Filenews 20 February 2024 - by Stuart Anderson
The second "anniversary" of Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the ongoing crackdown on domestic critics suggest that Russian President Vladimir Putin remains unlikely to change course. To learn more about Russia, the future of the war, and Putin's plans, I interviewed Brian D. Taylor, a professor of political science at Syracuse University and author of the highly acclaimed book The Code of Putinism. Taylor, who responded in writing, is concerned about the death of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny, the long-term consequences of moving Russia's economy to a war footing and how Putin would interpret the end of U.S. military aid to Ukraine.
Stuart Anderson: Do you think the war is unfolding as Vladimir Putin expected?
Brian D. Taylor: Obviously not. He believed and was told by the army and its secret police that it would end quickly, that it was only a matter of days before the Ukrainian government was overthrown. A revealing detail was the deployment of police along with the military during the invasion in February 2022. The scenario was that the army would quickly capture Kiev and other major cities in the east of Ukraine, and police were there to deal with protesters, rioters and rebels. Putin and the Federal Security Service believed they had collaborators who would take power – instead, these people largely took the rubles and ran away.
The fundamental problem is that Putin does not understand that Ukraine is a nation made up of patriotic citizens determined to defend their country from submission to a foreign power. He thought the government was an American implant and not a genuine reflection of popular support. Putin still seems to believe this. Now, his goal is to transcend the West in general and the U.S. in particular, because he believes Ukraine will fall quickly without U.S. support.
Anderson: What were the most important short- and long-term economic effects of the war on Russia and the Russians?
Taylor: The most important short-term impact is the transition of the economy to a war basis. Military spending now stands at 7% of GDP. Much of the budget now goes to orders for military equipment and high salaries and "death grants" for soldiers and their families. The result is what economists have called "military Keynesianism" — an economic injection into the hand because of military spending.
The economy grew by 3% in 2023. The economic result is real, but also somewhat misleading, because building or refurbishing tanks that blow up months later in Ukraine counts as increased production, but does not create long-term benefits for Russians. In connection with the above, the increased expenditures, combined with the flight of about one million euros, are not the same. Russians of working age because of their opposition to the war or to avoid conscription have led to labour shortages, higher wages and rising inflation.
Some benefit from the war economy, even in macabre ways like "death grants" for their husbands or sons, while others face inflation and falling spending on things like health care. Finally, a key economic change is the significant cuts in European purchases of Russian hydrocarbons (oil, gas and coal), shifting Russian oil exports to buyers such as China and India.
The long-term economic consequences of the war are serious. First, Russia lost its most important export market in the past 50 years to its most important exports – oil and gas sales to Europe. It will probably never do it again, especially given the green transition underway in Europe. Asian countries cannot replace these revenues for Russia, especially for gas.
Second, even before the 2022 invasion, the Russian economy was stagnant and in dire need of investment and productivity growth. Government investment is now being made, but in the wrong sector (military) for long-term improvements to important infrastructure. Private and foreign investment has declined due to the war and sanctions. Although not as evident yet, sanctions over time are eroding the Russian economy's ability to modernize and grow, causing shortages of parts and machinery.
Finally, the exodus of young, highly educated and skilled workers also hurts long-term growth prospects. The Russian state, in a sense, is "stealing the future" to finance this war.
Anderson: Russia has opposed Western countries seizing its assets. How has the Russian government acted towards Western companies that invested in Russia and tried to pull out?
Taylor: In a word, like a mafia. They literally make these Western companies offers that they cannot refuse. The Russian government dictates the selling price of companies that leave, tells them who to sell to, introduces new punitive taxes and uses raids by authorities to terrorize companies. Sometimes, the godfather himself (Putin) is directly involved in these decisions. The Russian state makes money from these forced deals and keeps the Russian elite in order by handing out companies to favoured individuals.
It should be stressed, however, that these short-term profits have long-term costs for Russia's reputation as a place to do business. Will these Western companies, with some of the biggest brands in the world – McDonalds, Starbucks, Heineken and so on – want to do business in Russia again? This seems unlikely as long as Putin is in power.
Anderson: What is your reaction to the news of the death of Alexei Navalny?
Taylor: It's sad. Navalny was, of course, not perfect, but he had become Putin's main adversary thanks to his bravery, his charisma, his intelligence, his willingness to learn and adapt, and his determination. It represented for many the possibility of a better, freer, happier, more modern, democratic and European future for Russia. He understood that Russia had to become a parliamentary republic with a meaningful federal system. He disagreed with the invasion of Ukraine, insisted that Russia respect the internationally recognized 1991 borders and pay reparations to Ukraine for the horrific disaster.
Navalny is dead now because of Vladimir Putin. The decision to try to kill Navalny in 2020 with Novisk was almost certainly made personally by Putin. It was a kind of miracle – and thanks to the quick decisions of a pilot and several medical professionals and the courage of his wife Yulia – that he lived. When Navalny returned to Russia in 2021, it was Putin and his team who locked him up in harsh prison conditions, spending much of it in solitary confinement. Regardless of what happened on the day of his death (February 16), Navalny would be alive today without Putin's determination to destroy him. Putin rightly perceived Navalny as a great threat and probably hated him for his audacity in revealing to the world Putin's massive corruption and personal secrets (for example, about his mistresses).
Anderson: How did the war affect the Russian government's treatment of critics?
