By Marc Champion
We still don't know when the Strait of Hormuz will open and when the U.S. war with Iran will end. However, thanks to a carefully leaked piece of information from the Trump administration, we now know what a deal is for, including a moratorium on uranium enrichment and an end to the blockade of this vital passage for oil flows. Suppose that this time, against the odds, the men who govern Tehran will simply say "yes" to everything – would this agreement be worth the war?
The short answer is no. However, this is a question that is answered differently for each protagonist of the conflict. And the conclusion could also evolve in retrospect, because Iran will change because of this conflict – the only question is how. Everything is open once peace is restored: from a more aggressive and powerful Islamic Republic to the collapse of the regime.
The most important and indisputable reason why the US proposal, as we know it from the leaks, could not justify the war is that it has created a problem that would not otherwise exist: Iranian control of the Strait of Hormuz. This is not an issue that can be resolved simply by ending the existing blockades. The possibility of imposing tolls and granting or not granting permits offers the Tehran regime a huge potential source of funding and geopolitical influence that - like its nuclear program - will now require continuous management. This is true regardless of whether the problem is addressed through negotiations, further conflicts or the construction of additional bypass pipelines that will cross the Arab states of the Gulf.
Just as – rightly – all recent US presidents believed that the Islamic Republic should not be allowed to develop a nuclear arsenal, no occupant of the White House is likely to accept meaningful Iranian control over Hormuz. However, Iran's state media announced last week that a new system for issuing permits for transit through the strait had been put into operation. This, if allowed to operate, would provide Tehran with the means to put pressure on any government that wishes to import or export oil, gas, fertilizers or other goods through Hormuz.
This brings us to the second undeniable negative element of the war: it has severely damaged the Arab states of the Gulf and will force them to reconsider their dependence on US forces to protect themselves against Iran. In this conflict, the US bases provoked the Iranian attacks they were supposed to prevent.
But it is not so much the material damage to the US allies that is causing concern, but rather the fact that an apparent security "bubble" has burst, on which a significant part of their enormous wealth rests. Foreign investors, bankers, etc., should henceforth take into account the fact that Iran may again start firing missiles at its Arab neighbours at any time.
The United Arab Emirates cannot accept this, so – like Israel – it will oppose any agreement that leaves the Iranian regime in power and capable of projecting power. The agreement, as it has been presented, would do just that. Other Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, are more concerned about the much greater devastation that would be wrought by a protracted, all-out war, in which all energy and water infrastructure would be targeted.
Still, the one-page memorandum of understanding reportedly does not appear to refer to Tehran's missile program or its network of proxies, two issues that were presented as the fatal flaws of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) — an agreement that, in President Donald Trump's words, was the worst ever negotiated.
The latest memorandum of understanding, as leaked to Axios on Wednesday, reads something like this: The two sides will continue the ceasefire for 30 days, during which time they will gradually lift their blockades in the Strait of Hormuz and negotiate a viable agreement on Iran's nuclear program.
The first position of the US at the start of these talks is that Tehran must commit not to build nuclear weapons, something that Iran has repeatedly stated, so it should not be an obstacle. Of course, a new statement would not be more convincing than in the past.
The second thesis is that the Islamic Republic should accept a moratorium on any kind of uranium enrichment for 12 to 15 years. The US had previously proposed 20 years, while Iran counter-proposed five. Therefore, a 15-year deal would be the best-case scenario — especially after Iran's new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, said he would defend his nuclear rights as if they were his borders.
The third requirement is that Iran will have to hand over all of the 440 kilograms of uranium it has enriched to 60%, a level that is just one step away from the 90% needed to build a nuclear warhead. Iran will also have to accept an enhanced inspection regime and, once the suspension ends, limit any further uranium enrichment to 3.67% – the level required for electricity generation. In return, Tehran will receive sanctions relief and the release of frozen funds.
In other words, this would be a deal that in many ways looks a lot like the 2015 JCPOA, which Trump cancelled in 2018 because it was only intended to limit, not terminate, Iran's uranium enrichment program. The passage of time and other developments make it difficult to compare key figures (Iran, for example, did not have 60% enriched uranium in 2015), but similarities (such as the 10- to 15-year sunset clause that would have left Iran the right to enrichment) are hard to ignore.
Trump and his cabinet are damaging their arguments for war because of their inconsistency. The conflict has severely degraded Iran's ballistic missile production capability, which had accelerated since the first joint U.S.-Israel strike last summer, as well as its ability to support and direct its network of proxies from Yemen to Gaza and from Lebanon to Iraq.
So the bombings have already done some of the work that a better version of the JCPOA could have done. But if you want to know if that's enough to justify the decision to declare war, just look at Israel's reaction to the prospect of an agreement to end it: It launched airstrikes on Beirut — a red line for Tehran that cancels any deal — for the first time since Trump announced the April 8 ceasefire, which Israel also sought to torpedo through massive strikes on the Lebanese capital.
Israel's priorities were the complete destruction of Iran's missile program and the total paralysis of its ability to support and mobilize its network of proxies against Israel. These have not been achieved and arguably cannot be achieved without regime change or the collapse of the Iranian state. There is no agreement that the Islamic Republic would consent to and that Israel could approve. And while withdrawing from this war on the basis of the leaked memorandum of understanding is right for the US, it cannot strategically justify the decision to start the war.
BloombergOpinion
