Fifty-two years after the Turkish invasion, public archives of the United States, the House of Commons and the United Nations shed more light on the dramatic hours that preceded the greatest tragedy in modern Cypriot history.
The Cyprus News Agency presents journalistic research based on primary sources: American and British diplomatic cables, minutes of the United Nations Security Council, minutes of the House of Commons of the United Kingdom, documents of the "Foreign Relations of the United States" (FRUS) series, minutes of the Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG), archives of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and declassified conversations of the American leadership.
The last hours before landing
On the afternoon of July 19, 1974, four days after the coup d'état against President Makarios, the crisis had now acquired international dimensions. In Nicosia, the "government" of Nicos Sampson was trying to consolidate, while the junta of Demetrios Ioannides in Athens insisted that it was an "internal Cypriot affair". At the same time, Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit had essentially decided that, if the pre-coup situation was not restored, Turkey would intervene militarily. For Washington and London, the biggest concern was now preventing war between two NATO allies, Turkey and Greece.
At 3:30 p.m. (New York time), the UN Security Council held an emergency meeting for the second time in a few days. Before the debate even began, he rejected the request of the Sampson government to replace the permanent representative of the Republic of Cyprus, Zenon Rossidis, and to postpone the meeting, as shown by the minutes of the 1780th meeting (S/PV.1780). Keeping Rossidis in his position was a clear indication that the UN did not recognize the Samson regime.
In his speech, Archbishop Makarios said that the coup was organized by the military government of Athens and executed by Greek officers commanding the National Guard. He also accused the Greek junta of financing and guiding EOKA B, while revealing that a few weeks ago he had requested in a letter to the President of the Hellenic Republic, Phaedon Gizikis, the withdrawal of Greek officers from Cyprus. As he said, the answer was that this would weaken the island's defenses against Turkey.
"I replied that I considered the danger from Athens greater than the danger from Turkey," he told the Security Council.
Makarios also claimed that the coup threatened the entire Republic of Cyprus, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, and called on the UN to demand the withdrawal of Greek officers from the National Guard and the restoration of constitutional order.
"The events in Cyprus are not an internal affair of the Greeks of Cyprus. And the Turks of Cyprus are also affected. The coup d'état of the Greek junta is an invasion and all the people of Cyprus - Greeks and Turks - will suffer from its consequences," he said in the most discussed phrase of his speech.
The Greek response
Greek representative Ioannis Panagiotakos rejected any involvement of Athens, insisting that the events were exclusively an internal matter of the Greek Cypriots. He claimed that both the commander of ELDYK and the chief of the National Guard were in Athens before the coup and that communications with Nicosia had been cut off.
He then personally attacked Makarios, accusing him of "personality cult" and "demagoguery", while also accusing him of maintaining a paramilitary apparatus and being responsible for persecution and political assassinations of his opponents.
Ankara warns
The declassified US documents show that Ankara had warned in time of its intentions. On July 17, the American ambassador to Turkey, William McComber, sent a telegram about his meeting with Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, who described the coup as a violation of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee and attributed his organization to the military government (junta) of Athens.
Ecevit warned that if an "acceptable situation" was not restored, Turkey would intervene militarily, adding that if the intervention was inevitable, it had to be carried out within "a few days", otherwise it would be "bloodier".
He also revealed that he was going to London seeking joint action with the United Kingdom, as a second guarantor power.
"They have bases there. If they don't use them now, then why do they exist? We will consider all peaceful solutions before considering other options," Ecevit had said.
According to the American cable, the main objectives put forward by the Turkish government were the restoration of constitutional order, the withdrawal of Greek officers from the National Guard and ensuring safe access for Turkish Cypriots to the sea.
The American dilemma
On the evening of July 19, while international attention was focused on the Security Council, crucial decisions were being made in Washington, London and Ankara. The documents in the "Foreign Relations of the United States" series show that the US administration had now realized that Turkish intervention was extremely likely and focused its efforts mainly on preventing a Greek-Turkish war that would threaten NATO's cohesion in the midst of the Cold War.
From the first hours after the July 15 coup, Washington has been trying to balance between restoring constitutional order and preventing a Greek-Turkish conflict.
