Filenews 19 February 2026
By David A. Deptula
I recently participated in a discussion at the Atlantic Council that addressed a critical issue: the impact of Vladimir Putin's ongoing disinformation campaign. What are the data from the Russia-Ukraine war compared to what we are told?
War is not only fought on the battlefield. But also at the level of perceptions and narratives that affect political will and economic expectations.
Putin understands this. His strategy depends less on success on the battlefield and more on convincing the world, especially the United States, that Russia's victory is inevitable, that support for Ukraine is futile, and that realistic Americans would behave intelligently if they prepared for a profitable normalization of the situation than for a protracted confrontation. As Kaja Callas warned at the Munich Security Conference: "Right now Russia is threatening more with what it wins at the negotiating table than with what it has achieved on the battlefield."
The seemingly inevitable Russian victory is not a fact. It's a narrative. And when compared to reality, the narrative collapses.
What is really happening in Ukraine
On the military side, it is a gruelling war of attrition, where Ukraine continues to resist and prevent Russia from achieving its strategic goals, despite the enormous pressure it is under.
At the strategic level, Russia sought to quickly seize Kyiv, overthrow the government of Ukraine, "integrate" the country into its sphere of influence, and split NATO. None of these goals have been achieved. Kiev remains the capital of a sovereign Ukraine. Its government is functioning. NATO is bigger and stronger than it was before the invasion.
Five years ago, who would have imagined that Finland and Sweden would join NATO. Today, both countries are members of the North Atlantic Alliance. I recently visited the American air base where Finnish pilots are trained on F-35s and inspected the first Finnish aircraft. A fact unthinkable before Putin's invasion of Ukraine.
At the operational level, Ukraine has contained Russian ground forces on a front spanning about 1.000 kilometers. It has neutralized Russia's effective use of the Black Sea and deprived it of supremacy in the skies over Ukrainian territory, even though the Russian Air Force was considered modern.
The ratio of losses that Russians and Ukrainians have on the battlefield is in favour of Kyiv, from 2.5:1 to 7:1. Even when Russian forces are advancing a few kilometers, they do so at a huge cost in manpower.
The number of victims confirms two realities: First, Russia is willing to pay a heavy price, sacrificing human lives, in order to gain territory. Secondly, time favours Moscow only if Ukraine's defense weakens faster than Russia's manpower and production base.
This is the dominant dynamic of this war. It doesn't have quick twists. The key factors are endurance, industrial capacity and political will. The Russian narrative speaks of an "inevitable" final victory, but the battlefield shows attrition without dynamics.
Ukraine's will is not in doubt. The uncertain variable is the determination of the West.
Losses, conscription and a regime committed to war
Russia's levels of losses—the highest since World War II, according to reliable estimates—show that Moscow is giving lives to take time without achieving significant results. Large losses combined with small territorial gains suggest limited flexibility and adaptation, and reliance on brute force.
Recruitment patterns reinforce this image. Russia has recruited convicts, debtors, and foreign mercenaries. The Kremlin spends more rubles on compensating the families of soldiers killed in combat than on paying the salaries of active duty personnel or recruiting new soldiers. All these are not indicators of sustainability, but of pressure.
Of course, Putin is not only fighting for territory. He is also fighting for his political survival.
By presenting the invasion as an existential issue for Russia, he has turned it into an existential issue for himself. Putin does not have much political room not to present the course of the war in Ukraine as a success. The more the war continues, the more the legitimacy of his regime is questioned. And this explains why Moscow is willing to absorb large losses. Ending the war without tangible benefits risks exposing the enormous human and economic costs that have been borne by Russia.
Therefore, what we see is not the profile of a winner. But a regime that sacrifices lives to gain time, hoping that Western fatigue, political divisions or economic temptations will offer it what achievements on the battlefield have failed.
The economic narrative
Moscow's economic relations with Washington seem to improve, especially if the war is resolved on terms favourable to Russia. The conclusion is clear: Russia can be both an adversary and an opportunity. If the war ends on acceptable terms, U.S. companies may regain access to energy and other natural resources, and their trade relations with Russia will be warmed.
It's a strategic framework designed to appeal to those who prioritize trade deals and financial performance. The implication is clear: Why continue costly support for Ukraine, when the normalization of the situation could bring economic benefits?
But this argument is based on the same illusion as the narrative of the "inevitable" Russian victory.
First, Russia is not negotiating from a position of strength, but from a position of deadlock. Second, what Putin offers as an economic "opportunity" is, in fact, the result of geopolitical pressure exerted by the West. It is a lever of pressure, not cooperation. Third, rewarding aggression by restoring relations would send the wrong message to the world – particularly to Beijing – that military power can bring not only territorial gains, but also economic normalization.
Putin is trying to offset the "inevitable" with the opportunity. This is psychological pressure that is "marketed" in commercial language.
The narrative does not replace the dynamics
Some argue that Putin's greatest advantage is the mastery of the narrative – that by imposing the "story" of inevitable victory, Russia aims to shape negotiations independently of the reality on the battlefield. The narrative matters. But a narrative without dynamics is propaganda.
Putin is betting that Russia will be able to absorb the costs of war for a longer period of time than the West – that democracies will get tired, that business interests will push for normalization, and that political leaders will choose short-term economic engagement over long-term strategic stability.
The West can make this assessment prove wrong.
Russia's weaknesses are real. Its human resources are under pressure. Its economy is increasingly militarized and has weaknesses. Sanctions have restricted access to technology and capital. And its strategy is based on the belief that the infrastructure that supports the war remains largely unscathed. As long as the United States and European allies do not provide Ukraine with the means to challenge Moscow's beliefs, the Kremlin will continue to have the illusion that it can endure.
Peace by force requires real strength
For Putin to be led into serious negotiations, he must face a cost he cannot bear. So far, U.S. policy has focused on avoiding escalation rather than determining developments decisively. This approach has helped Ukraine avoid defeat. But it has not created the conditions for victory.
Peace by force only works if it has real grounds.
Which means that we should equip Ukraine so that it has the ability to attack for a long time to come, with advanced weapons systems that can hit command centers, logistics infrastructure, energy infrastructure, resources that support the war, and so on.
The strategic message
The way in which this war ends will shape events outside Europe as well. If Russia's aggression is rewarded with normalization and a profitable revival of trade relations, the lesson for China—and other revisionist powers—will be clear: just endure the sanctions, absorb the losses, manipulate the narrative, and your goals will be met.
If aggression is met with sustained resistance and failure to achieve objectives, the deterrence of future attacks will be strengthened.
Militarily, Ukraine has already refuted the Russian narrative of "inevitable victory". What remains uncertain is whether the United States and its allies will allow economic temptation and "narrative" to replace the strategic clarity and values shared by people in the free world.
The events tell a different story than the one told by Moscow — a story of tension, attrition and weakness.
History will remember which version we chose to believe — and follow.
