In a previous article, we examined the concentration of power and erosion of democracy in Cyprus. This article advances that discussion, focusing on the 2025 Democracy Index from the Economist Intelligence Unit and its sobering verdict on Cyprus’s political and institutional health. The island remains a liberal democracy but is now classified as a ‘Flawed Democracy.’ This classification highlights a widening gap: Cyprus’s democratic ‘hardware’—electoral systems and legal rights—remains in place, yet its ‘software’—efficiency, transparency, and citizen trust essential for effective governance—lags behind. Cyprus is at an impasse: its party system is cartelised, and its democratic identity suffers from internal friction, further eroding democratic norms. Renewal is necessary, maybe by the entry of new parties in parliament, but not guaranteed.
The Anatomy of a Flawed Democracy
In the EIU’s system, a flawed democracy means free, fair elections and respected civil liberties. However, governance is weak, political culture is stagnant, and participation is low. Cyprus scores 7.38 out of 10, ranking 40th globally, down from 37th in previous years. The country excels in the Election Process (9.17) and Civil Liberties (8.82), but its Functioning of Government score is only 5.36. In the EU, Cyprus ranks 22nd of 27, sharing the lowest governance score with Bulgaria. These figures show that Cyprus manages voting well but struggles with governance.
The Governance Gap: A European Outlier
The Functioning of the government pillar is fundamental in a democracy. Choosing a leader is one thing; running the country well is another. Government functioning highlights what happens after the election: policy implementation, transparency, and accountability. The contrast is clear: the government operates outside corruption, or it becomes part of it. A full democracy requires a competent, independent civil service free from political interference. Cyprus’s 5.36 score is an outlier in Europe; Nordic countries score above 9. This signals institutional inefficiency and public disillusionment, rooted in years of favouring political loyalty over technical skill.
The Convergence of the Right: A Structural Failure of Pluralism
A critical failure in Cypriot politics is the shrinking ideological gap between parties. Outside the traditionally distinct Left, the centre-left, centre, and right have fused into a single bloc, erasing policy contrasts. This ‘cartel party’ system trades ideology for executive power. The current administration exemplifies this: headed by a conservative DISY figure who rose through a partnership with the centre and centre-left. The coalition has since grown to include both DISY and the extreme-right ELAM, further blurring alternatives.
This ‘grand convergence’ signals a political environment stripped of traditional checks and balances. When centre-right, centre-left, or even extreme right parties join or support the same executive, demand for distinct alternatives disappears. The electorate faces a superficial choice between identical governance, only the occupants of power change. The EIU flags these settings as high risk for democratic decay, alienating voters who see the political class as a closed shop.
The Economics of Patronage: The Spoils of Corruption
Limited political differentiation is fuelled by patronage networks—the ‘spoils of corruption.’ Participation is driven by access to state resources, not policy. This clientelism (rousfeti’) allows all parties to retain influence by appointing loyalists. The EIU’s low ‘Political Culture’ score (6.88) shows weak democratic norms and a loyalty-first culture.
By forging a broad ‘pro-government’ bloc with the extreme right, the administration destroys parliamentary scrutiny and violates previous norms. The ‘politics of the spoils’ hijacks government. Party survival trumps transparency and efficiency. Securing a majority eclipses democratic values and entrenches a ‘culture of impunity.’ The distribution of state assets and contracts now dominates steadily lowering Cyprus’s transparency indices.
The Judicial and Executive Bottlenecks
Political convergence deepens weaknesses, especially in judiciary. By 2026, Cyprus will still have one of the EU’s slowest judicial systems, making the ‘Rule of Law’ seem theoretical. In a patronage system, slow justice shields against scrutiny, enabling institutional stagnation and delaying corruption challenges indefinitely.
The Attorney General’s dual role is a critical failure in executive accountability. It combines advisory and prosecutorial powers. Unlike systems where halting prosecutions is subject to judicial review, Cyprus has no such mechanism. This grants the executive legal immunity. Undifferentiated party blocs make it easy to distribute ‘spoils’ with little risk of prosecution. This is unlike democracies with strong checks and balances. The EIU cites this as a main reason Cyprus cannot become a Full Democracy. Without independent oversight, the government lacks the friction needed to prevent abuse of power.
