Filenews 11 July 2025 - by Hal Brands
Almost six months after the start of Donald Trump's presidency, a Trump Doctrine is beginning to emerge. Contrary to the fears of his critics and the hopes of some of his fans, Trump is not an isolationist. And unlike those who claim that Trump is just a wizard of ad hoc and inconsistency, there is a distinct pattern in the policies he has pursued.
This Trump Doctrine emphasizes the aggressive use of American power – more aggressively than Trump's immediate predecessors – to reshape key relationships and gain American advantage in a competitive world. In doing so, Trump has blown up any talk of a post-American era. However, he has also raised troubling questions about whether his administration can effectively wield America's oversized influence and keep it strong.
The label of isolationism has long followed Trump, but he has never accurately described this quirky man. Yes, Trump disregards key elements of U.S. globalization, from the international trading system that America created to the promotion of democratic values and its defense commitments around the world. However, Trump has also argued that America should more vigorously assert its place in a competitive world. And today, as Trump pursues a "spacious" conception of presidential power at home, he offers an equally ambitious conception of American power abroad.
Trump rails against long, costly nation-building efforts. But he has nonetheless waged two short, sharp conflicts in the Middle East: one to prevent Yemen's Houthis from attacking U.S. forces and Red Sea shipping, and the other to halt Iran's nuclear program. Several U.S. presidents have promised to use force to prevent Tehran from crossing the nuclear threshold — Trump has done so. This is not like the politics of a man who is a prisoner of the "Tucker Carlson wing" of the Republican Party.
Meanwhile, Trump has launched trade wars against dozens of countries in hopes of reshaping the international economy. He developed diplomatic influence, and explicit threats of withdrawal, to reshape the transatlantic agreement, convincing European allies to spend much more on defense. Trump also used America's power in innovation — its role in designing high-tech semiconductors — to bring Saudi Arabia and the UAE into Washington's tech bloc and make them partners in his quest for "artificial intelligence dominance."
Closer to home, Trump used veiled threats to wean Panama from China's Belt and Road initiative. It demanded territorial concessions from Panama, Denmark and Canada. At the same time, Trump is advertising the Golden Dome missile shield, intended to protect the homeland and give America greater freedom of action against its enemies.
This is not the usual American internationalism we have known since 1945: It is hard to imagine previous presidents telling the Allies to cede their territories. But this is not a retreat in "Fortress America" either. And by applying American power in such an energetic, all-powerful way, Trump has revealed much about the true state of international affairs.
Geopolitical journals are overflowing with articles about American decline and the advent of multipolarity. But Trump, in his own way, reminded many countries where power really lies. For example: The strike on Iran demonstrated America's unique global military reach and its ability, along with Israel, to reshape the Middle East, putting Russia and China – Iran's allies – on the sidelines.
Trump's basic finding is that the world's only superpower has more power than is usually realized. However, the Trump Doctrine suffers from three major problems.
First, its power exercise is weakened by a lack of strategy. Trump's trade war began in a feisty way, as he failed to take into account how skyrocketing tariffs could devastate the U.S. economy — he had to find out in real time and was forced into a rapid, humiliating retreat. A president who favours the art of agreement over consistency sometimes pursues contradictory policies: Trump's tariffs on allies in the Indo-Pacific are eroding their prosperity and making it harder for them to spend more on defense.
Second, a president who sometimes finds it difficult to distinguish friends from enemies sometimes fails to steer U.S. power in the right direction. Trump enjoys targeting U.S. allies. He is more reluctant to confront Russia, even as Vladimir Putin ridicules Trump's desire for peace in Ukraine — and even if Putin's war economy is increasingly vulnerable to the trade and economic coercion that Trump so often threatens to use.
Third, the best presidents build U.S. power for the future, but Trump risks depleting it. Perhaps the Big Beautiful Bill will boost the economy – or perhaps lock in structural deficits that constrain defense spending and growth. Cutting foreign aid saves little money but wastes U.S. global influence – the war on universities threatens the research ecosystem that underpins America's economic and military power. Moreover, a policy of "tough love" towards allies could turn into mutually destructive hostility, and a superpower that regularly coerces its friends could destroy the soft power that fertilizes these critical relationships.
Trump enjoys using U.S. power, but he doesn't understand exactly where it comes from. This is the central irony, and the fundamental weakness, of the doctrine that guides his government today.
*Brands is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, co-author of the book "Danger Zone: The Coming Conflict with China" and senior advisor at Macro Advisory Part