In a telegram included in the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) documents, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger reiterated that the United States recognized Cyprus as a "unitary, sovereign and independent state" and clarified that "it cannot accept any action that changes the political and constitutional structure of the island". At the same time, he called on the Greek government to show "maximum restraint", warning that new destabilization could lead to a Greek-Turkish war and strengthen Soviet influence in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Three days later, a new State Department cable to US diplomatic missions captured Washington's strategy even more clearly. The two main priorities were to prevent Turkish military intervention and to avoid a civil conflict in Cyprus that could be exploited by Moscow.
The same document also reveals the basic American dilemma. Although Makarios was still considered the legitimate President of the Republic of Cyprus, the Americans estimated that his return without external military support was extremely difficult. At the same time, they also rejected the Samson regime.
"We do not accept the Sampson regime," it said. However, the same telegram noted: "The regime is already in power and it would be reckless to seek its removal before an alternative becomes apparent."
Pressure on London for joint action
At the same time, the British government was at the center of intense pressure to take the initiative as a guarantor power. In the House of Commons on 19 July, proposals were made to make use of the rights granted by the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, and even to temporarily entrust the command of the National Guard to the United Nations.
Commonwealth Secretary of State Roy Hattersley confirmed that ongoing contacts were underway with Athens and Ankara, but avoided any commitment to military action.
In the meantime, Bulent Ecevit had gone to London on July 17 seeking a joint British-Turkish intervention under the Treaty of Guarantee. The talks did not yield results, as Harold Wilson's government was not willing to participate in a military operation. This failure left Ankara essentially free to proceed unilaterally.
Tuning in Washington, D.C., while the clock was counting down
At noon on July 19, 1974 (14:43 – 15:29 Washington time), the Washington Special Task Force (WSAG) meets in a hurry in the White House Operations Room. Under the chairmanship of Deputy Secretary of State Robert Ingersoll and with the participation of the heads of the Pentagon, the General Staff (JCS) and the CIA, the US staff is coordinating its moves as the clock counts down to the Turkish invasion.
The declassified minutes reveal a Washington that, while knowing that an invasion is imminent, is focusing almost exclusively on the disengagement of its own citizens and the diplomatic balance between Athens, Ankara and London.
The Undersecretary of Defense, William Clements, informs that — after approval — the American amphibious force (5 ships, including an LPH helicopter, two LPD landing craft, 1,800 Marines and 14 helicopters) has been ordered to approach 100 to 50 miles from Cyprus. The distance to the shore is estimated at about 10 hours. Clements clarifies: "The orders to the fleet are that it moves solely for the purpose of evacuating civilians, not for military intervention."
The "blurry" landscape with Ioannidis
During the meeting, a message is conveyed by Henry Kissinger (who is in San Clemente and gives instructions by telephone) regarding Joseph Sisco's visit to Athens. At that time, the American staff still does not have a clear picture of whether Cisco managed to see the "invisible dictator" Dimitrios Ioannidis, considering it rather unlikely.
At the end of the meeting, the telegram arrives from Athens. The fact that the Greek side agreed to send a representative to London on Monday (July 22nd) for consultations is met with cautious relief.
"At least he has something to discuss [Sisco in Ankara]," it said.
However, CIA Director Bill Colby poses the real problem: "The real issue is to convince the Turks to delay the invasion until Monday."
The background with Makarios' plane and the threat of murder
Makarios is expected in New York and Kissinger is scheduled to see him on Monday. The State Department reveals that the Cypriot side requested a US aircraft to transport Makarios from New York to Washington, citing threats to his life.
The then US ambassador to Cyprus, Robert James McCloskey, suggests that the request be rejected, so as not to give the diplomatic impression that the US is "leaning" in favor of Makarios.
CIA spokesman George Lauder intervenes and reveals: "The report comes from a good source... which says that orders have been given to assassinate Makarios anytime and anywhere in the world."
Ultimately, Clements proposes the middle ground: to be given a small, unmarked military jet to secure his life without any official political support.
The telegram that announced the invasion
On the afternoon of July 19, US Special Envoy Joseph Cisco briefed Henry Kissinger on his contacts in Athens with Dimitrios Ioannidis and the Chief of the Greek Armed Forces, General Grigorios Bonanos.
As he informed the US Secretary of State, he was departing for Ankara having secured limited concessions from the Greek side, which he considered insufficient to prevent Turkish military intervention. Athens agreed to participate in talks in London with Britain and support an enhanced role of the UN in controlling Cyprus' ports and airports, but categorically rejected the Turkish demand for Turkish Cypriot access to the sea, considering it a disguised form of partition.
