The testimony of Jean-Claude Juncker on the reunification of the island.
By William Lindsay Simpson*
Jean-Claude Juncker has with Cyprus what he himself describes as “a long-standing friendship.” A relationship that dates back to the earliest days of European enlargement and which led him to follow the Cypriot question for more than a quarter of a century, through five presidents of the 'Kypriaki Democratia', economic crises, and failed negotiations. It is from this accumulated experience that he recently spoke in Luxembourg.
A friendship forged in challenging times—enlargement and economic crisis
Juncker’s connection with Cyprus began in 1997 with the launch of accession negotiations with the countries that would later join the European Union in 2004. Cyprus was among them. The enlargement, which may appear today as an inevitable historical development, was anything but certain at the time. “Member states had reluctance, hesitations, doubts,” recalled the former President of the European Commission. France, in particular, opposed accession, arguing that admitting a divided island risked creating permanent tensions within the Union. Cyprus nevertheless joined the EU in 2004, a decision he now considers, in retrospect, “a good initiative.” Yet he notes that the Cyprus question has remained ever-present since then: “on the table, beneath the table and under the table, regardless of whom you were discussing the problems of that country with.”
The second chapter of Juncker’s relationship with Cyprus was shaped by the financial crisis of the early 2010s. The situation had to be understood within its broader regional context: while linked to Greece, Cyprus also faced its own structural vulnerabilities. The former head of the European Commission is uncompromising on the issue of solidarity. Several member states advocated excluding Greece from the EU—an idea he strongly opposed, warning that “had Greece left the EU area, hundreds of others would have followed.” Cyprus, for its part, managed its economic and financial adjustment with discipline. As Juncker put it plainly, "Cyprus has rediscovered its status because it has shown the EU member states that it is possible to return to a more orthodox way of conducting fiscal and economic policies. And it did deliver a good job.”
Diplomacy—from halloumi to Geneva
When Juncker became president of the European Commission in 2014, he approached the reunification question with genuine determination. His first official visit to Cyprus produced an unexpected lesson in what dialogue could achieve. Meeting jointly with Níkos Anastasiades (President of the Republic) and Mustafa Akıncı (Turkish Cypriot leader), he noticed that the two men genuinely got along. From that meeting emerged an agreement on the protected designation of origin of halloumi, the cheese shared by both communities. The former president freely admits that he does not like halloumi himself. Yet the agreement mattered. A seemingly modest issue had produced a first concrete compromise between parties that had failed to agree on almost anything for decades. Juncker said he was “very impressed by the excellent atmosphere throughout the negotiation that day.” He became convinced that “if this were possible, other things would be possible.”
The 2017 Geneva peace talks, convened under UN Secretary-General António Guterres, represented the most ambitious attempt at a comprehensive settlement. The format brought together the Republic of Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriot community, and the three historical guarantor powers—Greece, the United Kingdom, and Turkey. Turkey opposed the presence of the European Commission and asked Juncker to leave the meeting. "Which, of course, as I was there, I did not follow the invitation," he recalled. Among the European Commission’s main demands were the withdrawal of Turkish troops from the northern part of the island and a fundamental revision of the guarantor system established when Cyprus became independent. Neither objective was achieved. “We left the table of negotiations without any kind of result,” Juncker admitted. The collapse of talks at Crans-Montana later that year confirmed the failure, which he would later publicly describe as “a real regret.”
The former head of the European Commission identified three principal reasons, among others, for the continuing inability of both sides to reach a settlement.
• The first concerns Turkey. “Erdoğan is what he is,” Juncker said bluntly. He describes a recurring pattern in his discussions with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: "In all the discussions I had with him concerning Cyprus, he became more and more open to internationally led solutions. But at the very end, he always went back to his initial decisions.” Moreover, those on the Turkish side who had once been prepared to take the necessary political steps are no longer in place. They have been systematically removed.
• The second issue concerns the Republic of Cyprus itself. He argued that representatives of the Republic “were not really proactive,” stressing that negotiating a compromise necessarily means accepting outcomes that fall short of one’s ideal position.
• The third factor is what might be described as a growing “collective fatigue” within the European Union regarding the Cyprus issue. According to Juncker, the number of Europeans still willing to invest political energy in reunification efforts is steadily declining.
He also recalled that the UN proposal to reunify the island — the Annan Plan — was rejected in the 2004 referendum by more than 76% of Greek Cypriots, while being accepted by a majority in the North. “You cannot really go back to that period because history has moved on,” he observed. “We have to find another way.” Juncker also made clear that he does not support a two-state solution. In his view, such an outcome “does not reflect the history of the island” and “would not be in the interest of the island.”
What the EU still owes Cyprus: loyalty, confidence-building, and dialogue
For the former president, the European Union has a clear obligation toward Cyprus. Cyprus is a member state of the European Union, and the Union’s natural position must therefore be to stand behind the Republic of Cyprus — not out of partisanship, but as a matter of principle.
This duty of loyalty also derives from the EU treaties themselves, notably through obligations of cooperation and assistance. Recent geopolitical developments, including attacks affecting Cypriot territory, have further highlighted the importance of the mutual aid and defense obligations established under Article 42.7 of the Treaty on European Union.
Juncker nevertheless believes that more can still be done — namely, “to try again and again” in pursuit of peace and reunification. Despite repeated setbacks, he advocates incremental measures: confidence-building initiatives and practical cooperation such as opening additional crossing points along the Green Line separating the two parts of the island. None of these measures can replace a final political settlement, but each helps preserve the possibility of one in the future. The former head of the European Commission has also repeatedly stressed the importance of involving the younger generations in this process: "If you want to keep young people on board, you have to speed up because we have no time to lose.”
The obligation to keep talking remains the only way to preserve the possibility that one day, both sides may finally hear each other. “Silence has never brought an answer to any kind of problem,” he insisted—neither within a couple nor within an island!
*Mr. Simpson is a lawyer and President of the Conférence Saint-Yves (Luxembourg Catholic Law Society - www.csy.lu)
