By Melik Kaylan
There is intense debate around the escalation of hostility between Israel and Turkey, or, in other words, between Erdogan and Netanyahu. From this column, he had pointed out in time the tension that was forming, stressing that Erdogan may be leading his country on the same path that Iran followed. Under the banner of neo-Ottomanism, it has publicly hosted meetings with enemies of Israel, such as Hamas leaders and, most recently, Hezbollah leaders. Undoubtedly, it seeks to appeal to the most Islamic part of its electoral audience, in a strongly populist way. But what will be the ultimate cost to the stability of his regime or of Turkey itself? What is at stake in this confrontation and which side has the most influence?
Israel has developed its response on many levels. It has proceeded with strategic alignment with Greece and the Republic of Cyprus, including by providing Athens with state-of-the-art anti-aircraft missiles. At the same time, Israel has turned against Erdogan's ally, the Syrian government, with substantial moves: bombing weapons depots left over from the Assad regime, encouraging resistance from the Syrian Druze minority in the area beyond the Golan Heights, and many other actions. So far, there has been no direct conflict between Israeli and Turkish troops in Syria. However, a flash point is found every day and closer to reality. At the same time, Erdogan's triumph, which consisted of removing Russia and Assad, seems increasingly vulnerable and potentially unsustainable in a Syria that is so easy to destabilize.
What is Ankara's response? The signing of the Mecca Agreement with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, an alignment that seems to offer controversial benefits to all the countries involved, while at the same time unnecessarily creating new enemies, such as India. (Pakistan is currently providing Saudi Arabia with soldiers to protect its borders and support the state, while Saudi Arabia is preparing a ground invasion against the Houthis. However, Pakistani troops are not engaged in combat operations; there is no guarantee that Saudi troops will prevail in Yemen, while air strikes against Saudi facilities continue unabated.)
Inside Turkey, with the scandal of the investment fund amounting to more than 20 billion. and the stock market collapse further shaking an already fragile economy, Erdogan is already vulnerable. Essentially, members of his own political inner circle were involved in a Ponzi scheme, which collapsed. Now the country is threatened with downgrading from the category of Emerging Markets to the category of Frontier Markets.
In short, Erdogan does not need "costly" problems abroad, whether in Syria or Sudan or anywhere else. Potentially, Saudi Arabia is the ideal ally to deal with such a situation, providing financial support to Turkey. The problem is that the Saudis will ask for specific quid pro quo, such as military support in the confrontation with Iran or against the Houthis – that is, exactly what they sought through the Mecca Pact and did not receive. And exactly what Erdogan is deeply reluctant to do: open a front against Iran.
For years, the Turkish economy has benefited from the channeling of sanctioned Iranian funds through the Turkish banking system. Erdogan has coordinated with Iran to contain the threat posed by Kurdish separatists, which concerns both countries. It is recalled that it was Erdogan who allegedly convinced Trump not to support a Kurdish separatist operation in Iran. Iran's withdrawal from Syria has allowed Erdogan to drive his Sunni allies to power. The Syrian Kurds have laid down their arms and agreed to join the national army.
Despite Erdogan's weaknesses – which are now almost insurmountable – Netanyahu's position is not much better. He faces national elections this month and multiple problems. Top officials of various Arab governments have publicly stated that they had warned Netanyahu about the horrors of October 7 and that he did nothing. He responded by claiming that his intelligence chief did not inform him of the warnings - an allegation for which the official has now taken legal action against Netanyahu.
Under normal circumstances, leaders like Netanyahu and Erdogan would create military or even existential distractions to overshadow their internal problems. However, they have essentially exhausted almost all of their arsenal. The confrontation between the two countries is the only crisis left as a diversionary option – and neither of the two peoples is likely to tolerate it at this juncture.
The power struggle between Erdogan and Netanyahu has implications that go far beyond the region. Turkey is, after all, a NATO member country. Netanyahu has strong connections with the Russian-Israeli element inside his country and around the world. Erdogan has built strong ties with Turkic-speaking Central Asian countries. And, of course, both leaders must take Trump's reaction into account in their moves.
Information or disinformation is now such an important part of the debate that the term "hybrid warfare" is barely sufficient to describe it. In this area, Israel is many steps ahead of Turkey in the world, but not to the same extent in the region. Nevertheless, Ankara is finding it difficult to secure regional powers on its side. Egypt remains stubbornly neutral. Azerbaijan, although it maintains close relations with Turkey, also has strong ties with Israel and is not going to commit. The same applies to the Central Asian states – the so-called "Stans" – which Erdogan considers Turkey's strategic depth, but refuses to get involved in global conflicts. NATO could play a role if Israel attacked Turkey directly. However, when Erdogan shot down a Russian warplane that had briefly entered Turkish airspace in 2015, NATO did not get involved.
Netanyahu, for his part, is increasingly isolated from his international partners. Polls show that his popularity in the United States is declining, as he is seen as embroiling America in yet another war abroad. Trump seems, so far, to support Erdogan in Syria and his Middle Corridor efforts. Above all, Israel has alienated the once-friendly Kremlin because of the war against Iran. Putin is pleased to see a weakened Iran become more dependent on Moscow, particularly when it comes to nuclear initiatives, but he will not tolerate regime change.
All this leads to the conclusion that a hot incident between Erdogan and Netanyahu is not expected in the foreseeable future. With the current internal crises facing both leaders, the real question is whether Erdogan and Netanyahu will remain in power or whether they will continue to look powerful abroad for much longer.
Forbes
