VASILIS KAPIS - THE WAR HAS LAID BARE CYPRUS'S STRATEGIC POSITION AND ITS VULNERABILITIES - in-cyprus 11/4 by Xenia Tourki
A war that began as a regional conflict is rapidly reshaping not only the balance of power in the Middle East but the foundations of the global economy and international security. At the centre of it all lies a single strategic chokepoint: the Strait of Hormuz, through which a vast proportion of the world’s energy supply flows.
Within this complex geopolitical equation, Cyprus finds itself squarely in the eye of the storm, says Vasilis Kapis, Visiting Academic at the University of Cyprus. Its position in the Eastern Mediterranean makes it a key hub for humanitarian operations, energy planning and security missions — particularly in times of crisis. But that same proximity to a volatile region exposes it directly to the consequences of any escalation, whether in terms of security, migration or the energy uncertainty that bears down on the economy and on people’s daily lives.
“The crisis has laid bare, with traumatic clarity, Cyprus’s strategic position and its vulnerabilities, while simultaneously revealing the EU’s own dynamics. The defining feature of Cyprus’s position is this duality — between its strategic importance and its structural fragility,” he says.
The crisis also throws into sharper relief than ever the dual nature of Cyprus’s reality: on one hand, a pillar of stability and European presence in the region; on the other, a state with real structural weaknesses in defence and strategic autonomy. Deeper ties with Greece and growing EU engagement are creating a new security framework — but they also make clear that Cyprus’s geopolitical elevation must be matched by a corresponding strengthening of its capabilities, if it is to remain a protagonist rather than a spectator in the events unfolding around it.
Regardless of how the war ends, Tehran is developing and deploying methods to control the Strait of Hormuz. How likely is it to succeed, and what would the consequences be?
The central axis of this crisis is the price and security of fuel supply. The flow of oil and gas from the Gulf — vital to the global economy — is becoming scarce and deeply precarious, sending prices to historic highs. This is driven not only by an actual reduction in supply but, above all, by the uncertainty flooding international markets. Energy security has ceased to be an economic question and become a political one.
Iran is emerging as the absolute gatekeeper of access, creating a two-tier market. Favoured countries — likely those with close ties to Tehran, such as China — enjoy a privileged but inherently unstable connection, while Western nations find themselves facing a serious energy emergency. Forced to turn to costlier and more distant alternatives, such as liquefied natural gas from the United States, they face dramatically higher industrial operating costs and a squeeze on citizens’ purchasing power. The result is a severe inflationary shock pushing the global economy towards deep recession, disrupting everything from transport to basic production.
Will the war change the EU’s geopolitical orientation — in terms of both energy security and its relationship with the United States? If so, how?
The conflict is acting as a catalyst, compelling the EU to fundamentally reassess its geopolitical positions. What is emerging is a complex, dynamic push for greater autonomy — shaped under the pressure of events.
Central to this is the clear reluctance of many European countries to countenance direct military involvement in any escalation aimed at forcing open the Strait of Hormuz. Such a move would threaten energy supplies and risk triggering a new mass migration crisis towards European shores. European strategy is therefore focused on diplomacy, deterrence and maximum political and economic pressure on Iran — precisely to avoid that outcome.
In this context, Eastern Mediterranean energy reserves are acquiring new strategic weight. The natural gas deposits in the exclusive economic zones of Cyprus and Greece are no longer purely economic assets. They are becoming geostrategic ones, central to European energy security and political autonomy.
The EU’s relationship with Washington is shifting accordingly — towards a more balanced, if often more complicated, partnership. Strategic dependence on the US remains deep, particularly in intelligence and threat management. But a distinctly European consciousness is developing: one that wants to set its own boundaries and its own priorities.
How is the new architecture of the Middle East taking shape? Given that Iran has been significantly weakened, what might the day after bring in terms of alliances — with Arab states or with Israel?
The crisis is accelerating a radical restructuring of the region’s architecture, defined above all by the simultaneous weakening of its traditional state powers. Iran, though it retains a proxy network, is being damaged economically and militarily by isolation and conflict. Saudi Arabia, despite its diplomatic initiatives, faces internal pressures and limited power-projection capability. Israel, though militarily strong, is mired in a protracted and costly conflict that is exhausting its society and eroding its international legitimacy.
Into this vacuum, two countries appear to be consolidating their standing. Turkey is actively exploiting the turmoil to extend its influence in Syria and Iraq. Egypt, as a significant demographic and military power with control of the Suez Canal, is becoming an indispensable partner for any stability initiative. But these power vacuums will not be filled by states alone — non-state actors are equally significant players.
This is forcing the West, and the United States in particular, into a dramatic reassessment of its alliances. The need for reliable local partners against Iran and terrorism could drive a strategic rapprochement with Kurdish forces across Iraq, Syria and Iran. Meanwhile, the uncertainty will accelerate a shift in trade and transport routes away from traditional — and now dangerous — arteries, with alternatives being reinforced as a result.
How is the war affecting the geostrategic balance in the Eastern Mediterranean? Where does Cyprus stand in all of this?
The war has immediate and significant consequences for the Eastern Mediterranean — a region already marked by complex dynamics. It has laid bare, with traumatic clarity, both Cyprus’s strategic value and its structural fragility.
