Thursday, October 27, 2022

CHINA MAY LEAVE TAIWAN FOR EAST RUSSIA

 Filenews 27 October 2022



By Craig Hooper

At the end of the Congress of the Communist Party of China, China's "absolute leader" Xi Jinping emerged more powerful than ever. Securing a third five-year term in the country's leadership, the remaining internal opposition was ritually expelled from the congress chamber. Xi's strong base has heightened concerns among the West, which expects the Chinese leader's tough approach to China's territorial ambitions to crystallize soon in a military conflict against Taiwan, a key link in the Pacific strategically important "first island arc."

The threat has been overstated. Although Party representatives adopted a new anti-Taiwanese rhetoric in the Communist Party's charter, the real opportunity for "territorial takeover" for China lies in the North, in the Russian Far East, where hundreds of thousands of Russian citizens with Chinese roots, effectively trapped in a weakened and "hollow" dictatorship, are considering their options.

Taiwan is an obvious target for China's territorial expansion strategy, but it is also a "hard nut". Self-governing since 1949, Taiwan considers itself an independent country, while China treats it as a rebellious province. For his part, Chinese President Xi expects reunification to take place by 2049, using this target date as a push for massive military reforms and rapid modernisation of the country. Some Western observers fear that China, which is facing demographic and economic problems, has accelerated the "timetable" of reunification, and that it may take military action in the coming years to seize the rebelled territories.

This is possible. But if China's recent attempts at territorial expansion have taught the country's observers anything, it's that China's expansionism is opportunistic in nature, with its leaders preferring expansion into areas that are in question or under loose ownership. Instead of fighting, China grabs. And as Russia's forces "mine" in Ukraine, the best strategic advantage is to push in the North, along the more than 4,000 km. border that China has with Russia, grabbing territory there.

A perpetual friendship... with border disputes

In the face of Russia's debacle in Ukraine, Beijing and Moscow proclaimed their "limitless" friendship with each other. But both countries are well aware that friendship agreements are very fragile. Less than two decades after China and the Soviet Union signed their last "treaty of friendship," the two countries were embroiled in a series of fierce border clashes. The expansionism of Chinese nationalists, combined with China's growing and little-masked contempt for Russia's weakness, could erode the current rapprochement between Russia and China in the blink of an eye.

The causes for a conflict have deep roots. China and Russia have been sworn in and fought for their common borders for centuries, while the 'official' resolution of the conflict, as it stands now, was only achieved in 2008. On the altar of a centuries-old border dispute that predates the official appearance of the two countries, China could easily overturn current agreements, demanding from Russia the return of Vladivostok as well as some 60,000 square kilometers of former Chinese territory occupied by Russia since 1860.

Despite agreements pointing out that all outstanding issues have been settled, China is keeping all its expansionist options open. And it continues to quietly foment assertive tendencies that are simmering. Vladivostok, which is Russia's military and commercial gateway to the Pacific Ocean, China continues to call it by the city's old Chinese name, Haishenwai, or "cucumber bay". Chinese dissatisfaction with centuries-old agreements that established China's northern borders remains evident throughout Chinese society. For years, it has been speculated that the large demographic imbalance between China and the desolate Russian Far East could encourage Beijing to "push" north.

The "foundations" for a territorial claim to the north - albeit weak - in an even larger area of the territories of the Russian Far East, exist. China's historical records show that Chinese explorers arrived in the Arctic during the Tang Dynasty - if not earlier - which allows China to weaken Russia's legitimate territorial rights. Even if the claims may be exaggerated, they are food for thought. Gaining a foothold - any foundation - in the north of the Arctic Circle allows China to formally assert claims as an Arctic power.

The timing is right

China, globally, has made a great effort to minimize the differences between Chinese ethnicity and Chinese ethnicity. As Russia's Far East sinks into economic stagnation, sidelined by Moscow's Russian elite, many citizens of Russia, of Chinese ethnicity, could be tempted to reconsider their loyalty to the Russian state. The forced resettlement of Ukrainians in the region, after all, will further degrade the social homogeneity of Asian Russia.

Demographically, with only two or three people per square kilometer, the vast expanse of Asian Russia is practically deserted, ready for annexation and easy installation. Those Russian citizens who remain there, emigrate, heading west to the most attractive urban centers of European Russia. In a few years, there will simply not be many Russians left in the eastern territories of the country.

Beyond the vast expanses of open territory, Asian Russia is rich in natural resources, capable of fueling the rise of China in the coming decades. And with climate change, the inhospitable eastern territories of Asian Russia can even bloom, turning it into the source of "supply" that China needs so much.

With Russia's military prestige shattered, with the Russian military limited to "begging" for the supply of military hardware from Iran, and a motley group of former Soviet states, there is little left in Russia's conventional arsenal to deter Chinese military aggression. In desperation, Russia is re-commissioning the same type of T-62 tanks that China seized from Russian border forces some 50 years ago. In addition, for China it will become increasingly difficult to hide its contempt for Russia's army.

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Asian Russia is ready for occupation. With a skilful implementation of the Challenges of the Grey Zone, along with a clever exploitation of anti-Russian global sentiment towards the Putin regime, China could change "the field" quickly, overcoming Russia's nuclear deterrent power and leaving the shattered Moscow virtually with no choice but to accept a territorial fait accompli. In the following years, with Russia almost unarmed and unstable, as a pariah state, China could claim all of Siberia, from one moment to the next, and no one would raise many objections.

Taiwan can wait

Modern China has learned that one can often win without having to fight. Today, its absolute leader, Xi Jinping, has enough power in his hands to pursue provocative territorial claims. On the other hand, China neither needs nor wants a conflict which, like Ukraine, will provoke global resistance. The math just doesn't come out. Stripping a dying Russia of a dying country is a much more profitable 'investment' than a short-term conflict in Taiwan at this stage.

Russia will never be weaker than it is today, while on the other hand things for Taiwan may well change over time.

Certainly, a threatening attitude towards Taiwan is a useful tool. This aggressive stance of the government unites China, while continued military mobility offers good operational readiness to Chinese forces. A credible Chinese threat to Taiwan also disproportionately attracts western attention, distorting the priorities of Western states and their military "investments". In China's competition with the West, Taiwan is an extremely useful distraction, fueling America's obsessions while distracting the U.S. strategic focus on other critical areas.

If China moves against Taiwan in the short term, an expanded conflict is inevitable. But if China seizes territory in the north, it gains access to new natural resources, new reserves, and can, in turn, cultivate the wounded country's sense of "obvious destiny" at a very, very small price. Xi could even reluctantly receive some international respect for his contribution to removing a ruthless Russian leader from the helm of the country.

A Chinese pressure to recover Asian Russia makes sense. Taiwan will only bring conflicts to China, while Russia's expulsion from Asia opens up more lucrative avenues for the hungry and expansionist-minded Chinese state.

Source: Forbes