The Participation Malaise and the Crisis of Legitimacy
Political cartelisation has led to a malaise of participation. When parties unite only to pursue state resources, voter apathy becomes rational. The EIU notes a growing gap between public expectations and government performance. High-achieving young Cypriots emigrate, seeing connections rewarded over merit. This brain drain weakens public administration.
The falling ‘Political Culture’ score reflects a legitimacy crisis. Barriers against extremism are weaker, and the centre-right and centre-left have changed roles. Instead of containing the extreme right, they normalise it to keep patronage. Disillusioned publics, disappointed by mainstream parties, either support ‘strongman’ leaders or bypass parliament. Including the extreme right in government support exemplifies this shift and indirectly validates anti-systemic rhetoric.
Conclusion: The Necessity of Radical Reform
To progress from ‘Flawed Democracy’ to ‘Full Democracy,’ Cyprus needs structural, not elective, reform. The EIU report says Cyprus is a ‘theatre of democracy.’ Here, elections are just a spectacle, separated from real governance. Breaking this ‘glass ceiling’ means rejecting the politics of the spoils and demanding transparency and accountability without compromise.
This requires urgent digitalisation of the courts to eliminate human involvement in administration, the formal separation of the Attorney General’s conflicting powers, and a decisive shift to merit-based public administration. Critically, the political class must abandon its cartelised unity, which ideological differences are ignored in pursuit of executive power, and restore real opposition. Cyprus must restore principled opposition to recreate necessary friction and stop state capture. If these contrasts are not established, Cyprus will remain in the ‘Flawed’ category—a country with the hardware of a modern state but the software of a previous era—facing increasing and irreparable isolation from the EU’s democratic core.
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Concentration of power and the erosion of democracy in Cyprus 5/4
The Republic of Cyprus is currently at a significant constitutional juncture. The legislative debate on amending Article 17 of the Constitution, which guarantees the secrecy of correspondence, for a new surveillance framework has revealed a deep divide between state security and individual liberty.
However, an analytical review of the Cypriot constitutional framework reveals that this is not merely a technical debate about law enforcement tools.
Rather, it is indicative of a structural shift towards the systematic concentration of power within the Executive branch, accompanied by the erosion of the checks and balances essential for a functioning democracy.
The risks inherent in expanded surveillance powers should be obvious. Examining the foundational imbalances inherent in the Cypriot state, the poor performance of law enforcement agencies and Cyprus’ standings in international indices, suggests a steady and troubling decline in democratic health!
Constitutional architecture and executive dominance
Most EU member states use parliamentary or semi-presidential systems, in which executive authority is balanced by a prime minister or is accountable to a legislature. Cyprus maintains a full presidential system, established by the 1960 constitution only strengthened by what we call the ‘doctrine of necessity’. Following the intercommunal strife of 1963–1964, the subsequent withdrawal of Turkish Cypriots from state institutions, allowed the state to diverge from the exact terms of the 1960 Constitution to ensure the government’s continued functioning. And so, the ‘doctrine of necessity’ was historically justified as a temporary measure to ensure the survival of the state. However, it has been applied for over six decades, resulting in the gradual expansion of executive prerogative. The result is a system in which power is heavily concentrated within the Presidential Palace, often at the expense of the original, rigid ‘Trias Politica’ structure.
The Trias Politica, or separation of powers, is the democratic principle whereby the state is divided into three branches: the legislature which makes laws, the executive which enforces the laws, and the judiciary which interprets them. In Cyprus, the president serves as both head of state and head of government. The president possesses the unilateral authority to appoint and dismiss the council of ministers, the chief of police, the head of the Cyprus intelligence service, and the attorney general. The president is not accountable to the House of Representatives, and there is no mechanism for a ‘vote of no confidence.’ The executive branch frequently overpowers the legislative and judicial branches, resulting in a lack of horizontal accountability.
Corruption metrics and ‘flawed democracy’
The erosion of democratic safeguards in Cyprus is reflected in objective international data provided by leading research institutions. The Democracy Index of the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), classifies Cyprus as a ‘flawed democracy’. While the nation performs well in electoral metrics, its ranking is significantly hindered by its very low score in the ‘functioning of government’ category. According to the EIU’s methodology, a low score in this category indicates a state characterised by institutional gridlock, an executive branch with significant influence that frequently bypasses legislative scrutiny, and a disconnect between the political elite and the general public. Decision-making is opaque, and the legislature often fails to act as an effective check on the presidency.
