Filenews 1 June 2022
Recep Tayyip Erdogan has made it clear, in all directions, that what interests him at this stage is largely Syria, and several of the interventions he is making are moving around it. This is because Syria also means Syrian Kurds, who, with the support of the Americans, have formed conditions for a quasi-Kurdish state entity on the territory of Syria, which, in contrast to the largely self-governing Iraqi Kurdistan, could act as a point of reference for the Kurds of Turkey and this would bring back the "existential" question about the cohesion of the country, the unfinished in a sense of national integration that is exactly never answered: "what is the position of the Kurds in modern Turkey".
The successive Turkish military operations in Syria
The first major Operation of the Turks in Syria began in August 2016 and was operation "Euphrates Shield". In it, Turkish forces and Syrian opposition armed organizations cooperating with it attacked Islamic State forces to conquer Jarablus and then clashed with the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces, as far as Manbiz. The aim of the operation is to ensure that there was no territorial continuity between the different "cantons" of the Kurdish autonomous regions.
Soon after, Turkey began to participate actively in the "Astana Process". For Turkey, it was of particular importance that Russia defended the integrity of Syria and did not accept the autonomy of the Kurdish areas (Russia even accepted a federal structure).
At the same time, in October 2017, Turkey launched military operations in the Idlib region, as it had already agreed with Russia the creation of a demilitarized zone and the formation of special military observatories. In fact, Turkey at the time wanted to avoid a very large-scale operation by the Syrian-backed government forces at the expense of the armed Islamist organizations in the Idlib region, which included the organizations it supported.
The next operation, called the "Olive Branch", took place from January to March 2018 and aimed to capture the kurdish-controlled city of Afrin and the surrounding area, leading to the displacement of up to 300,000 Kurds from these areas.
The third major operation, called Source of Peace, took place in October 2019 and was intended to enable Turkey to secure a security zone on the border with Syria. This operation was largely based on the fact that U.S. forces in the region withdrew, effectively allowing Turkish forces (and their allies in Syria to move). At the same time, Turkey secured the agreement of the Russians, who in turn intervened to partially remove the pro-Kurdish forces from the border with Turkey.
The difficult balance
Since then, Turkey has been trying to maintain a difficult balance. On the one hand, it is trying to contain any aggressive plans by the government forces towards the Enclave of Idlib, which has endangered both its own forces and the forces it supports. To a large extent it is secured by Russia, which in turn does not fail to recall that at some point the restoration of Syria's political and territorial integrity must be completed. On the other hand, it has the problem that the U.S. has made it clear that it will not stop supporting the Syrian Kurds, who see them as not only effective allies against the Islamic State but also a way of having a say in post-war Syria. It should be noted that Russia also maintains relatively good relations with the Kurds, in an effort to lead things towards their participation in a political solution in Syria.
Escalation of Turkish aggression
But the Turkish government is seeking to escalate aggression against the Kurds again. It has already escalated its operations in Iraqi Kurdistan, with whose government it has an understanding, with the aim of striking the PKK forces there. He obviously has the tolerance of the UNITED States in this operation. However, this is not enough, because it is understandable that the core of the problem for Turkey is the Syrian Kurds. He considers them an "existential" threat.
All this obviously has internal political calculations. Erdogan believes that opening up a Kurdish issue and choosing an aggressive stance activates nationalist reflexes, commits the Kemalist and nationalist opposition to his own agenda, and widens the gap between the opposition coalition and Turkey's Kurds, hoping that this will avoid the risk of a Kurdish tactic of voting for the opposition in a manner similar to the 2019 municipal elections.
The turkish government's position that if the security zone is extended under the control of Turkey and pro-Turkish forces, Turkey will be able to organise the relocation there of part of the Syrian refugees in Turkey. Let us not forget that although, in general, refugees have been viewed positively in Turkey, in recent times, in the midst of an economic crisis, there are also feelings of dissatisfaction.
Erdogan believes that now is the best time to try a new operation, as Turkey has strengthened its position due to the war in Ukraine. Essentially, the Turkish side's assessment is that Washington will eventually give the green light to a new Turkish operation in Syria in exchange for Turkey's support for Finland's and Sweden's entry into NATO.
Turkey is seeking to take Tel Rifaat and Manbiz to the west of the Euphrates (a target of previous operations) and Kobani, Ain Issa and Tel Tamer to the east of the Euphrates.
The negotiation with the US and Russia
But it is by no means a given that both the US and Russia will accept a new operation of such a large scale. Operation "Source of Peace" ended in October 209 with two agreements by Turkey, one with the US on the armistice, on 17 October and one similar on 22 October later with Russia. In this way the US and Russia are the guarantors of the situation in NortheastErn Syria and it is by no means a given that they will allow Turkey to strike at such important positions of the Kurds.
Already the U.S. has expressed its concern, because of the fear that this would jeopardize the fight against the Islamic State, an indirect reference to its strategic investment in the Kurds.
For the part, Russia has also sent its messages. Sergey Lavrov may have shown a few days ago that he understands Turkey's concerns, but at the same time Russia is strengthening its military presence in the region and has recently carried out joint patrols with Kurdish militias.
Turkey insists that Kurdish forces have not adhered to the terms of the 2019 Sochi agreement, which provided for a distance of 30 kilometres from the Turkish border, and that they are using their current positions to attack Turkish positions. However, a Turkish operation in Kobani, for example, in Kobani, with all its symbolic significance internationally as a sign identified with the Kurdish resistance to the Islamic State, would provoke great reactions.
More complex are things about Tel Rifaat which would allow Turkey to block the ability of Kurdish militias to hit Afrin, maintain a pressure on government forces in Northern Aleppo and pave the way for easier cooperation between the armed organisations supported by Turkey. However, the question is whether Russia is prepared to acquiesce to this move, which could also mean pressure on Damascus, at a time when Iran, too, would not want the pro-Iranian forces operating in the region to be under pressure. But Syria's foreign ministry has already taken a negative position, arguing that the Turkish presence in Syria constitutes "an aggressive action, occupation and an attempt at demographic cleansing".
In the face of all this, Turkey will try to "cash in" on the one hand the moves in relation to Ukraine and the strategic importance that it retains, today perhaps more than ever, for NATO, and on the other hand the fact that it insists on not aligning itself with other Western countries in a line of complete rupture with NATO.
