Friday, October 30, 2026

TRUMP-PUTIN DEAL ON RUSSIAN DIESEL IN THE CROSSHAIRS - LEGAL OBSTACLES AND FEARS OF POLITICAL COSTS




TRUMP-PUTIN DEAL ON RUSSIAN DIESEL IN THE CROSSHAIRS - LEGAL OBSTACLES AND FEARS OF POLITICAL COSTS - Filenews 30/10


By Andy J. Semotiuk

In retrospect, US President Donald Trump's agreement with Vladimir Putin on diesel, on October 9, 2026, turns out to be a serious mistake. It weakened the pressure Washington could exert on Russia, sidelined better alternatives, complicated compliance with the current legal framework, and limited Ukraine's ability to defend itself — all in exchange for an uncertain and limited price de-escalation ahead of the midterm elections.

It is true that Americans need affordable fuel prices. However, energy policy must be based both on commercially reasonable choices and on compliance with international rules, to which Washington expects the rest to be bound. By rewarding Moscow while at the same time pressuring Kiev to limit its defense capabilities, the US administration undermined both targets.
The decision is already causing criticism, as it is seen as a gift to Putin, with the risk of having a political cost for Trump and his party. At the same time, the promised relief in the price of diesel at the pump has not been felt.

General License 135, issued by the U.S. government on October 9, allowed transactions involving Russian diesel, including imports into the U.S., until April 7, 2027. With this permission, Washington's policy took a concrete form. It has not been proven, however, that the purchase of Russian fuel was necessary, economically advantageous or compatible with the restrictions imposed by Congress.


The problem with international law

From the point of view of international law, the key issue concerns the Charter of the United Nations. Article 2(4) prohibits the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of a State. Article 51 recognises the right to self-defence in the event of an armed attack.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the Ukrainian resistance are not equivalent cases. U.S. sanctions were aimed at increasing the cost of Russian aggression and stepping up efforts to end it. The purchase of Russian diesel weakened this pressure.

The US Ending Importation of Russian Oil Act, passed in 2022, banned the import of Russian energy products. Lifting the ban requires consultation, reporting, and certification by the U.S. president. Among other things, there is an agreement on the withdrawal of Russian forces and the end of hostilities, which Ukraine will accept, as well as a period of parliamentary control.

The Ministry of Finance's power to issue permits must be assessed in the light of this legislative framework. Labeling the markets as "temporary" does not solve the problem. The government has not clearly defined the legal basis for its decision or explained how this particular license complies with the law.

The consequences go far beyond a normal trade in fuel, especially since there are better alternatives.

Canada already has an established supply network

Canada was an obvious choice in the search for additional quantities of fuel. It borders the US, is a member of NATO and already supplies the US market. Before granting special treatment to Russia, Washington should have practically examined the possibilities of increasing Canadian supplies.

The strongest relevant data comes from the US Energy Information Administration (EIA). According to them, Canada covered 95% of US petroleum spirits imports in 2024, which amounted to 144,000 barrels per day. Much of this fuel was directed to the East Coast of the US, where diesel and heating oil are of particular importance.

These figures demonstrate that a functioning commercial supply relationship already exists. The U.S. government could ask Canadian refineries to determine what additional quantities they could dispose of, how quickly they could deliver them, and at what final price.

As Canadian CTV journalist Eric Hamm comments: "When he had the opportunity to advocate for stability and democracy, Trump chose to look elsewhere. With this decision, he may have jeopardized the seats of his loyal candidates in Congress, while exacerbating the divide of opinion between Washington and Ottawa."

Nigeria is another alternative

Nigeria also deserved serious consideration. The expansion of domestic refining capacity creates room for diversification of US supplies, without offering Moscow additional economic or diplomatic influence.

According to the EIA, Nigeria's exports of petroleum products amounted to 350,000 barrels per day in the second quarter of 2026, compared to 46,000 barrels per day in 2023. A significant part of this increase is due to the Dangote refinery.

Exports to Europe averaged 130,000 barrels per day. Of course, the data refer to all petroleum products and not specifically to the quantities of diesel that could be purchased directly from the USA. They do, however, demonstrate the development of an export industry that already serves international markets.

In addition, Nigeria's coastline on the Atlantic allows cargo to be transported to U.S. Atlantic ports without passing through the Strait of Hormuz.

Russia's choice requires explanations


Russian diesel can indeed be transported to the US. The essential question, however, is why it should be preferred, taking into account distances, transport requirements, insurance, payment arrangements and disruptions caused by war.

Supplies from Canada can tap into an already well-established supply system between neighbouring countries. Cargoes from Nigeria offer an alternative route across the Atlantic. These factors alone make Russia's choice commercially questionable.

The US government should have made public a comparative assessment of the available quantities, final delivery prices, arrival times and expected savings. It would also have to explain whether the Russian exports really represented additional supply or just cargoes that would have been directed to other buyers anyway.

The mere redirection of loads from one market to another is not enough to justify promises of generalized price de-escalation.

The Russian diesel market required thorough analysis. This should cover private importers and refineries, the credibility of trading counterparties, the enforceability of contractual conditions and whether the alleged savings would be maintained after deduction of transport and other distribution costs.

The necessary preparatory work to secure suitable fuels on competitive terms has not been done.

Ukraine does not explain the price problem on its own

Another weakness of Washington's argument is highlighted by a BBC analysis. The wars in Iran and Ukraine have curtailed diesel exports. While Ukrainian attacks on Russian refineries may have contributed to the problem, attributing blame solely to Kiev distorts the true picture. The disturbances in the Strait of Hormuz had a much more significant impact.

In addition, the argument of containing domestic diesel prices cannot be used as a legal justification for limiting Ukrainian defenses, while Russian aggression remains virtually unanswered.

The level of international fuel prices is not a criterion of legality. Washington and Moscow cannot turn a bilateral trade understanding into a substitute for Ukraine's consent to abandon its legitimate defense options.

If Russia gains easier access to markets, while Ukraine is under pressure to limit its defenses, the incentives to achieve peace are moving in the opposite direction.

The U.S. can strive for affordable diesel prices and at the same time abide by international law. They can seek competitive bids from Canada and Nigeria, make the relevant trade assessment public, and link any easing of sanctions against Russia to verifiable peace-promoting concessions.

Otherwise, Washington pays for fuel not only with money, but also with a loss of bargaining power and credibility.

At the same time, the Ukrainians continue to suffer Russian shelling every day, while the US is limiting its ability to defend itself.

For all these reasons, looking back at the decision, the conclusion is clear: it was a bad choice, which will hurt American interests, weaken support for Ukraine and burden Trump and the Republicans ahead of the upcoming elections.

Forbes