On one hand, the island has proved itself an indispensable hub, for humanitarian and operational reasons alike. On the other, the Republic of Cyprus’s sovereignty over its entire territory remains constrained. The presence of the British Bases, while providing a framework for international operations, underscores that absence of full Cypriot sovereignty. This complex reality makes Cyprus simultaneously a formidable asset and a vulnerable target.
Yet this time we saw tangible support from both Greece and other European countries.
Greece acted as a willing and reliable ally — providing immediate military assistance and reinforcing Cyprus’s air defences. This strengthened the Athens–Nicosia axis as the most cohesive and functional security alliance in the Eastern Mediterranean, demonstrating a depth of strategic cooperation that goes well beyond rhetoric.
The EU, meanwhile, recognised Cyprus as a vital component of European security with a clarity it has never shown before. The high-level summit in Paphos was a powerful symbol of that recognition — and the EU did not stop at declarations. France, Italy and Germany contributed resources, expertise and diplomatic support, cementing Cyprus’s position as the frontier of a zone of peace in a turbulent neighbourhood. Britain’s response, by contrast, was ambiguous and slow. Despite the British Bases and its historical ties to the region, London appeared reluctant to step up.
Yet two significant weaknesses remain. The Republic of Cyprus’s defence budget — roughly €175 million annually — is wholly inadequate for the challenges of this era and the role being assigned to it. It cannot sustain a credible air defence, meaningful maritime and aerial power projection, or effective countering of hybrid threats. Cyprus’s growing strategic importance must be matched by a radical increase in defence investment. Second, despite the practical support on offer, there remains a deep reluctance within the European establishment to publicly acknowledge the pivotal role of the Hellenic world — Greece and Cyprus — in the collective defence of south-eastern Europe. Their contribution is too often treated as a local matter rather than one of vital importance to European security as a whole.
How do you assess Turkey’s stance? Can it capitalise geopolitically on the crisis?
Turkey’s position in the current crisis is multifaceted — a blend of mediation, denunciation and calculated pursuit of its own national interests. Erdoğan has adopted a stridently anti-Israeli rhetoric, positioning himself as a champion of Muslim rights and a critic of Western powers. This bolsters his domestic standing and Turkey’s influence in the Islamic world, but generates friction with Israel and Western allies.
The crisis also hands Turkey opportunities to reinforce its military presence in neighbouring territories — particularly against Kurdish forces in Syria and Iraq — exploiting the distraction of international attention. For Ankara, the primary threat posed by Iran is not its nuclear programme but the dynamics of Iranian Kurdish groups. One final point deserves close attention: whether Turkey reaches the conclusion that only possession of nuclear weapons can guarantee its integrity amid mounting geopolitical pressure.
What were the real reasons the United States struck Iran?
The American strikes must be understood not only through the lens of immediate US interests, but as a direct outgrowth of the radical shift in Israeli strategic thinking after 7 October.
Before that attack, Israeli strategy relied on deterrence and containment of Iran’s proxies — Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad — while Iran itself represented a long-term concern, primarily over its nuclear programme. What changed afterwards was a fundamental conviction: that cutting off the tentacles of the “octopus” was no longer enough. The Hamas attack was a catastrophic failure of Israeli deterrence, and it hardened the view among Israel’s leadership that the problem was not the proxies but Iran itself — the “head of the octopus.”
The United States has its own reasons for military action — protecting its forces, ensuring freedom of navigation, deterring regional escalation. But it is also acting as Israel’s principal security partner. American strikes against Iranian targets and proxies, while officially framed as retaliation, serve the broader Israeli strategy of degrading the Iranian network. The US struck Iran, in other words, not only to protect its own interests but under the weight of intense Israeli pressure and in alignment with the new Israeli doctrine that seeks the definitive weakening of Iran as the primary source of regional instability — particularly after the shock of 7 October.
What scenarios do you see for Iran’s future, and how do you expect the conflict to develop?
Iran’s trajectory depends on a multitude of factors, internal and external. In the early hours of last Wednesday, the warring parties appeared to agree on a two-week ceasefire and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. We will have to wait and see how that holds.
The theocratic regime, with the Revolutionary Guards at its core, is likely to retain control. That means continuing to invest in its regional proxies, pursuing its nuclear programme — without necessarily building weapons in the immediate term — and exploiting anti-Western sentiment across the region. But internal destabilisation remains equally plausible. Growing economic hardship, social discontent and pressure from a restless younger generation could trigger serious unrest — though not necessarily the fall of the regime.
If the conflict resumes after the two-week pause, it is likely to settle into controlled escalation: proxy warfare and sporadic, limited strikes. Two scenarios follow from there. The first is gradual de-escalation, with regional relations normalising and energy and trade flows recovering. The second is a prolonged period of instability — episodic strikes and counter-strikes, Iran backing its proxies, the US seeking to contain it, and neither side achieving victory or a lasting peace.
What is the situation inside Iran, with the Revolutionary Guards controlling almost everything?
The situation inside Iran is inseparable from the dominance of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The IRGC has evolved from an ideological military force into a state within a state — controlling virtually every aspect of Iranian society, the economy and political life. That grip severely limits the space for reform or democratisation.
Dissent is suppressed by force. Economic sanctions, while punishing ordinary Iranians, frequently reinforce the IRGC’s power: it controls illicit trade routes and profits from what amounts to a parallel resistance economy. This makes Iran a deeply difficult interlocutor internationally. The regime’s decisions flow from a deeply rooted ideology and a formidable military-economic complex that is determined to hold on to power at any cost.
