Filenews 14 February 2025 - by Andreas Kluth
Donald Trump did not end Russia's war against Ukraine within 24 hours, as he promised during his election campaign. On the other hand, as usual, we probably shouldn't have taken it literally (or was it serious?). Now, however, it seems that he is preparing to close the matter. But he is about to run into a contradiction that he himself created. It is a dilemma that may doom his efforts.
In a phone call this week, Trump and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, agreed to begin talks to end the conflict. This followed Russia's release of an American wrongfully detained by Russia, which prompted Trump to comment that "there is goodwill when it comes to war."
The president also sent a team led by his vice president to the Munich Security Conference this weekend. Trump's person in charge of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, Keith Kellogg, will gather intelligence there to present Trump with negotiating options. It will be an extremely complex process.
Talks to turn bloodshed into a ceasefire are always difficult and painful – negotiations to end the Korean War (which resulted in an armistice rather than a peace treaty) lasted well over a year, during which the deaths continued. In the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the list of contentious points seems endless.
It begins with the clash of irreconcilable narratives: Russians continue to support Putin's fairy tale that Ukrainians are actually Russians who, misled by their "Nazi" leaders, forgot where they normally belong. Ukrainians, backed by international law and world public opinion, point out that they are a sovereign nation that Russia invaded, brutally and unprovoked.
Should Russia keep the land it conquered? To exchange some of them in exchange for the Russian territories currently occupied by Ukraine? And what about the many Ukrainian children the Russians have kidnapped (a crime for which the International Criminal Court wants Putin arrested). Above all, there needs to be some account of Russian atrocities committed since 2022.
The biggest obstacle to a deal, however, is Ukraine's postwar geopolitical identity. The country may officially be on track to join the European Union one day – this destiny offers cultural and economic benefits, but few military advantages. As for Ukraine's NATO membership, the Trump administration, along with several other allies, has for now ruled that out.
That leaves a bigger question unanswered: What security guarantee, other than NATO membership, can the West give Ukraine to prevent Putin from attacking again a few years later? It must be credible, not only to keep the Kremlin at bay, but also to reassure Ukrainians, who are still traumatized by hollow assurances given in 1994 by the US, UK and Russia in exchange for which Ukraine renounced Soviet-era nukes.
At this point, Trump has cornered himself. His entire foreign policy pitch, except for a vague claim to "power," is that he will end or prevent foreign wars and bring U.S. troops and dollars home rather than send even more overseas. But without sending American boots to the ground, or at least without providing the firepower and state-of-the-art munitions that America possesses and its allies lack, no security guarantee will be believable.
Here are some options that would rule out sending U.S. troops, from least to most convincing. Western Europe could station lightly armed "peacekeeping" troops in Ukraine, under the auspices of, say, the United Nations. That would amuse Putin, a man who doesn't think at all before threatening with his nuclear sabre. (A similar effort under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, between Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its 2022 invasion, made no impression on him at all.)
Alternatively, the Europeans could move to a more belligerent approach, deploying thousands of troops from various countries and some materiel. The idea behind this "trapping" strategy is that the Russians could attack and neutralize these forces, but then inflict "punishment" from the countries whose soldiers were hit.
This has long been NATO's approach to its eastern member states, particularly the Baltic states, where the Alliance stationed some troops, but not enough to repel an all-out Russian attack. Whether the threat of punishment is credible has always been debatable. In any case, the strategy assumes that, say, Estonia in the case of NATO, or Ukraine in a future scenario, will first be conquered, and rescued only later, if rescued. Kiev will not accept it.
This leaves a third option, called deterrence by denial. This means that there will be enough troops and weapons on or near the border to repel a Russian attack from the very first bullet. NATO is now trying to adopt this strategy for its member states, upgrading its combat forces from Finland to Bulgaria. It's also what Zelensky wants for Ukraine, because that alone would keep Putin away forever so Ukraine can rebuild.
The problem with a purely European deterrence force is both quantitative and qualitative. Zelensky asked for about 200,000 troops (who would have to rotate, requiring even more on standby). NATO's European members cannot even remotely send such a number of troops without damaging their internal defences. Also, European armies lack America's formidable surveillance capabilities, air and artillery power. Credible deterrence through denial without the US is impossible. That's why Poland, for example, said it would not send troops into Ukraine without American support.
Hence Trump's dilemma. It could probably bring peace to the conflict, but that would entail a huge American commitment and an apparent readiness to engage in another war, the opposite of what he has promised the Americans. Even the most ardent supporters of MAGA would rebel.
Or it could force Europeans to make peace, which would lack credibility. Ukraine would encounter obstacles to reconstruction, war could break out again, and more people would die and suffer. The Nobel Peace Prize that Trump desperately wants would be removed.
It is good that negotiations will finally begin. But conversations are just conversations. The biggest concern remains Putin. But the second biggest is Trump, who may not have understood the dilemma he faces. Even worse, he may be tempted, for the sake of a "victory" in the negotiation, to sell out Ukraine. As he said just this week, Ukrainians "may become Russians one day, or they may not become Russians one day." That's something I don't want an American president to think about, let alone express, when it comes to facing an adversary like Putin.
Performance – Editing: Lydia Roumpopoulou
