Filenews 26 January 2026 - by Xenia Turki
A year ago, when the regime of Bashar al-Assad fell, the Syrian Kurds seemed to be closer than ever to their dream of autonomy. But clashes in recent weeks between Kurdish forces and government forces in Damascus have brought significant upheavals. The ceasefire agreement reached, if fully implemented, would likely mark a definitive end to Syrian Kurds' hopes for political autonomy and would be a huge political victory for the country's leader, Ahmed al-Saraa.
In his interview with "fileleftheros", Zenon Tziarras, Lecturer at the Department of Turkish and Middle Eastern Studies, University of Cyprus, explains that we have reached the point today where the Kurds are retreating from areas that were under their control. As he said, despite the initial integration agreements after the fall of the regime of Bashar al-Assad and US mediations, negotiations between the two sides collapsed due to conflicting demands, pressure from the PKK and internal rifts in the SDF itself. This has led to armed conflicts, loss of territory for Kurdish forces, and ultimately, to an agreement that amounts to their capitulation and the strengthening of control over Damascus. In addition, the risk of a new cycle of violence remains real.
This is an important development that affects the entire region. The instability in Syria is shifting the balance between Turkey, Israel and the US, with Ankara indirectly supporting developments in favour of Damascus and Israel taking advantage of sovereignty vacuums. These developments also have indirect consequences for Cyprus, which is called upon to balance its relations with the US and Israel, while at the same time monitoring the risk of new refugee flows in case of further destabilization of Syria.
Ahmed al-Sharaa has completed one year in power. What is the current situation in Syria? Have the hopes of the Syrians for better days after Bashar al-Assad come to fruition?
More than a year after the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad, Syria remains in a post-war, transitional and unstable situation with significant power and legitimacy gaps. Despite the lifting of sanctions, the economy remains fragile with high levels of poverty, poor humanitarian conditions and food insecurity, among others. For the Sunni majority and beyond, the overthrow of Assad has brought an air of hope and change that for many has already changed the climate on a psychological and social level. For other communities in Syria, such as Kurds, Druze and Alawites, the scene remains precarious. The tensions and conflicts between the new regime and other pro-regime forces with all these communities call into question – for many – the declared effort of the transitional government for an inclusive state. However, despite the outbreaks of violence, the new regime has so far functioned more pragmatically than many expected, repeatedly showing a willingness to conciliate with the leaders of the other communities. First, pro-regime jihadist groups remain imponderable and destabilizing factors, which in most cases are not controlled by the regime and act criminally and violently. Second, the sectarian tendencies of decentralization created during the war were reinforced by the involvement of third powers, such as Turkey, Russia, Iran and Israel, and raise obstacles to the unification of Syrian sovereignty. There is still a long way to go before we can talk about a stable, prosperous and auspicious Syria.
When the Syrian civil war began, many analysts spoke of the country's dismemberment into three or even four regions. How likely is this scenario today?
-Despite the rapid developments in the country, nothing is over yet – the situation is extremely dynamic. However, the chances or extent of territorial fragmentation are now more limited than they were a year ago. This is mainly due to the collapse of the Kurdish-controlled Autonomous Administration of Northern and Eastern Syria (ADVAS, otherwise known as Rojava). Without ruling out the maintenance of an administrative structure controlled by the Kurds in specific cities in the northeast, their dream of autonomy no longer exists in the way they envisioned it in the context of federalization. Of course, the dynamics of decentralization remain in relation to other communities, especially those of the Alawites in the west and the Druze in the south. The aim of the new regime and the declared purpose of foreign powers such as the US and Turkey is to avoid the federalization of the country. However, no one can guarantee that the open intercommunal issues will be closed easily, bloodlessly and serving the plan for a united Syria. Already the clashes between the regime and the Kurdish forces foreshadow a course with obstacles.