Sisko also revealed that he deliberately avoided conveying to Athens the proposal of Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit for a complete partition, estimating that this would lead to the collapse of any diplomatic effort, while he suggested as the last possibility of de-escalation the assumption of the Presidency of the Republic of Cyprus by the Speaker of the Parliament Glafkos Clerides, in the context of constitutional succession.
In the last and most prophetic paragraph of the telegram, Sisko records his clear belief that diplomacy is doomed:
"I have the clear impression that, whatever happens in this situation, the Turks consider this to be the ideal time to achieve through military intervention a long-term goal."
In the White House, the invasion is now considered imminent
That same night, WSAG held an emergency meeting, with the participation of Kissinger and senior officials from the State Department, the Pentagon, the CIA and the National Security Council.
The minutes show that the question was not whether Turkey would intervene, but when.
A declassified July 19, 1974 telephone conversation between U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and CIA Director Bill Colby reveals that Washington had a clear picture of the impending Turkish invasion and its military goals. The CIA estimated that Turkish forces were fully prepared for a landing in Kyrenia, with the aim of capturing Kyrenia, Famagusta and a zone that would connect the two regions, in order to secure a strong negotiating position.
At the same time, it predicted resistance from the National Guard, but considered that Greece did not have the possibility of effective military intervention due to Turkey's distance and numerical superiority.
The American discussion focused mainly on the prevention of a Greek-Turkish war and the safe evacuation of American citizens from Cyprus. In this context, the dispatch of warships to the Eastern Mediterranean exclusively for evacuation operations was also considered.
As midnight approached on July 19, American and British documents recorded that the Turkish landing fleet had already sailed from the southern coast of Asia Minor to the northern coast of Cyprus. Operation "Attila" had actually been implemented.
In Nicosia, on the contrary, the coup had caused serious disorganization in the chain of command of the National Guard and attention remained focused mainly on the internal situation, rather than on the indications of an imminent external attack.
"They disembark"
One of the most revealing documents in the US archives is the telephone conversation between Henry Kissinger and Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, on the night of July 19 to the early hours of July 20. Kissinger informed that Turkish forces had already begun the landing.
"They are disembarking," he said characteristically.
According to the information he had received, the Turkish units were ordered not to open fire on Greek forces, unless they were attacked. At the same time, Washington promoted the so-called "Clerides solution", i.e. the departure of Nicos Sampson and the assumption of the Presidency by the Speaker of the Parliament, Glafkos Clerides, in the context of constitutional succession, although Kissinger himself acknowledged that the chances of success were limited.
In discussing Ankara's real goals, Schlesinger estimated that Turkey "would not settle for anything less than a part of the island." Kissinger replied that, if that was her goal, then "we should work for a double union and give the rest of the island to Greece."
The dawn of the invasion
Shortly before 5 a.m. on July 20, the last hopes for a diplomatic de-escalation evaporated. The Turkish landing fleet reached the northern coast of Cyprus and Operation "Attila" began with aerial bombardments, landings in the area of Five Miles, west of Kyrenia, and paratroopers drops north of Nicosia, with the aim of connecting the bridgehead with the Turkish Cypriot enclave of the capital.
The Turkish Government announced that it was acting on the basis of Article 4 of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, arguing that the intervention was aimed at restoring the constitutional order that had been overthrown by the coup.
Nixon-Kissinger: "If necessary, we will cut off military aid"
A few hours after the invasion began, President Richard Nixon was briefed by phone by Henry Kissinger.
The foreign minister said that Athens had accepted the US proposal for a ceasefire, while Ankara was slow to respond, seeking, as he estimated, to create a military fait accompli.
"They are trying to gain as much ground as they can," he said, adding that "the Turks have gained a strong negotiating position" and the National Guard has effectively been defeated.
Nixon asked if there was a risk of Greece's direct involvement. Kissinger replied: "If the Greeks don't go to war in the morning, I think we'll be fine."
The discussion turned out to be the main means of pressure that Washington considered to have. Kissinger suggested that, in the event of a Greco-Turkish war, the United States would cut off all military aid to the two countries.
"That would stop the war," Nixon commented.
Shortly after, a new session, chaired by Robert Ingersoll and with the participation of CIA Director William Colby, reveals the background of American moves in the military and diplomatic field.
In particular, Henry Kissinger's order to the mediator Joseph Sisko to appear extremely harsh and "brutal" towards the Turkish leadership, threatening it with a complete cessation of military aid, is recorded.
