By Wesley Alexander Hill
On February 28, 2026, the conflict with Iran began after the US and Israeli attacks. Aimed at weakening Tehran's missile and nuclear programs, Operation Epic Wrath continues. The ensuing escalation hit power plants across the Persian Gulf and led to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.
The closure of Hormuz is not only a problem for global markets, but also a particular strategic "thorn" for China. 37% of the oil that passes through the Strait is destined for China. Hence scenarios that wanted China to take a more active role in the conflict to defend its economic interests were fuelled.
Despite the strategic partnership agreement with Tehran, Beijing has called for de-escalation, promised support for Iran and prioritized energy price stability at the expense of alliances and political agreements. The cautious statements and limited public positions on the conflict in the Middle East indicate the creeping tension between China and the US and the long-standing relationship between China and Iran, but also outline where Beijing will prioritize in the midst of an escalation of the war. Even the choice of words is indicative of the fact that Beijing has neither the economic incentive nor the strategic military room to risk for Tehran's sake.
Conflicting priorities: Sino-Arab vs. Sino-Iranian relations
When President Xi Jinping brokered the diplomatic normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023, China essentially took a position on Middle East events in a more impartial way. The main goal of this approach was not to support Iran, but to help stabilize the Gulf, which plays an important role in China's energy security. This was followed by a wave of optimism in Beijing and a... panic wave in the West: Chinese diplomacy could bridge the problems between Arabs and Iranians.
But this did not happen.
China-Iran and China-Arab relations, at the level they are today, prevent Beijing from supporting parties involved in the war, since it has ties not only with Tehran, but also with Israel and other Gulf countries. China is the largest oil consumer for many Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia, and is much more dependent on Arab oil than on Iranian oil. Although China coordinates with Iran to buy crude, it is essentially more dependent on the Gulf. About 50% of the oil imported by China comes from Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia, and just 17% from Iran. The Sino-Arab supply chain is "translated" into more than 4 million. barrels of crude per day imported into China, while Iranian oil numbers 1.38 million. barrels.
The risk to Beijing's military reputation
China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi has called for a ceasefire and has opposed attacks on Iran. However, Chinese support for Iran is limited to rhetorical statements. This reluctance to intervene is partly due to China's military situation. The performance of Chinese air defense systems exported abroad is controversial in terms of its power. In the past decade, China has not sold advanced air defense systems to Iran. The ones it has sent to Tehran, like the older generation drones and UAVs, do not particularly stand out for their performance. So far, Chinese air defense systems have not intercepted a single Israeli, American or Arab aircraft.
These are air defense systems that may be more affordable, especially compared to Western ones, but there are gaps in their effectiveness and power. China is an alternative to supplying weapons systems to states such as Iran, but it mainly uses diplomacy as a strategy rather than military escalation. If China becomes involved militarily in the Middle East conflict, given that its military equipment may not achieve the desired results, its military reputation is at risk if gaps and defects in its military equipment are revealed.
Taiwan and the People's Liberation Army are priorities
China's military priorities lie elsewhere. On February 26, two days before the US and Israeli attack on Iran, the National People's Congress of China (NPC) decapitated ten officers of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), as part of the "permanent" purge of the Chinese army. Between liquidation and restructuring, China has its internal issues and reforms to focus on, which limits it to intervening abroad, even in the case of the US-Israel conflict with Iran.
At the center of Chinese interest is Taiwan. The war in the Middle East does not supplant the importance that Taiwan has for Beijing. China does not want to distract itself from this issue. Deploying forces and resources in the Middle East would have limited benefits for Beijing and would not significantly change its relations with Iran.
China may benefit most from the fact that the United States, Israel and various of their Arab allies will be embroiled in a war, or even an uncertain peace, in the Middle East. It will give Beijing the ability to pressure Taiwan as it pleases, while testing US commitments. Even if the alliance fighting Iran achieves its goals, this does not mean that energy exports to China will be stopped.
Between its relations with Iran and Arab states and its prioritization of conflicts closer to its territory, China is adopting a cautious stance, betting on U.S. failure rather than taking action to lead Washington to failure. Although she has called for a de-escalation of tensions and has condemned US and Israeli attacks on Iran, her rhetoric is not incendiary. The prioritization of its interests is the main factor in China's decision-making, as stability in the Persian Gulf and securing the flow of hydrocarbons are more important issues. The possibility of exposing gaps in its military equipment, its interest in Taiwan, and military purges inside the country also play a significant role. As the war escalates and continues, China will likely remain — nominally — an ally of Iran.