This democratic decline is also reflected in the Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, in which Cyprus has fallen to 49th place globally with a systematically dropping score over the last 12 years. This ranking is fuelled by the perception of undue influence on the judiciary and a lack of accountability for senior public officials. When a state ranks low on corruption indices, it suggests that public office is too often utilised for private gain or political protection. The ‘Videogate’ scandals of early 2026, involving alleged cash-for-favours negotiations, and the ongoing controversies surrounding ‘shadow funds’, have reinforced the international view that the Cypriot state suffers from systemic malpractice. In such an environment, the concentration of secret surveillance powers within the executive branch should be viewed with extreme scepticism.
The President’s fondness for centralized authority
Since taking office, the administration has shown a clear preference for centralised authority over legislative transparency and consensus. A defining moment was the presidential veto in October 2024 of a bill that would have mandated the disclosure of donors to the Independent Social Support Fund. This fund, which was previously chaired by the First Lady, operated with significant opacity. When the House of Representatives sought to implement transparency measures, the president used his veto and subsequently challenged the matter in the Supreme Court. This demonstrated preference for executive secrecy over legislative oversight. This model of governance, in which the leader prioritises personal control over institutional transparency, suggests that new surveillance powers would likely be used to further consolidate executive dominance.
The Attorney General
A key issue in the Cypriot model is that the Attorney General holds a dual role, acting as the President’s legal advisor and as the public prosecutor, who has the exclusive power to initiate or halt any criminal proceedings, and does so in real time. As the Attorney General is a presidential appointee, this creates a potential ‘closed loop’. In a healthy democracy, the state’s lawyer and the state’s investigator should be independent of each other. When these roles are combined in a single presidential appointee, the ‘watchers’ are effectively chosen by the ‘watched’. This conflict of interest means that investigations into high-level corruption often stall.
Surveillance and Institutional Incompetence
A critical analysis suggests that the current legislative push distracts from systemic failures and incompetence within law enforcement. The Cypriot police have been heavily criticised for failing to investigate crimes for which there is already tangible evidence. By framing the debate as a need for ‘modern tools’, the government is attempting to shift the narrative away from its own failures.
The case of Ioanna Photiou, is a clear example of institutional malpractice. She has publicly claimed to possess a hard drive containing evidence of police misconduct, bribery and collusion with criminal elements. Rather than launching an independent commission to investigate her allegations, the state has issued arrest warrants for the whistleblower for ‘misinformation’. The law is being used as a weapon against those who expose the system’s failures, while the system itself remains unscrutinised. Similarly, the suspension of the Paphos mayor in February 2026 for alleged crimes committed a decade ago highlights a ‘selective deafness’ within law enforcement. If the accusations were known ten years ago but are only being pursued now, this demonstrates that the police often follow political directives rather than impartial evidence. Granting such an institution expanded surveillance powers would create a political tool rather than a professional investigative body.
The ‘paper tiger’ parliament
Concentrated power is at its most dangerous when the legislature lacks the means to exercise oversight. In Cyprus, the House of Representatives is a ‘paper tiger’. For instance, it does not have the power to issue subpoenas. In robust democracies such as the US and Germany, parliamentary committees can compel officials to testify under threat of imprisonment and seize internal documents. In Cyprus, however, parliament relies on the ‘goodwill’ of the executive. Ministers and heads of the Central Intelligence Service, frequently cite ‘national security’ to avoid answering difficult questions. Without the power of subpoena, oversight becomes merely a formality rather than an effective check.
The European best practice
In healthy democracies such as the UK and Germany, surveillance is governed by the ‘double lock’ system. A minister or intelligence head requests the tap based on a security threat. Then, an independent Judicial Commissioner, typically a senior judge, must review and sign the warrant before surveillance can begin. Furthermore, these nations implement the right to notification, whereby the state is legally required to inform citizens that they were under surveillance once an investigation concludes. This acts as a deterrent against abuse.
Conclusion: Accountability over Power
Without robust checks and balances, the relationship between power concentration and corruption becomes a mathematical certainty. When the Trias Politica collapses into a single line of command the state stops serving its citizens and starts serving the ‘System’. The Cypriot executive and security apparatus are currently shrouded in suspicion, fuelled by whistleblowers in exile, leaked videos of bribery and the systematic dismantling of transparency. Granting an unaccountable state further surveillance powers invites the further erosion of the Republic. To combat corruption, a state must increase its accountability, not its powers. Anything less is a surrender to authoritarianism.
