Greece’s prospects are real, but they should be defined carefully, separating what is realistic from what is aspirational
Chevron has just filed a request to acquire a 70 per cent stake in offshore Block 10 in the Ionian Sea that is expected to be granted by Greece. The following examines how this changes the energy and geopolitical balances around the wider East Med.
Chevron’s gradual expansion from the Ionian sea to the south of Crete creates a unified energy axis under an American “umbrella”, which upgrades Greece’s position in Western energy planning and strengthens its role as a natural gas gateway to Europe.
What this signifies for Greece
Block 10 directly borders the Block A2 concession to the north. Because Chevron and Helleniq Energy have already secured Block A2, the South of Peloponnese block, and two blocks south of Crete, acquiring Block 10 creates a seamless, contiguous exploration corridor spanning over 60,000 square kilometres. Upstream energy majors favour consolidated acreage because it allows them to map out entire underground gas basins rather than fragmented pockets.
Greece is heavily positioning itself to become Europe’s primary regional energy gateway. If Block 10 and the Cretan blocks yield commercial discoveries, Chevron will have the scale needed to develop the gas finds and link into regional infrastructure and LNG terminal networks.
Geopolitically, the impact is significant. US majors are anchoring Greece’s offshore strategy: ExxonMobil in the Ionian/western Greece and Chevron across southern/western offshore Greece. That gives Greece more strategic weight with the US and the EU, particularly as Europe tries to reduce Russian gas dependence and use Greece as a regional gas/LNG corridor.
Unlike brand new exploration frontiers, Block 10 is already in its second exploration phase. Helleniq Energy completed extensive 2D and 3D marine seismic data mapping on this block. By stepping in as the 70 per cent operator now, Chevron can immediately begin advanced data evaluation to pinpoint drilling targets
Block 10 has drilling pencilled in for Q2 2028, so it could become an earlier test of the western Greece prospects than the deeper Crete acreage.
The biggest challenge for Greek hydrocarbon exploration is not geology alone. It is whether Greece can prove that discoveries – if they are made – can be developed commercially, politically and socially within a rapidly changing European energy system.
Greece must make sure exploration and development are not hampered because of bureaucracy, legal challenges, environmental disputes, domestic politics and geopolitics – particularly Turkish maritime claims that must be handled robustly.
Energy cooperation between Greece and the US is now becoming more intense.
The presence of major US companies such as Chevron and ExxonMobil in Greece is no longer simply a commercial upstream story. It is gradually becoming part of a broader strategic architecture linking energy security, regional stability, maritime security and geopolitical alignment in the wider East Med.
This does not mean the US is guaranteeing Greek positions in regional disputes. But it does mean that Greek energy infrastructure and offshore development are becoming increasingly integrated into wider US strategic interests.
Several developments point in this direction.
First, Greece has evolved into a key regional energy hub for southeast and central Europe through LNG imports, gas and electricity interconnections, floating LNG terminals, and potential offshore gas production.
Greece now plays an important role in reducing European dependence on Russian energy. That aligns very closely with long-standing US strategic objectives after the Ukraine war.
Second, the involvement of US supermajors creates what might be called “strategic commercial entanglement”. When companies like Chevron and ExxonMobil commit capital to offshore Greece, the US inevitably develops a greater interest in regional stability, freedom of navigation, and protection of investment conditions. This is especially important south of Crete and in the wider East Med, where maritime jurisdiction disputes remain sensitive.
Third, the wider East Med itself has become strategically more important because it connects several overlapping priorities that include European energy diversification, Middle East stability, competition with Russia and increasingly competition with China over infrastructure and influence.
From US’ perspective, Greece is attractive because it is viewed as politically stable, strongly Western-aligned, institutionally reliable within the EU and Nato and geographically positioned between Europe, the Balkans, the Middle East and North Africa.
This is one reason why US-Greek cooperation has expanded simultaneously across energy, defence, ports, military facilities and logistics.
Energy is therefore reinforcing a wider strategic partnership rather than operating separately from it. The deeper US commercial involvement becomes in Greek infrastructure and offshore development, the harder it becomes for the US to ignore instability affecting those interests.
For Greece, this strengthens geopolitical relevance and increases its value within Western energy-security planning.
For the US, it provides a reliable regional partner, alternative energy corridors into Europe, and stronger influence over the evolving wider East Med energy system.
The presence of US supermajors creates a kind of indirect geopolitical shield – not a military guarantee, but a factor that complicates aggressive moves that, as a result, now carry diplomatic and economic risks.
But it can also increase tensions with Turkey. Fearing strategic exclusion, it is likely to respond with more maritime claims, stronger rhetoric and more aggressive actions. Greece must manage this.
Greece’s prospects are real, but they should be defined carefully, separating what is realistic from what is aspirational. The stronger opportunity for Greece is to become a regional energy platform: LNG entry point, electricity interconnection hub, renewables/storage market, and an upstream gas frontier.
The main risk is overreach. The best strategy is a disciplined portfolio strategy:-Fast-track credible upstream exploration, especially where Chevron and ExxonMobil are willing to carry technical and financial risk.
-Prioritise shallower water gas discoveries that are easier to develop and may contribute to Greece’s domestic energy security, eg Area 2.
-Given that deepwater gas discoveries may take a decade to develop and may not be commercial, treat such prospects as optional strategic upside, not the foundation of national energy policy.
-Prioritise electricity interconnections, especially Greece-Cyprus-Israel and Greece-Egypt, because they provide flexibility and fit better with Europe’s long-term decarbonisation agenda.
-Invest heavily in storage, grids and flexibility, otherwise renewables growth will hit curtailment limits.
-Use LNG infrastructure selectively, avoiding overcapacity but preserving Greece’s role as a Balkan supply gateway.
-Keep Turkey risk managed, not inflamed: proceed firmly under international law, but avoid rhetoric that turns commercial projects into direct confrontation.
The realistic prize is not just producing Greek gas. It is making Greece the main Western energy gateway of Southeast Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean. That requires balance: gas for security, renewables for competitiveness, interconnectors for energy security and regional influence, and US/EU partnerships for geopolitical weight.
Dr Charles Ellinas, @CharlesEllinas, is a councillor at the Atlantic Council
