By Christakis Hatzilaou (Electrical engineer, with many years of experience in the operation of the Electricity System)
A crisis that was not unforeseeable
The rolling power cuts of 22 July 2026 cannot be blamed solely on rising consumption or production breakdowns. Extreme temperatures and equipment failures acted as a catalyst, not the root cause. The real cause lies in longstanding weaknesses in energy planning and the failure to take corrective measures in time.
More worrying still, Cyprus faced similar problems in the summer of 2025, when the adequacy of the electricity system was already tested severely. The repetition of the same picture a year later shows that the warning signs did not lead to the necessary interventions to substantially strengthen the reliability of the electricity system.
As early as the first months of 2026, well-documented public assessments had already warned that if available generation capacity was not reinforced in time, the electricity system would face serious difficulties during peak periods. Events unfortunately confirmed that these concerns were not theoretical.
How we got to the crisis
The electricity crisis of summer 2026 is not an isolated incident but the result of longstanding failures and omissions by the authorities responsible for the electricity sector. The absence of substantial long-term strategic planning for electricity generation, such as the Ten-Year Transmission System Development Plan, is the root cause of the crisis and is reflected in the following key issues:
Failure to integrate and operate new conventional generation units.
Uncontrolled development of renewable energy sources without parallel development of storage systems.
Years-long delay in the arrival of natural gas, leaving 420 MW of modern capacity idle because the units run on gas.
The failure to implement the Great Sea Interconnector electrical link on time.
These problems stem from the lack of substantial long-term strategic planning in electricity generation. In turn, they led to excessive reliance on the Electricity Authority of Cyprus’s (EAC) old, worn and breakdown-prone conventional units, making the generation system increasingly unreliable. The result was several breakdowns in conventional generation units, leading to a shortfall in electricity generation, since available production could not cover peak electricity demand during periods of prolonged heatwaves.
Institutional responsibilities
The current legislative framework clearly sets out the responsibilities of the bodies involved. The Cyprus Energy Regulatory Authority (CERA) is responsible for long-term generation adequacy planning and for ensuring the electricity system has sufficient generation resources to meet demand.
The Transmission System Operator of Cyprus (TSOC), on the other hand, is responsible for the safe and reliable real-time operation of the electricity system, using whatever generation resources are available to it. This distinction matters, because operational crisis management cannot substitute for a lack of adequate long-term planning.
Assessment of long-term electricity adequacy
Under its own Decision 144/2017, CERA must ensure a reserve margin (that is, additional available installed capacity beyond peak electricity demand) ranging between 20 and 40%.
In our technocratic assessment, the margin for the 2026 summer period should have exceeded 30%. The reasons for choosing a margin of this size relate, on one hand, to Cyprus’s isolated electricity system, which has no interconnections, and on the other, to the age, large scale and continuous strain on EAC’s conventional units. This buffer exists to effectively cover electricity needs in the event of increased breakdowns or rising demand due to extreme weather conditions.
However, for summer 2026, the reserve margin was estimated at around 18%, insufficient to cover peak demand and to deal with the possibility of increased breakdowns in the generation system. Therefore, according to our own estimates, CERA did not make available to TSOC a satisfactory reserve margin percentage, that is, sufficient conventional unit capacity for TSOC to be able to adequately meet rising electricity demand during the 2026 summer period.
The legislation exists, so why wasn’t it applied?
Article 34 of the Electricity Market Regulation Law (2021) is clear: when forecasts show an adequacy shortfall, CERA must inform the Energy Minister so the situation can be assessed and, if necessary, measures taken to reinforce generation.
Despite warnings from technocrats and others involved in the electricity sector, it appears the authorities judged there were no grounds for bringing in additional generation capacity during the 2026 summer period. The result of this assessment, which proved mistaken: rolling power cuts leading to disruption in critical infrastructure, discontent among citizens and businesses, and a serious blow to the country’s reputation and tourism image.
Conclusion
The electricity crisis of summer 2026 has highlighted the need for a change of course, with substantial reforms to Cyprus’s electricity sector. The lack of sustained forward planning, delays in critical projects and mistaken assessments led to the disgrace of electricity cuts due to a generation shortfall in the middle of a heatwave and at the height of the tourist season.
And the next crisis is not a question of if it will happen again, but when, unless the country radically changes its energy policy approach. That means introducing substantial long-term strategic planning for electricity generation.
Uncontrolled development of renewable energy sources without parallel development of storage systems.
Years-long delay in the arrival of natural gas, leaving 420 MW of modern capacity idle because the units run on gas.
The failure to implement the Great Sea Interconnector electrical link on time.
These problems stem from the lack of substantial long-term strategic planning in electricity generation. In turn, they led to excessive reliance on the Electricity Authority of Cyprus’s (EAC) old, worn and breakdown-prone conventional units, making the generation system increasingly unreliable. The result was several breakdowns in conventional generation units, leading to a shortfall in electricity generation, since available production could not cover peak electricity demand during periods of prolonged heatwaves.
Institutional responsibilities
The current legislative framework clearly sets out the responsibilities of the bodies involved. The Cyprus Energy Regulatory Authority (CERA) is responsible for long-term generation adequacy planning and for ensuring the electricity system has sufficient generation resources to meet demand.
The Transmission System Operator of Cyprus (TSOC), on the other hand, is responsible for the safe and reliable real-time operation of the electricity system, using whatever generation resources are available to it. This distinction matters, because operational crisis management cannot substitute for a lack of adequate long-term planning.
Assessment of long-term electricity adequacy
Under its own Decision 144/2017, CERA must ensure a reserve margin (that is, additional available installed capacity beyond peak electricity demand) ranging between 20 and 40%.
In our technocratic assessment, the margin for the 2026 summer period should have exceeded 30%. The reasons for choosing a margin of this size relate, on one hand, to Cyprus’s isolated electricity system, which has no interconnections, and on the other, to the age, large scale and continuous strain on EAC’s conventional units. This buffer exists to effectively cover electricity needs in the event of increased breakdowns or rising demand due to extreme weather conditions.
However, for summer 2026, the reserve margin was estimated at around 18%, insufficient to cover peak demand and to deal with the possibility of increased breakdowns in the generation system. Therefore, according to our own estimates, CERA did not make available to TSOC a satisfactory reserve margin percentage, that is, sufficient conventional unit capacity for TSOC to be able to adequately meet rising electricity demand during the 2026 summer period.
The legislation exists, so why wasn’t it applied?
Article 34 of the Electricity Market Regulation Law (2021) is clear: when forecasts show an adequacy shortfall, CERA must inform the Energy Minister so the situation can be assessed and, if necessary, measures taken to reinforce generation.
Despite warnings from technocrats and others involved in the electricity sector, it appears the authorities judged there were no grounds for bringing in additional generation capacity during the 2026 summer period. The result of this assessment, which proved mistaken: rolling power cuts leading to disruption in critical infrastructure, discontent among citizens and businesses, and a serious blow to the country’s reputation and tourism image.
Conclusion
The electricity crisis of summer 2026 has highlighted the need for a change of course, with substantial reforms to Cyprus’s electricity sector. The lack of sustained forward planning, delays in critical projects and mistaken assessments led to the disgrace of electricity cuts due to a generation shortfall in the middle of a heatwave and at the height of the tourist season.
And the next crisis is not a question of if it will happen again, but when, unless the country radically changes its energy policy approach. That means introducing substantial long-term strategic planning for electricity generation.