Taylor: State repression has increased massively, which we see most acutely in the assassination of Alexei Navalny.
But it's not just Navalny. Vladimir Kara-Murza, another Russian opposition activist who was poisoned in the past, is serving a 25-year prison sentence for speaking out against the war. Another prominent opposition politician, Ilya Yashin, is serving an eight-year prison sentence for disagreeing with the war. A young artist and activist, Sasha Skotsilenko, has been sentenced to seven years for changing some supermarket price tags with anti-war slogans. There are many other examples.
I would also like to mention the complete disappearance of independent media in Russia and the arrest of American journalists Evan Gershkovich of the Wall Street Journal and Alsu Kurmasheva of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.
Anderson: Can you explain the role that elections play in Russia?
Taylor: There is a lot of literature in political science on the role of authoritarian elections. I think the most important thing is that Putin has spent the last 25 years building a personal dictatorship in which alternatives to his power are not allowed to emerge and challenge him. The Kremlin controls most of the media, controls the police, special services and courts, controls the legislature and political parties, killed or threw in jail its most important political opponents, and so on.
Elections are a part of this system. Putin will obviously win the "elections" in March 2024, because this is not really an election but a massive creation of the impression that he is not contested. The presidential election is meant to show the rest of the elite that Putin has a legitimacy they don't have, to show those who oppose the regime that they are a minority and thus discourage them, and to show Russian citizens who are trying to forget politics most of the time that Putin is still there and inevitable. This is another round of coronation of the Tsar.
At the same time, elections test the system's ability and loyalty. The system takes this quite seriously as a "stress test" of the control of various levers of power.
Anderson: What does Putin think of the US?
Taylor: I think it's fair to say that he dislikes the US. Twenty years ago – he was in power less than five years at the time – he accused the US of supporting Islamist terrorists inside Russia with the aim of dividing the country, an accusation he repeated in his recent interview with Tucker Carlson. Seventeen years ago, he compared the U.S. to Nazi Germany. Therefore, this is nothing new. It's something he's been thinking about for a long time. His core belief is that the U.S. is a rogue hegemon that unfairly has too much international power and influence.
In Europe, he sees the US not as the leader of an alliance of (mostly) like-minded democracies, but as sovereign with his vassals. He believes that if he succeeds in overtaking the US on the Ukraine issue, Europe will be forced to agree on a new security order in Europe that gives Russia a dominant role.
Anderson: What are Putin's long-term goals in Ukraine?
Taylor: Putin is very clear about his goals — he wants Russian political control of Ukraine. He has repeatedly said that he considers it an artificial state. He was okay with the "virtual" independence of this state, as long as he did not exercise that independence and try to move away from the Russian trajectory of influence and join Europe politically and economically. When Putin speaks of "denazification" he means a pro-Russian puppet government, and when he speaks of "demilitarization" he means a Ukrainian army that is too weak to resist Russia.
Ironically, it was Putin's annexation of Crimea and the start of a war in Donbas in 2014 that cemented Ukraine's European direction. Until then, Russia had successfully manipulated Ukrainian elites to maintain Russian influence there. Now, through his own mistakes – in 2014 and even more so in 2022 – he has lost almost the entire Ukrainian people, who were perfectly fine with good relations with Russia, if they were on an equal footing.
It is worth remembering that the TV series that turned Volodymyr Zelensky into a star, "The Servant of the People", was about a (fictional) random Ukrainian president, and almost all the dialogues are in Russian, which was Zelensky's native language. Now, many Ukrainians avoid Russian as much as possible, and more and more people are now using the Ukrainian language.
At this point, Putin wants not only political control of Ukraine, but also recognition of the five regions of Ukraine that Russia illegally tried to annex. Note that this area is larger than Switzerland and Austria combined and is by far the largest land theft in Europe since World War II. I think he would like to take possession of areas like Kharkiv and Odessa, and completely cut off what is left of Ukrainian access to the Black Sea.
Anderson: How would Putin interpret the end of U.S. military aid to Ukraine?
Taylor: Putin will interpret the end of U.S. military aid as a clear victory for Russia and the beginning of the end for Ukraine. Putin told Tucker Carlson in the infamous interview earlier this month: "If you [the US] really want to stop fighting, you have to stop supplying weapons. It will be over in a few weeks." He is confident that Russia will win if the US stops sending military aid. It is already a fact that Congress' delay on military aid has forced the Ukrainian military to increasingly target artillery shells, and there is a risk that air defense missiles protecting Ukrainian civilians from Russian missile attacks will run out.
Several important things need to be emphasized about U.S. military assistance. First, it is not true that the US is doing more than our European allies. EU countries have provided more aid than the US and 22 European countries (including Poland, Germany and the UK) have provided more aid as a percentage of their economy than the US.
Secondly, more than €48 billion has been allocated by the European Union. USD 60 billion Dollars for Ukraine in the bill currently being delayed by House Speaker Johnson would actually be funding for the Pentagon — the bulk of it to buy new weapons for the U.S. military, to replenish U.S. military stockpiles, or to order weapons for Ukraine from U.S. companies that produce weapons in factories in the U.S. Most of the aid to Ukraine is spent in the US.
Third, the amount of U.S. aid to Ukraine over the past two years amounts to less than 0.16 percent of U.S. GDP. The Ukrainians are carrying out all the fighting and have suffered all the deaths and are destroying the Russian army with weapons manufactured in American and European factories.
