Filenews 7 November 2021 - by Kostas Venizelos
It was a long game of chess, which could never have ended. A hard poker with players accustomed to the difficult. Negotiations on the Bases, their scope and operation, prior to the implementation of the Agreements, could constitute a manual of negotiation and tactics. To be taught to young diplomats, but also to people in general who practice negotiation. Makarios and Zeno Rossidis emerged victorious from this battle. The credit also paid to Kutsiuk, who supported the Cypriot positions and claims to the end, despite the pressures he had received from Ankara.
Professor and lawyer Achilleas K. Emilianidis in his book "A long game of chess - The secret negotiations for the British bases (1959-1960)", which is published by Hippasus Publications, presents the whole background. The subject of the monograph is the political negotiation that led to the provisions of the Treaty of Establishment, which concern the Sovereign Areas of the Bases. Therefore, the approach of the book is primarily concerned with the scientific disciplines of political history and diplomacy. It sheds light on unknown aspects and highlights the backstage games and the... underground activities.
The scene had been set by Britain with the support of the other two guarantor powers, Greece and Turkey, which did not show much interest in the issue. Against this backdrop, was the "stubborn" Makarios, who had next to him a suffering negotiator, the latter for years Permanent Representative of the Republic of Cyprus to the United Nations, Zenon Rossides. Makarios in those negotiations played with fire, showed that he was willing to torpedo even the agreements of Zurich and London. He threatened to declare unilateral independence, causing panic among the British but also in Athens and Ankara. Makarios stopped at some point listening to the Greek side, Evangelos Averoff in this case, wanting to bypass his pressures. But Kutsiuk also withstood greatly the pressures of Ankara, the then foreign minister, Zulu.
The last governor of the colony of Cyprus, Sir Hugh Futt, described the final negotiations on the "Sovereign" Base Areas as a "long game of chess", which was in danger of destroying everything. Makarios knew that the United Kingdom could not abandon the Zurich and London Agreements, but mainly the issue of the Bases and that is why he was pushing to the end. According to what is reported in the book, Futt added that he admired Makarios' political skills, self-confidence and composure, but often thought that he liked to take too much risk, to walk on the razor's edge, to put his intelligence against others. The fact is that the British had underestimated Makarios and believed that he would give in to threats. But they fell out, as can be seen from the course of the discussions.
As stated in the book, "the Averoff, like a section of the Greek Cypriot elite, did not consider that the question of the geographical extent of the state and the extent to which the United Kingdom would maintain on the territory of the island was so essential that it justified the postponement of independence or even jeopardized the implementation of the compromise reached. The Averoff was more inclined to support Makarios' positions on the future status of the Bases, since there he saw the strategic importance of avoiding the risk of a military base being ceded to Turkey in the future in the event of the withdrawal of the British. Especially after the failure of the London Conference in January 1960, Averoff and Clerides gave information to the British as to the negotiating objectives and the tactics that the British themselves should follow in order to reach an agreement, focusing on the ways of exerting pressure on Makarios".
Very important was the support provided to Makarios, Kutsiuk, in an unexpected for the British, but also for Turkey turn of negotiations. "The alliance of Makarios and Kutsiuk, a sign of good cooperation between the leaders of the two communities with a view to achieving common interests, as well as the Turkish Cypriot leader's refusal to comply with Ankara's instructions, forced the Turkish government to change its policy and pressure the British for further concessions." The Deputy Minister of Colonies, Emery, who was sent in the middle of the negotiations, from London, "to save the lot", was forced to encourage the return of Denktash, who was absent from Cyprus after the London Conference in January 1960, in order to put further pressure on Kutsiuk.
It is noted that "at the end of the negotiation, the reduction of the area of the Sovereign Areas of the Bases from 170 sq. miles, which was the initial British negotiating goal, to 99 sq. miles and the forced force of Britain to make the statements of the Appendages "O" and "P" (Cmnd 1093 – Cyprus), constituted an indisputable success of Makarios and Rossidis". As far as the status of the Bases is concerned, it has been made clear that it will be military. The rights of Cypriot citizens residing in these areas were largely safeguarded, while the state's facilities to the Bases were recorded.
The agreement also included financial assistance from Britain to the Republic of Cyprus, the result of both the negotiations and Nicosia's insistence. London agreed to pay to the Republic of Cyprus the sum of 12 million pounds during the first five years after Independence (in five annual instalments until 31.3.1965). The United Kingdom had agreed on other grants and in 1965 it would re-examine the issue of financial assistance for the next five years (until 1970) after consultation with the C.C. In practice this was not invoked invoking the constitutional crisis that began in 1963. In addition, a special grant of €1.5 million was made to the company. pounds were given by Britain to the Turkish Cypriot community, based on Appendix "U" (Cyprus – Cmdn 1093), to be used for the development of the Vakoufiki property and for educational and cultural purposes.
The book by Achilleas K. Emilianidis, with rich bibliography and scientific documentation, sheds light on the background of a negotiation that is not particularly well known. A negotiation that overturned a political dogma, which was flourishing in Athens and Nicosia, that the weak must adapt to the strong, the powerful. That was not the case here. The book mentions that perhaps Makarios, when he had hardened his stance, insisted on stretching the rope, took into account the domestic front. The possible reactions from AKEL and Grivas. With the attitude he adopted, however, he had against him the Greek Cypriot elite: the living rooms and the people who live in the British court. And the latter, as the descriptions show, included both politicians and the economic establishment, capital, which often acted as 'underminers'.
Achilleas K. Emilianidis dedicates the book to the diplomat Zeno Rossidis. His honorary choice is fully justified by the course of discussions and negotiations, a fact that will be realized by the reader of the book. It is no coincidence that the British tried to bypass him, to put him out of the negotiation. He was, however, until the end next to Makarios. His right hand in this tough deal.
