Filenews 5 September 2024 - by James Stavridis
Israel is at yet another strategic crossroads. The country was fiercely attacked last October by a relentless terrorist group. His military response, though at terrible cost to civilians in Gaza, was appropriate to the threat to his existence. He feels he is very close to achieving the destruction of Hamas as a credible war organization, probably within a few months.
The question for the Israelis is what comes next. What should be the military and diplomatic strategy for next year? For the next five years?
I know Israel well, having travelled there for the first time in 1980 as an officer on the American aircraft carrier Forrestal. During the four years I was military commander of NATO and the US European Command, one of my duties was to oversee the military relationship between the US and Israel. A decade ago, I travelled to Israel to oversee a wide range of military exercises, planning sessions, and real-world operations.
Given these experiences, many things stand out when I think of Israelis. The first is their stubborn resilience, sharpened by millennia of anti-Semitism and existential threat—the Israelis are not giving up. On the other hand, they are realistic, eager to recognize that achieving a perfect outcome is not always possible and that they must be willing to use their competent negotiation skills when necessary. And thirdly, they disagree a lot with each other.
The latter trend makes it difficult to devise long-term strategies – especially when elections can be held almost every year, such as between 2019 and 2022. But even with their fragmented politics, Israelis need to think about how to move forward while permanently on the brink of regional war. These are decisions for the Israelis, of course, not for the Americans. Sometimes, however, a strategic view from the outside can be useful for those who find themselves within the day-to-day grind of battle and focus on tactical and operational challenges.
There are two key elements of an effective long-term strategy for the Israelis: One is diplomatic and the other military.
The best strategic move is diplomatic: deepening Israel's alignment with the Arab world. The Abraham Accords, initiated by President Donald Trump's administration and bolstered by President Joe Biden's team, are the lower limit, not the upper limit, of Israeli-Arab camaraderie. These agreements brought recognition of Israel by four countries, including the United Arab Emirates, but not by the most important Arab state: Saudi Arabia.
Shortly before the October 7 attacks, it seemed that the outline of a strategic agreement between the US, Israel and the Saudis was taking shape. Hamas' invasion, though long planned, was undoubtedly planned to thwart these negotiations. Any such agreement would see the Saudis more or less accede to the Abraham Accords, recognize Israel, and enter into strong defense cooperation. It would also provide formal U.S. security guarantees to both the kingdom and Israel, and would include boosting nuclear power for the Saudis.
The reason why this should be the centerpiece of a long-term Israeli strategy is that it entrenches resistance to Iran. Tehran has spent two decades building a deadly string of more than a dozen proxy organizations focused on eliminating Israel: Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis in particular.
By exploiting the friction between Arab states and Iran, Israel can construct a much better barrier to Tehran's bellicose behaviour. It will benefit from excellent information sharing, missile defence and early warning capabilities, as well as special forces cooperation.
The second key element is military – and it is not, as some have argued, the attack on Hezbollah in Lebanon.
If Israel successfully weakens Hamas in the south, there will be a serious temptation to fight Hezbollah in the north. But that would be a big strategic mistake. An attack on Hezbollah by the Israel Defense Forces would almost certainly draw Iran into the conflict, including more ballistic missile and drone attacks like the one successfully repelled by Israel, the U.S. and other allies in April. It would be very difficult for Washington to stay out of such an open conflict. You'd expect U.S. auxiliary attacks against Iran's energy infrastructure, intelligence platforms, and naval forces. Combined U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities would be considered.
This conflict would not only be bad for the Middle East, but would likely cause cracks in the global economy, as oil and gas supplies would be immediately disrupted. The Iranians would likely blockade the Strait of Hormuz, the world's oil tap. The Houthis would redouble their attacks on the Saudi side of the Red Sea and likely attack oil and gas facilities in both the kingdom and the United Arab Emirates. Iranian proxy groups in Iraq would carry out attacks on Israeli and American targets.
So what should the Israelis do? Hybrid warfare. This would entail a sustained campaign of airstrikes targeting Hezbollah's leadership, special forces operations that would disable Hezbollah's offensive capabilities, cyberattacks against the terrorist group's financial and logistical chains, closure of land and sea supply routes between Iran and Lebanon, and information warfare that would try to drive a wedge between Hezbollah and Lebanon's ever-unstable government.
A similar approach against the Houthis is imperative. This should be closely coordinated with the US and NATO allies, who are outraged by the massive restriction of the Suez Canal and Red Sea shipping routes.
There is a middle ground between a return to the status quo before October 7 and an all-out regional war. The first key component is diplomatic and consists of upgrading the Abraham Accords to an "Abraham Alliance" – creating a strategic triangle between the US, Israel and the Arab world. The second is a military campaign of hybrid techniques against Iranian proxies. Tehran won't like that, but it's unlikely to launch a full-scale regional conflict on behalf of the Houthis and Hezbollah.
The strategic choices Israel makes in the coming months will be crucial to its long-term prospects — and to avoiding a war in the Middle East with global implications.
James Stavridis is a columnist for Bloomberg Opinion, a retired U.S. Navy admiral, former Supreme Allied Commander of NATO, and dean emeritus of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. He is also vice president of global affairs at the Carlyle Group. He serves on the boards of American Water Works, Fortinet, PreVeil, NFP, Ankura Consulting Group, Titan Holdings, Michael Baker and Neuberger Berman and has advised Shield Capital, a cybersecurity investor.
Performance – Editing: Stathis Ketitzian
