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| Makarios’ financial demands and Kissinger’s intervention reshaped a pivotal Cold War decision. File photo PIO |
WHEN LONDON CONSIDERED LEAVING CYPRUS - KNews 29/3 by Thanasis Photiou
Makarios’ financial demands and Kissinger’s rejection of the British defense review.
Surprisingly, in the mid-1970s Britain seriously considered a complete withdrawal from Cyprus. A series of declassified British archival documents show that in the early months of 1974, the government under Harold Wilson examined the possibility of fully removing its bases from the island.
The main reason appears to have been the severe economic difficulties Britain was facing at the time. As part of broader cost-cutting efforts, officials were studying a wide strategic review aimed at reducing defense spending and the high cost of maintaining bases around the world. At that time, the annual cost of maintaining the bases in Cyprus was approximately £35 to £40 million.
Preferred option
Studies launched in the spring of 1974 on Britain’s presence east of Suez, including Cyprus, concluded that the bases were no longer militarily essential to the United Kingdom.
A classified Ministry of Defence memorandum dated May 13, 1974 and marked “UK Eyes Only” examined the scenario of abandoning the bases while retaining only limited communications facilities.
Cabinet meeting minutes from November 28, 1974 indicate that a proposal for complete withdrawal from the Sovereign Base Areas had become the “preferred option” of the Wilson government. A timeline was even discussed, with completion projected by 1976.
The Cabinet memorandum had been submitted by James Callaghan, then Foreign Secretary, who believed maintaining the bases was no longer cost-effective.
Declassified documents also describe a meeting at Chequers, the prime minister’s country residence, where Wilson and his ministers discussed in late November the possibility of closing one of the two bases. The proposal was to abandon Dhekelia, considered vulnerable because of its proximity to the ceasefire line, and retain Akrotiri, which was viewed as having broader operational capabilities.
Kissinger’s “no”
London made its final decision in 1975. The plan called for a reduction in forces, but not a full withdrawal. Strong opposition from the United States played a decisive role.
The United States had just lost its bases in Greece after Greece withdrew from NATO’s military structure. Losing Cyprus as well was considered unacceptable, since it would leave the Mediterranean, in their view, exposed to the Soviet Union.
Washington reacted immediately and forcefully when London communicated its intentions. Henry Kissinger sent a firm message to Callaghan, stressing that a withdrawal from Cyprus would be disastrous for NATO’s southeastern flank.
Kissinger applied strong pressure to ensure the bases remained in place, as the United States considered them vital for intelligence gathering and for maintaining influence in the Eastern Mediterranean.
A report from the Joint Intelligence Committee also noted that Britain’s presence acted as a stabilizing factor that discouraged the full annexation of Cyprus by Turkey.
Makarios’ “bill”
In the early 1970s, as Britain struggled with economic crisis, relations between Cyprus and the United Kingdom were further strained by financial demands from the Republic of Cyprus under Archbishop Makarios III. The Cypriot government challenged the financial arrangements tied to the British presence.
Under an Exchange of Notes between the two countries, Britain had been required to pay £12 million by 1965. This was not rent for the bases, but compensation for facilities and privileges Britain enjoyed.
Britain showed no willingness to renew the arrangement, and Nicosia was informed that any continuation would depend on progress in broader negotiations. It also became clear that London had yielded to behind-the-scenes pressure from Ankara and had agreed not to move forward with a new deal.
In 1972, Makarios presented Britain with a detailed claim covering the period from April 1, 1965 to March 31, 1972, requesting £76.5 million for the use of facilities and services. He also demanded an annual payment of £11.48 million beginning April 1, 1972.
London initially rejected these claims, stating they had no legal basis. It also made clear that any future payments would have to fall within the framework of the 1960 Exchange of Notes.
However, Foreign Secretary Alec Douglas-Home took a more pragmatic view of geopolitical developments and believed Britain should restore financial assistance to ensure the smooth operation of the bases.
Available evidence suggests a plan that included annual payments of up to £2.5 million from April 1974 to March 1980, along with a retroactive payment of £10 million.
Everything changed after the February elections, when the Labour Party returned to power. At that point, under the weight of severe economic pressures, the possibility of completely abandoning the bases was seriously considered.
In the end, their continued presence was not determined by any financial agreement. Instead, it reflected the strategic importance of Cyprus to American policy in the Eastern Mediterranean. Henry Kissinger viewed the bases as not absolutely
