Filenews 1 September 2025 - by Andreas Kluth
Now that all the hype surrounding this month's Ukraine summit has faded, it's time to take stock and think about the next steps. The first question is whether the performances given by US President Donald Trump in Alaska and Washington have improved, left unchanged, or worsened the overall situation, i.e. how to end Russia's war against Ukraine. The next question, if you're in Washington, is what America should do next.
So I asked Philip Gordon. He was Kamala Harris's top foreign policy adviser and, if she had won last year's presidential election, he would now be national security adviser, replacing Marco Rubio.
"We're in a worse position now than before" the summits, Gordon told me. Whatever pressure the Trump administration began to exert, albeit belatedly, on Russian President Vladimir Putin has been lost. Any concern Putin may have begun to feel about strengthening Trump's resolve to help Ukraine has been dispelled.
Trump came to the summits having given Putin a deadline to join a ceasefire, and even during his flight to Alaska he threatened "serious consequences" if this did not happen. Trump returned from Alaska having let the deadline expire without any noticeable consequences, arguing instead that the ceasefire is not necessary to start the talks.
Meeting Putin on the red carpet, Trump made several assumptions that turned out to be completely wrong. His special envoy, Steve Witkov, had visited Putin earlier and had somehow gotten the impression that the Russian leader also wanted peace and was ready to accept some, still undefined, security guarantees from the West for Kiev, in exchange for Ukrainian territory. On the contrary, the Russian Foreign Ministry clarified that it "categorically rejects" anything like this.
Before, during, and after the second summit in Washington, where he hosted Ukraine's Volodymyr Zelensky and seven other European leaders, Trump also caused a lot of confusion about the role America could play in any security guarantee scheme (excluding sending U.S. troops).
When the British, French, German and Finnish guests later asked the Pentagon for details, a government official said America would play only a minimal role. The Europeans concluded that the U.S. is "not fully committed to anything" and now has no idea "where this leaves us." Probably in the "worst world," Gordon believes: with "enough European forces on the ground to be in danger, but not enough to deter Russian attacks."
Even if Trump's immediate goal at the summits was simply to organize even more summits, it seems to have failed. He continued to give the impression that he had persuaded Putin to meet bilaterally with Zelensky in preparation for a "trilateral" meeting with Trump to sign a peace agreement. Niet, niet and niet, the Russians clarified after the Summits. Trump again threatened "very serious consequences" if the meeting did not take place. Almost exactly what he had said when he set the deadline for the ceasefire, which he then withdrew.
In an ideal world, the U.S. would now rally a united West to intensify support for Ukraine and exert maximum pressure (a term Trump uses for his approach to Iran) on Putin to force him to agree to a ceasefire that includes security guarantees for post-war Ukraine. guarantees stable enough to resemble NATO's notorious Article 5. But we don't live in an ideal world. In this world, the question is what the U.S., and especially Congress, can do as a second-best policy.
Gordon proposes that the Taiwan Relations Act be studied as a model. This law dates back to the 1970s, when the U.S. shifted its diplomatic recognition from the Republic of China (Taiwan) to the People's Republic. Combined with subsequent "communist" and "assurances," this legislation has enshrined U.S. policy toward the Taiwan Strait to this day. It's called "strategic ambiguity."
Just as the U.S. wants to avoid war with Russia over Ukraine today, since the 1970s it has been trying to avoid provoking communist China by pledging to defend Taiwan. Thus, the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) does not make such a commitment. It simply stipulates that any attempt by China to forcibly seize Taiwan will be a matter of "grave concern" to the United States. This leaves U.S. military intervention likely enough to deter China from attacking, but also unreliable enough to prevent Taiwan from declaring independence. At the same time, the law, official announcements, and assurances also commit the U.S. to equip Taiwan sufficiently to defend itself.
Gordon believes that, with some modifications, the U.S. could apply this model to Kyiv, based on a security agreement it has already signed with Ukraine last year. Such a law would not amount to a defense treaty similar to that of NATO. However, it would formalize the U.S. commitment to equip and supply Ukraine and leave open the possibility that the U.S. will intervene on its behalf in a future crisis. It could bypass the issue of sovereignty over Crimea or other territories subject to negotiation, just as the TRA law addresses the issue of sovereignty in greater China: with ambiguity.
I pointed out to Gordon that the two frameworks are different. The TRA was established when China was relatively weak and, under Deng Xiaoping's leadership, willing to avoid confrontation with the U.S. – that is, easy to prevent. Today's China, under Xi Jinping, may one day call the U.S. bluff, if it is a bluff. Putin can do the same, if he believes that his fate (which he confuses with Russia's) depends on victory in Ukraine and can even justify (as has been hinted) nuclear escalation.
Correct observation, Gordon replied, before reminding me that we are not talking about an ideal world, but about the chaos we find ourselves in today. In this context, the strategic ambiguity favouring Kiev, with the support of Republicans and Democrats in Congress, is far better than the strategic clarity of J DeVance's wing in the MAGA movement, according to which the U.S. would leave Ukraine long before it had to confront Moscow.
Even with such a law on relations with Ukraine, post-war Ukraine will have to remain forever ready to fight for its national survival, and NATO's European allies will have to become braver, as its potential cavalry. But at least the U.S. will have enshrined in law the commitment to stay there — without seeking war with Russia, but also without turning its back on Ukraine and Europe.
Rendering – Editing: Lydia Roubopoulou