What is the background of the new regime's relations with the Syrian Kurdish forces? The recent clashes were a bolt from the blue;
The clashes between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the (pro) regime forces were not a bolt from the blue. In March last year, mediated by the Americans and the French, the new transitional government and the SDF signed an agreement in principle. It provided for the integration of the ADVAS Autonomous Region into the new Syrian government, including the military and civilian structures of the SDF, while allowing them to maintain de facto control over border crossings and oil fields in Kurdish areas. A supplementary agreement in April, also with US involvement, established a common security framework for two Kurdish enclaves in Aleppo province, which would remain under the control of ADVAS security forces. Although the implementation horizon was August 2025, the negotiations did not work, mainly due to pressure from the PKK and its Syrian branches for more claims and refusal to integrate into the new state. The convergences, however, were reaffirmed by a new agreement last October that provided for the consolidation of Kurdish political rights and the recognition of Kurdish as a national language through a constitutional revision, along with arrangements for the integration of the structures of the SDF and the security forces of ADVAS into the Ministries of Defense and Interior. However, the SDF returned with new demands, such as that regime personnel should not have access to northeastern Syria, that there be independent recruitment for their forces, that their divisions control the borders with Turkey and Iraq, and that their personnel coordinate the communication part of the Ministry of Defense. These have already created conditions of intransigence, divergence and competition.
– How the negotiation effort for integration turned into an armed conflict;
When the deadline of December 25 for the implementation of the integration agreement expired, clashes broke out between the regime and the SDF in Aleppo. Mediated by the US, there was an agreement to evacuate Aleppo from the SDF forces, but local Kurdish units, operating largely autonomously, refused to leave. This was followed by the advance of the regime and the complete occupation of the Kurdish enclaves. Subsequently, on the basis of the same agreement, the SDFs were completely withdrawn from the territories west of the Euphrates, which passed under the control of the regime, which proceeded further east, occupying important oil fields. Developments have been accelerated by internal dynamics in the FMS. The SDF was created in 2015 with American input as an attempt to "rebrand" the PYD/YPG (Syrian branches of the PKK) in order to appease Turkish opposition to U.S.-Kurdish cooperation against the Islamic State. Although the leadership was maintained by Kurds of the YPG, Sunni groups and Arab tribes joined the SDF, mainly motivated by wages, education and common perceptions of threats (Islamic State and Turkey). Recent events have highlighted divergences between hardliners and pragmatists, but also between Kurds and Arabs, while the withdrawal of Arab tribes (with thousands of fighters) from the SDF that sided with the regime was catalytic. Since many areas controlled by the SDF were majority Arab (with the exception, to the east, of areas such as Kobani, Qamishli and Hasakah), the regime forces were in many cases warmly received. Finally, the regime has begun to coordinate returns of displaced Arabs from northwestern Syria (e.g. Afrin, Idlib) to their areas of origin in eastern Syria.
– The claim that the Americans abandoned the Kurds is justified.;
-Yes and no. The Americans had made great efforts to persuade the SDF to implement what had been agreed and had already informed them in early January that they had to leave western Syria and withdraw to the east. From the American point of view, however, the SDFs from March 2025 onwards worked counterproductively to the mediation efforts for the integration framework, retreating from what was agreed and demanding more.
At the same time, the SDFs have shown ambiguous tendencies over time in relation to American interests. They developed relations with Iran and procured weapons from it, but also - according to reports - integrated up to ten thousand personnel from the Assad regime's army. Indicatively, in the fighting in Aleppo, the Assad "Azrael Regiment" announced the loss of four of its fighters fighting with the SDF. Given the U.S. pursuit of disengagement from Iraq and Syria and relations with Syria's new transitional regime — due to its contribution, along with Turkey, to limiting Iranian-Shiite and Russian influence — the SDF's goals for federalization did not coincide with Washington, Damascus, and Ankara's pursuit of a united Syria. In addition, for the US, the PKK is a terrorist organization and its interventions created a lot of problems with Turkey, which threatened several times with new military intervention. The inability of the SDF to distance themselves from the PKK and to mitigate their claims contributed - in connection with the above - to the US, through its special envoy Tom Barrack, declaring that its role has "ended".