However, behind the official declarations of a ceasefire and the restoration of constitutional order, Ingersoll was already formulating the cynical geopolitical compromise of "double union" (i.e. de facto partition) as the only realistic way out in the event of a failure of the negotiations.
At the same time, tensions between the US and the Greek junta had hit "red" after the news that the Greek authorities had forcibly requisitioned three US barges loaded with ammunition destined for Turkey. This action provoked intense indignation among US officials, who described Greece as "belligerent" and suggested that Washington's gradual distancing from Athens begin. Fearing both the reactions in Congress and the possibility that arms deliveries could be perceived as bias, the US decided to proceed with a strict protest through the ambassador in Athens, while imposing a total but temporary "freeze" on all military missions to both sides.
Kissinger's double game with the arms embargo
A top-secret telephone conversation between Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and his deputy, Robert Ingersoll, reveals that Washington has implemented a "double game" tactic regarding the freezing of military aid to Greece and Turkey, while Kissinger appears outraged by the indiscipline of his subordinates.
While the Department of Defense (under James Schlesinger) had internally announced the cessation of arms shipments to the two countries, Kissinger intervened forcefully to overturn the decision. The Minister of Foreign Affairs gives an explicit, cynical order: there should be no official announcement to stop the aid, as he fears that if it is officially stopped, "we will never be able to start it again".
Instead, it sets out a delaying policy: deliveries must not be made, but this must be presented as "technical delays" of the coming days.
The second and most explosive point of the conversation concerns the attitude of the US towards Turkey. Kissinger is outraged to learn that Deputy Secretary of State Arthur Hartman did not convey to the Turkish ambassador the stern warning that Washington would cut off military aid if Ankara rejected the ceasefire.
"It's going to be a very lonely ministry when I get back," Kissinger says, bursting into insults and adding: "Tell Hartman that the next time he doesn't follow instructions, I want his resignation. I do not accept the principle that Assistant Ministers have the right to judge when they are given a mandate."
Kissinger orders Ingersoll to force Hartman to immediately call back the Turkish Ambassador and make it clear to him, "as friend to friend", that if Turkey does not accept the ceasefire proposal conveyed by mediator Joseph Sisko, this will lead to a inevitable cessation of American aid to Ankara.
Background to Resolution 353
While the Turkish invasion had already begun, Washington was continuing efforts to reach a ceasefire through the Security Council.
A declassified telephone conversation between Henry Kissinger and Deputy Secretary of State Robert Ingersoll and U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations John Scully reveals that the U.S. delegation was watching minute-by-minute negotiations on the resolution that would evolve into Resolution 353.
US Ambassador to the UN Donald Buffam informed that the meeting was delayed, as consultations continued in the corridors of the UN. As he said, the Soviet Union was attempting to amend the American draft resolution, while the American delegation was "taking a hard line".
A central point of the negotiation was the French proposal to request the withdrawal of all foreign troops that exceeded what was provided for in international agreements, a wording that now also concerned the Turkish forces that had already landed in Cyprus.
Kissinger commented: "This might not be a bad idea... except that the Turks will not like it." He eventually agreed to the compromise wording, but demanded: "Make sure that the British and French will be with us when this happens."
The same record also reflects the effort to control the public image of the crisis. Asked about briefing reporters, Kissinger replied: "I kept it very low and my main concern was to give the impression that we knew what we were doing." At the same time, he underlined that it should be made clear that "we are not in a situation of confrontation with the Soviet Union".
UNFICYP's reaction
From the first hours of the invasion, UNFICYP was put on full alert, strengthened its observatories, carried out continuous patrols and attempted to reach local ceasefire agreements and facilitate humanitarian operations, but without being able to influence the development of the conflict.
On the same day, the Security Council adopted Resolution 353 (1974), which called for an immediate ceasefire, an end to all foreign military intervention, the withdrawal of foreign military personnel not provided for by international agreements, and the start of negotiations between Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom as guarantor powers.
However, when the resolution was adopted, Turkish forces had already established a bridgehead in the Kyrenia area and were attempting to consolidate their positions.
The documents show that the great powers had realized in time that the crisis was leading to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, but without making much effort to prevent it. The last diplomatic initiatives were exhausted while military operations were already underway.
By the dawn of July 20, 1974, diplomacy had given way to arms. In the hours that followed, the Turkish invasion shaped a new reality, the illicit consequences of which still define Cyprus more than half a century later.
