By Ariel Cohen
Russia, one of the world's largest oil producers, is facing restrictions on domestic fuel consumption after a decade in which it tried to use gas as a geopolitical weapon against Europe.
The shortages are spreading across the country, while Crimea has declared a state of emergency. Problems in ensuring adequate supplies are also recorded in other occupied regions of Ukraine, which citizens continue to leave due to unfavourable living conditions.
At the same time, the continuous Ukrainian drone and missile attacks against Russian refineries, fuel depots and supply networks are gradually limiting Moscow's ability to support its war machine and maintain conditions of stability at home. The turning point has not yet been reached, but the balance of power is gradually shifting in favour of Kyiv.
Whatever the final outcome of the war, it has already been greatly affected by the underperformance of the Russian army. The picture is even clearer in the economic field. Vladimir Putin may hold on to power, but Russia's economic foundations are steadily eroding.
Even if Moscow retains the Ukrainian territories it controls, it will hardly reap benefits capable of offsetting the human losses, economic costs, diplomatic isolation and industrial decline that have accumulated since 2022. Whatever form the "victory" takes in the Russian narrative, it will not be accompanied by the prosperity that the conquest of Ukraine once promised.
The crucial question is not only how the war will end, but what Russia will be like when hostilities stop. Prolonged volatility in one of the world's largest energy exporters will impact investment flows, supply chains, and energy prices from Vietnam to Ireland.
The military conflict may continue, but the economic and energy transition has already begun.
The big buyers of Russian energy
Even if sanctions are lifted after the war, Russia's credibility as an energy supplier will continue to cause serious reservations among investors. Europe, which has been the largest customer of Russian hydrocarbons for decades, is the most striking example.
The European Union has drastically reduced its dependence on Russian gas through pipelines, implementing policies to save energy, diversify suppliers and increase imports of liquefied natural gas.
While Russia still covered around 12% of Europe's gas needs in 2025, the EU officially banned imports of Russian gas from January 2026, with the aim of completely eliminating them by the end of 2027. In Brussels, there is no desire to return to the dependence that had made Europe vulnerable to Gazprom.
The United States has now emerged as Europe's largest supplier of LNG, accounting for approximately 63% of EU imports during the first quarter of 2026. Russia remained in second place with about 13%, while Nigeria overtook Qatar to take third place.
Qatar's position still depends on the safety of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. If the passage of ships is fully restored, competition for European LNG markets is expected to intensify.
In such an environment, trade needs could create limited scope for Russian gas to return to certain market segments. However, sanctions, infrastructure shortcomings and strong political reactions are not going to disappear with a simple ceasefire.
Russia's growing dependence on China
China looks set to take a different path. Throughout the war it proved that it could absorb much larger quantities of Russian hydrocarbons at no significant cost, but chose not to do so.
Beijing's calculation was clear: the fewer alternatives Russia has, the more it depends on China for financing, technology and political support. Russia's gradual integration into China's sphere of influence may be the most important long-term consequence of the war.
An increase in Chinese imports of Russian energy after a peace agreement was reached would not be a sign of solidarity with Moscow. It would mainly act as a means of strengthening Beijing's bargaining power.
As long as this imbalance is maintained, the scope for Chinese economic penetration in the Russian Far East and Eastern Siberia will widen. Unless there is serious political turmoil, which is considered unlikely as long as Putin remains in power, Russia will formally retain its sovereignty but gradually turn into an increasingly dependent partner of China.
How India can move
The case of India is different. New Delhi has dramatically increased imports of Russian oil, taking advantage of the large discounts offered by Moscow during the war.
The discounts, however, were the result of extraordinary circumstances and not a permanent feature of the market. As prices normalize and other producers increase their production, Indian refiners are expected to re-diversify their sources of supply on purely economic grounds.
Trade patterns that were in place before 2022 are likely to return, with India shifting more towards the Middle East and East Africa.
The new producers claiming a share
A peace agreement in Ukraine will not suspend competition in the global energy market. Damage to Russian infrastructure, the country's continued exposure to sanctions and political uncertainty create space for new competitors to emerge.
Even China, the most likely major buyer of Russian energy, has an interest in maintaining alternative sources of supply. In this way, it can contain prices and maintain its political influence in Moscow.
Namibia is developing its offshore energy projects, which are attracting strong international interest. Mozambique maintains significant prospects for expanding LNG exports, despite persistent security challenges.
Kazakhstan is strengthening its position as a reliable supplier to Eurasia while simultaneously seeking export routes that bypass Russia. Guyana has already developed into one of the world's most important new oil producers.
Venezuela may also continue its energy recovery following the capture of Nicolás Maduro by US military forces on January 3, 2026 and the assumption of the presidency by Delcy Rodriguez.
What companies may return to Russia
The companies with the greatest chances of returning to the Russian market, if peace and the lifting of sanctions allow, are those that still have significant "trapped" assets in the country.
BP failed to sell its 19.75% stake in Rosneft, as Russian law prevented its transfer. The British company thus retains a holding for which it has recorded an accounting impairment of about $25 billion. If the sanctions are lifted, the economic incentives to return will be particularly strong.
ExxonMobil recorded a write-down of $4.6 billion. after its effective withdrawal from the Sakhalin-1 project. In 2025, Putin signed a decree allowing foreign companies to regain shares in the holding company. According to the article, Exxon has already begun discreet talks with Rosneft about a possible comeback.
TotalEnergies, which held a 19.4% stake in Novatek and a 10% stake in Arctic LNG 2, is also considered a strong candidate for a return. Although it withdrew from the second project in June 2026, it still has other mining interests in Russia.
The French government has always adopted a softer stance towards Moscow than London or Washington. At the same time, the management of TotalEnergies appeared reluctant to completely sever its ties with the Russian market.
Shell, which gave up its 27.5% stake in Sakhalin-2 in 2022, recorded a write-down of about 5 billion. dollars. Norway's Equinor, with a 1.5% stake in Rosneft and a series of exploration licenses in the Arctic, diluted assets worth $1.08 billion. dollars.
Norway's geographical proximity and the two countries' long-standing energy cooperation in the Arctic make some form of rapprochement possible.
The companies that may move faster
Companies providing services in oil fields may move faster. SLB, formerly Schlumberger, Halliburton and Baker Hughes maintained an extensive presence in Russia prior to 2022.
The mature deposits of Western Siberia still need the advanced drilling and enhanced recovery technologies offered by these companies. If sanctions are eased, the trade incentives for a return will be strong.
For Washington, the question will be whether such a development serves the strategic interests of the United States or simply boosts Moscow's state revenues.
The market will not return in 2021
Peace in Ukraine, whenever it is achieved, will not automatically restore Russia's reputation. The country will emerge from the war more authoritarian or unstable, economically weaker, more dependent on China and much less reliable as an energy partner compared to 2021.
The damage to its reputation is not a communication problem but a structural one.
The global energy map has already changed. Supply routes have shifted, new trade relationships have been established and European governments have realised the cost of over-reliance on a single supplier of hydrocarbons.
Markets may stabilize, but they will not return to the reality of 2021. Russian supply will hardly dominate international markets in the same way again.
Companies wishing to return to Russia will continue to face political risks, complex sanctions regimes and significant reputational costs. These factors will slow down any reintegration effort, even in the most favourable scenario.
The energy geopolitics of the post-war period will not be about restoring Russia as an energy superpower, but about who will fill the void it leaves behind.
Forbes
