Filenews 12 December 2025
By Kamran BokharioI
The US has gone beyond the framework of the post-war period that for a long time was a guide for the management of international affairs. The National Security Strategy of the second Trump administration formalizes a strategic shift that has gained momentum since the end of the Cold War, codifying Washington's intention to readjust its global role. Transferring primary responsibility for security to regional allies and partners may address the limitations of the 21st century, but it will create new vulnerabilities and spillovers that Washington cannot fully foresee. As the United States moves forward in implementing this geostrategy, the national security apparatus must strengthen its institutional strategic foresight capability – a critical capability for anticipating risks, identifying points of influence, and effectively implementing policies in an international environment characterized by uncertainty and shifts in power dynamics.
The 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy, unveiled on December 5, captures three pillars that redefine Washington's stance on a global level. First, Washington is reconciling itself to the fact that it cannot exert its influence uniformly across the globe and is focusing its attention and resources on the regions and issues that directly affect its long-term security and economic position. Second, it seeks to prevent instability by expanding geo-economic cooperation with both partners and adversaries, using markets, investments, and supply chain architecture as tools to manage competition. Third, it aims to drastically reduce U.S. exposure to protracted land wars by shifting military focus toward maritime space, where control of sea lanes and strategic points is crucial for U.S. and international security.
A month after the start of President Donald Trump's second term, I argued in an article that the United States is in the process of a historic revision of its foreign policy, in response to the geopolitical forces that have developed over the past three decades. I noted that any change of such scale inevitably leads to a long, chaotic, worrying and dangerous transition, as traditional institutions and assumptions resist strategic realignment. However, such "turmoil" is inevitable, because dealing with emerging threats with means designed for bygone eras is unsustainable and, in essence, dangerous. I also underlined that, despite the "turmoil", the current situation is paradoxically favourable for Washington, as its two main adversaries, China and Russia, remain preoccupied with deep internal and external pressures.
Trump's National Security Strategy identifies the Western Hemisphere and Asia as the two priority regions. It is worth noting that both are connected by the main sea routes crossing the Pacific basin. By placing the Eurasian mainland at the center of its strategy, Washington recognizes that it can better maintain global security by focusing its attention on areas where its comparative advantages are greater. While allies and partners are assuming greater responsibility on the ground, the United States remains the only power capable of truly deploying a global naval force – a necessary asset to North America's security and the shaping of the international system.
As for Europe, most observers have focused on the National Security Strategy's reference to a continent "mired in deep economic, political and cultural decline, which calls into question its long-term credibility as an ally, unless these structural trends are reversed." Not due attention has been paid to the document's assessment that Europe has sufficient conventional forces to counter Moscow's threat without direct US military superiority. Therefore, Washington sees no reason to continue shouldering most of Europe's defense burden. On the contrary, he envisions the transition to a more supportive, rather than leading, role. However, before making this transition, the United States must use its diplomatic weight not only to end the war in Ukraine, but also to restore strategic stability between the Kremlin and European states.
The National Security Strategy argues that the Middle East no longer demands the top strategic priority it once had. U.S. energy independence, global diversification of energy supplies, and broader geopolitical shifts have downgraded the region from its central role in U.S. national security. Although the conflicts continue, against the backdrop of Iran, whose path remains highly uncertain, Washington believes that the threats have been significantly mitigated and that an effective policy requires cooperation with regional partners "as they are", rather than trying to reshape their political systems. The Middle East is increasingly seen as a place of investment, technological cooperation and geo-economic influence, which will require careful management of the regional balance of power between its key allies: Turkey, Israel and Saudi Arabia – an extremely difficult task.
While the National Security Strategy streamlines US foreign policy priorities, it is shaped by the Trump administration's "gaze" on "what America should want". Section II of the report is entirely devoted to the formulation of these ambitious objectives. What ultimately matters, however, is the set of goals that Washington can realistically achieve within the existing capabilities, constraints and geopolitical realities. It is therefore remarkable and strategically enlightening that the next section of the report focuses on the practical means and possibilities available to implement this emerging geostrategy.
The document underlines that stable relations with other states are a prerequisite for the smooth functioning of world trade. In order to minimize the risk of conflict, Washington declares that it will no longer pursue large-scale efforts to democratize authoritarian regimes. This means that the U.S. recognizes that past efforts to promote domestic political change have failed and been extremely costly.
The most important political dilemma is how to prevent adversaries from exploiting the transition period as the United States seeks to build a new world order with an expanded role for its regional partners. Russia will likely try to take advantage of Europe's assumption of greater security responsibilities by creating "gaps" and testing the cohesion of the European bloc. Similarly, China has a strategic interest in limiting the ability of its East Asian allies to control the vast maritime expanse of the Western Pacific. In the meantime, Iran, with its revisionist ambitions, will seek to exploit the differences between Turkey, Israel and Saudi Arabia, and will try to manage these regional imbalances.
The United States is at a strategic crossroads: it seeks to abandon an 80-year-old system that is well past its expiration date, while its replacement will take a long time to complete. By delegating responsibility to competent regional partners, Washington is broadening its reach while accepting the inherent risks and uncertainties of common security. The ability to anticipate and act decisively will determine the extent to which this realignment will turn ambitions into lasting influence. If approached wisely, this juncture offers an opportunity to redefine American power for the 21st century, which must be flexible, resilient, and strategically dominant in the world's most important regions.