A new cycle of violence is possible
How did we arrive at the most recent agreement and what is its importance? Do you think it can last a long time or will we soon see new conflicts?
The advance of regime forces – which are neither homogeneous nor fully controlled by the regime and include jihadist groups – combined with US pressure, led to the 14-point agreement of January 18. The agreement provided for a ceasefire and withdrawal of the SDF east of the Euphrates, with Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor (along with their institutions) coming under the full control of Damascus, as well as border crossings and key oil and gas fields. It also provided for individualized (after screening) integration of SDF members into the Ministries of Defense and Interior, transfer of responsibility for Islamic State prisoners to Damascus, recognition of Kurdish cultural/linguistic rights, removal of non-Syrian PKK officials, and steps for the return of displaced persons. It was essentially a capitulation and proof of the failure of the SDFs to safeguard their interests. Two days later, at a meeting between Damascus-SDF-Tom Barak of the US envoy for Syria, the head of the SDF, Muslim Abdi, refused the position of deputy defense minister or to propose a candidate for governor for Hasakah due to pressure from PKK circles and asked for a five-day deadline, which al-Saraah rejected. The fighting continued with violations of the truce on both sides, followed by a new ceasefire with a four-day deadline in the SDF (until January 24) to draw up a plan for the integration of Hasakah, with a commitment not to intervene by the regime in Kurdish villages and in the cities of Hasakah and Qamishli. If implemented, the worst may be avoided, although guerrilla warfare by Kurdish forces that disagree is not ruled out. If rejected, a new cycle of violence is possible with a more active role for Turkey.
Nicosia's role is constructive – Difficult to handle
How does Turkey's involvement affect Israel's security calculations in Syria? Does Israel take advantage of the absence of Syrian state sovereignty in a large part of the country?
-It is interesting that on January 6, a meeting between Israel and Syria took place in Paris under the supervision of the USA. The two sides agreed to avoid hostilities and explore cooperation on security and trade issues. According to information that has come to light from multiple sources, Damascus received at that meeting the consent of the US and Israel to advance on SDF territory. Israel denies the information, but has not shown any reaction to the events taking place in eastern Syria, although it considers the SDF an allied force, in contrast to its dynamic intervention in southern Syria, in favour of the Druze community. If the information is true, questions are raised regarding possible quid pro quos that Israel received from Damascus which may concern southern Syria, the Golan Heights and beyond. Israel has taken advantage of the country's sovereignty gaps and expanded its military presence in the Golan Heights, on the border with Lebanon and inside Syria, supporting specific Druze armed forces against the new Syrian regime. In any case, while the developments in eastern Syria - which work in Ankara's favour - are fuelling the existing Turkish-Israeli rivalry, it is obvious that intensive efforts are being made by the US to normalize Syria-Israel and Israel-Turkey relations.
How and to what extent is Turkey involved in the recent conflicts?
Paradoxically, Turkey's involvement has so far been limited to political-diplomatic and air support with drones in various phases of operations. But it is possible that the mobilization of PKK/YPG fighters from Syria and northern Iraq to put up resistance will trigger a more active and fierce involvement of Turkey.
And in what way does the instability in Syria affect Cyprus?
To the extent that developments destabilize Syria and strengthen regional tensions between Turkey and Israel, Cyprus continues to find itself in dilemmas. On the one hand, it wants to maintain good relations with the US, which supports the regime, on the other hand, it maintains strategic relations with Israel, which is in competition with it. Nicosia's role needs to be constructive, but handling it will be difficult indeed. In relation to the humanitarian situation, the conflicts have created some waves of internally displaced persons, most of whom have already returned to their homes. The derailment of the situation may create new refugee flows at a time when many Syrian refugees around the world had already started to return to their country.
