HOW RUSSIA CAN LEVERAGE TRUMP'S GEOPOLITICAL RISK IN IRAN - Filenews 4/3
By Natasha Lindstaedt
Just as former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad learned that his friendship with Russia had its limits, so did the Iranians.
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov offered Iran sympathy and... rhetorical support after the US and Israeli attacks, but nothing more. Chatham House, the international affairs think tank in London, describes Moscow's approach as a "counterbalance strategy", which does not want to get too involved, but remains in constant contact.
The US and Israeli attacks on Iran come a year and a half after the signing of the 20-year cooperation treaty between Russia and Iran. However, the agreement did not include a military alliance or a commitment to mutual military assistance. Even during Israel's "12-Day War" with Iran last June, Moscow did not have the resources or interest to contribute to the Iranian regime's military defenses.
At first glance, the US and Israel will be the main beneficiaries of the war with Iran, while Russia is increasingly marginalized. If the Iranian regime emerges from this conflict intact, but seriously weakened and forced to conclude a deal with the US, then Moscow could lose some of its influence not only in Iran, but also in the wider region. After all, Russia has already lost some of its influence in Syria after the fall of Assad, having a more limited role under the new leader Ahmed al-Saraa.
If the Iranian regime collapses completely—whether it is plunged into chaos or replaced by a government less friendly to Moscow—Russia risks losing many investments, including a multibillion-dollar rail line connecting the two countries, and a $25 billion deal. to build four nuclear reactors in southern Iran. In addition, Russia had planned to expand its presence in the Iranian oil and gas industry.
However, it is unclear whether the loss of powerful allies in the Middle East is a decisive blow to Russia's influence. Although Moscow lost its investments in Syria and millions of dollars in loans it had granted to the Assad regime, it has essentially lost a "problematic" ally. Putin had repeatedly tried to persuade Assad to be more conciliatory with his neighbours and the opposition. To no avail.
Even after the fall of Assad, Russia remains a major player in the region. It is strengthened by the loans it has granted, but also by the supply of weapons to Middle Eastern states. Russia still has bases in Syria, albeit with restrictions. Initially, the status of these bases was uncertain, but the high-level contacts between Putin and Al Saraah had a positive outcome for Moscow.
Moscow is no longer dependent on Tehran
According to reports, the death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was a hard blow to Putin. In addition to the Russian president's personal relationship with Iran's former supreme leader, Moscow's cooperation with Tehran was mutually more beneficial compared to its relationship with Damascus. Iran's assistance in Russia's conflict with Ukraine has been invaluable. In the early stages of the invasion, the Russians were heavily dependent on Iranian-made Shahed drones. From 2023 onwards, Russia is able to produce drones almost identical to the Shaheds, on a large scale, at various facilities in Russia's Special Economic Zone in the Republic of Tatarstan.
Iran has provided Russia with useful know-how on how to continue exploiting its oil and gas despite sanctions. However, Russia no longer needs Iran's guidance on how to circumvent economic constraints, as it has found its own alternative networks and learned how to operate a huge shadow fleet of oil tankers. Thus, Russia is much less dependent on Iran.
How Russia can benefit from Trump's war on Iran
The U.S. and Israel's war with Iran can benefit Russia in several ways. First, oil prices are rising. More than 20% of the world's oil and gas exports pass through the Strait of Hormuz and, after the start of the war, the Iranian authorities ordered the ships to make a U-turn. The closure of the Strait could bring market turmoil and drive up oil prices, which favours Russia. Oil and gas make up 45% of Russia's federal budget, and rising oil prices will relieve the Russian economy while also financing the conflict with Ukraine.
Second, Iran has agreed with Russia to purchase 500 Verba portable launchers and 2,500 surface-to-air missiles in order to defend itself against air attacks. Verba launchers can only hit aircraft at low altitudes, which makes it difficult for them to effectively counter US or Israeli attacks. Iran will continue to want Russian weapons. Russia has been and remains Iran's main arms supplier, accounting for 1/3 of all arms imports into the Islamic Republic since 1979. Russia benefits from these sales, as they provide the Kremlin with significant revenue.
Third, a protracted U.S.-Iran conflict carries the risk of depleting stockpiles of specific U.S. munitions, such as the PAC-3 MSE interceptor missiles that launch Patriot systems and the APKWS missiles used to shoot down Shahed drones. Such a development would undermine the ability of the US to continue to support Ukraine militarily – another benefit for Moscow. It should be noted that Volodymyr Zelensky has acknowledged that developments in the Middle East will have a direct impact on Kiev's peace talks with Moscow.
Although Russia appears to have more to lose than gain from Trump's attacks on Iran, the Kremlin has found ways to make the most of the climate of uncertainty that is growing globally. Moscow may once again adapt and hedge risks, leveraging the turmoil to serve its own strategic goals.
