Three Cypriot companies - jointly owned - based in Nicosia are connected to the scandal that has plagued Slovakia since the beginning of August and concerns a contract of that state for the purchase of 279 cameras in order to carry out traffic policing (speed control).
As claimed through opposition statements and relevant publications in the central European country, but also in a Swiss media, the contract for the installation of cameras may have been an operation by Russian secret services for espionage purposes on Slovak territory. The cameras, according to a report, refer to a Russian manufacturer, while the whole effort has been attributed to a covert operation through Cyprus.
Companies and shareholders
"F" identified that a total of three legal entities registered on our island are directly or indirectly involved in the whole case, one of which is presented in documents of the Slovak state as the manufacturer of the cameras. In fact, we ended up with the two persons originating from a Baltic country who control these Cypriot companies.
More specifically, the three companies identified through the "F" investigation are SODASUS LTD, FIDESTA MANAGEMENT LTD and FIDESTA LTD. These three companies are owned by Sens Zalitis and Artis Rozenbergs, who present themselves as shareholders/owners.
SODASUS
Although based on our investigation to date, it does not appear that any audit procedure has been initiated against the three companies and their two owners, there are nevertheless many parameters that need to be answered.
One concerns the role of SODASUS LTD. In a document of a competent Slovak state body that checked the technical specifications of the cameras, as well as the technical documents of the contract that are available to us, the Cypriot SODASUS is presented as the manufacturer of the cameras.
This, however, is not supported by evidence. This legal entity, as it also declares to the Cyprus Registrar of Companies, has as its objective "Investment works and more". It has nothing to do with the manufacture of such products or at least does not appear in any published file to be active in a similar industry.
Two Latvians
"F", continuing his investigation, tried to identify the natural persons behind SODASUS. The sole shareholder of the latter appears to be the company FIDESTA MANAGEMENT LTD. However, the latter does not have a natural person as the owner either. Its share capital is owned by FIDESTA LTD, which is owned by Latvians Sens Zalitis and Artis Rozenbergs. Both hold 50 shares each.
All three companies are presented to have the same purpose of establishment ("Investment work and others"). The first two companies, SODASUS and FIDESTA MANAGEMENT LTD, do not seem to be particularly active. After a specialized investigation we did in their file with the Registrar of Companies, we identified financial statements that show a small movement of amounts, reaching a few hundred euros.
On its official website, "Fidesta Limited is a specialized company management company, licensed and regulated by the Cyprus Securities and Exchange Commission (CySEC) as a Provider of Administrative Services ... We are located in Cyprus and specialize in formations of Cypriot companies and trusts."
No research
However, answers we received from competent persons reveal that until yesterday no request for assistance to the Cyprus Police had been made from Slovakia, nor have the prosecuting authorities started any investigation for any possible offense.
"We have not approved any transaction"
"F" sent an e-mail to the company FIDESTA LTD asking for a position. We were contacted yesterday morning by a Greek Cypriot official of the company. We informed him of everything we found and a little later he took a written position.
We present in full the statement he made on behalf of the owners of FIDESTA LTD: "We have taken note of your question. We take our legal and corporate responsibilities very seriously as a licensed administrative services company. We have not authorized or approved any transaction, nor have we received any instructions from the beneficial owner of Sodasus Ltd to execute transactions. Where appropriate and required, the company will cooperate with the relevant authorities and handle any relevant issues through the prescribed and appropriate procedures."
Correlation of cameras with Russia, Croatia and Cyprus
The case came to the surface within the first ten days of August, as we found out from the Slovak electronic press. The issue took on dimensions when two of the 279 cameras were procured for testing purposes. It was initially found that the cameras were exactly the same as those produced by a Russian company. This was followed by reactions from the opposition Slovak party PS (Progresívne Slovensko – Progressive Slovakia) and criticism of the country's Minister of the Interior.
As a result, the execution of the contract was suspended. Indicative of the climate, but also of what came to the surface, are the statements of Peter Bátor (7/8), a member of the PS. He spoke of a strange corporate route until the cameras arrived in Slovakia, saying: "Croatia is the only EU country, apart from Slovakia, that has a license for the Russian cameras of the Simicon company.
According to all available information, the route of the cameras to the Slovak roads started from the Russian company Simicon and passed through Croatia to the Cypriot shell company Sodasus LTD, then to the Slovak company It-s, j.s.a., from which the cameras were to be purchased by the company Soitron, which supplied the Ministry of the Interior with two systems for 160,000 euros."
The case... was internationalized this week following an article in the Swiss newspaper Neue Zürcher Zeitung.
Various publications followed, showing, among others, the following:
>> The Slovak Ministry of the Interior has suspended the supply of 279 road traffic cameras from the Cypriot Sodasus Ltd, as it was found that the devices were manufactured in Russia by the company Simicon (ООО "Симикон") of St. Petersburg.
>> An expert from the Slovak National Security Bureau found a hidden slot for a second SIM card and the ability to receive SMS commands from Russian phone numbers, which creates a risk of espionage.
>> Similar Russian-made cameras are already in use in several EU countries, including Croatia.
>> In 2025, GRU hackers, known as APT 28, hacked more than 10,000 cameras in Europe to monitor military installations and aid shipments to Ukraine.
>> A hidden slot for a second SIM card was reportedly found on one of the cameras, even though there was no mention of it in the technical documentation. It was also found that the devices can receive commands via SMS messages from 12 telephone numbers registered in St. Petersburg and the Leningrad and Kemerovo regions.
