to remove them from Iran at the end of their mission, as was done on June 13. In particular, two C-130 or KC-130H aircraft were recorded flying at low altitude over Syria that morning.
All of these moves would pose a greater risk if Israeli planes had to cross hundreds of miles of Syrian air defences.
Iran's failures The fall of Assad was the latest and most serious failure for Iran. Before 2024, Iran and Hezbollah had built up arsenals of long-range missiles, rockets and drones. No one knew how effectively Israel could counter a massive attack against it.
The "evil" began with Hezbollah's low-scale attacks on Israel, in support of Hamas. The result was massive retaliation by Israel, which killed Hezbollah leaders in a coordinated attack with trapped bombers and radios detonated, bombed Hezbollah command's arsenals and shelters, and eliminated leader Hassan Nasrallah. Hezbollah was unable to react convincingly.
The second "evil" is the short, but large attacks launched by Iran against Israel: first with 320 drones and missiles in April last year and then in October with 200 ballistic missiles. Israel's defensive effort to repel these attacks—with the assistance of the U.S. air and naval forces and many other states—was large-scale, costly, but successful, as it did not result in many casualties in human lives or major damage to military equipment.
Iran's strikes have enabled the Israeli leadership to better understand its operational capabilities for long-range strikes. Iran proved to be less capable than most feared.
The Israeli counteroffensive on October 26 destroyed Iran's most sophisticated air defense systems: the Russian S-300s.
Unwittingly, Tehran exudes less fear after its attacks. Syria ceased to be a "safety cushion" after the fall of Assad. Trump's election signalled that the U.S. would be more positively disposed to support an Israeli attack on Iran, either agreeing in advance to the military operation or not punishing Israel for attacking.
Israel destroyed Iran's air defenses. And now?
The IAF is attacking targets throughout western Iran, with no apparent aircraft losses so far. However, it does not have the proper weapons to strike Iran's subsoil and destroy the nuclear facilities in Natanz and Ford. There are reports that the facilities in Natanz have suffered significant damage due to the loss of electricity. Ford, however, which is literally under a mountain, if it has suffered damage, these are minimal.
Perhaps the IDF will take "some hare out of their hat": a secret weapon or a dangerous commando raid. Or Netanyahu may hope that Iran's retaliation will force the U.S. into the war and strike with deep-penetrating GBU-57 bombs.
Netanyahu has set himself the goal of changing Tehran's regime. Perhaps it will be satisfied by some very important political concessions. But it may stubbornly insist on attacks on Iran to prevent the reconstruction of nuclear facilities or the development of ballistic missiles — as it did with Syria, which has been bombing it for more than a decade.
However, geography may be a problem in a long-term bombing plan because of Iran's "strategic depth." Tehran could rebuild facilities and rebuild forces in eastern Iran, where Israel's strike capability is much more limited.
