CYPRUS RECALIBRATES SECURITY AND DIPLOMACY AFTER IRAN CRISIS - in-cyprus 15/3 by Costas Venizelos
New realities are taking shape after the crisis triggered by the United States and Israel’s attack on Iran, and Cyprus is among the countries feeling the effects because of its proximity to the theatre of war.
What followed the drone attack on the Akrotiri base has also altered the landscape. The acute insecurity of the first days gave way, to a large extent, to a greater sense of safety after supportive forces arrived in and around Cyprus. Even so, the continuation of the war can only bring serious consequences for everyone.
What the recent developments have shown is that Cyprus can be part of the equation, without becoming part of the war.
The first conclusion concerns solidarity. The response from Greece, France, the Netherlands, Italy and Spain to the Republic of Cyprus’s call for support has created a protective shield.
For Greece, a doctrine of decades has effectively been broken. From the old notion that “Cyprus lies far away”, the position has now moved to one of closeness. France, too, was quick to signal its presence, driven both by its relationship with Cyprus and its wider interests in the region.
The readiness of partner states to reinforce Cyprus’s security also reflects the ties Nicosia has built with those countries. That allowed President Nikos Christodoulides to pick up the phone, ask for help and receive an immediate positive response.
At the same time, this support came while the European Union is still discussing a new security and defence architecture. The regional crisis and Nicosia’s appeal have shown how solidarity and support can make this field of cooperation decisive.
The second conclusion concerns defence upgrades. The Republic of Cyprus is moving ahead with the purchase of four Greek-made anti-drone “Kentavros” systems and may proceed outside the EU SAFE framework through a direct purchase from Greek industry. The delivery time is estimated at one year.
At the same time, Cyprus is accelerating the upgrading of the Andreas Papandreou air base in Paphos and the Evangelos Florakis naval base at Mari. The United States has shown interest in involvement in both cases, but neither facility would change status and both would remain under Cypriot ownership, with outside parties contributing know-how and funding.
The plans for Paphos include extending the runway so that more military aircraft can use the base, while continuing its role in humanitarian missions and civilian evacuations. There is also a reference to the construction of a large hangar and a modern communications centre.
For the naval base at Mari, there is already interest from the European Union in financing and use, while France has for years shown interest in using the facility when needed. The United States would help with the construction of a helipad.
Nicosia has made clear that Cyprus will not become a war launchpad, and this position is understood by its interlocutors.
On military procurement, Cyprus gets most of its equipment from France, with about 80% of purchases coming from there, while other acquisitions are made from Greece, Israel and other third countries.
The third conclusion is that recent events have exposed Britain’s weakness in operating its military bases in Cyprus. The drone strike on the British base at Akrotiri, which landed on the runway, revealed serious gaps in responsiveness and reopened the wider question of the bases’ presence on the island.
Britain’s inability to operate the bases effectively creates insecurity for Cyprus and the region. The United States is aware of British weaknesses but still views the bases as useful and necessary for its own planning.
More broadly, different interests can be aligned when conditions permit, and Nicosia is linking Cyprus’s security to wider regional developments, above all while keeping Turkey’s continuing occupation as its priority.
The regional crisis risks are turning the Cyprus problem into collateral damage. Although momentum had already slowed, the latest upheaval has imposed new priorities on all sides.
Even so, Nicosia is trying to keep the Cyprus issue alive. Christodoulides is due to meet United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres in Brussels on March 18 on the sidelines of the European Council summit. While such contacts help sustain interest in the issue, international developments are changing both the context and the methods.
Turkey’s deployment of six F-16s to the occupied areas is not simply a response to the support Cyprus received from third countries, but reflects Ankara’s wider strategic goals and its resistance to any shift in regional balances.
The six aircraft are stationed at Tymbou airport, a civilian airport, while the illegal airport at occupied Lefkoniko would need upgrading if it were to host fighter jets permanently. Ankara is more troubled by the Greek presence and, in particular, by the possibility that Greek forces might remain after the crisis.
Kudret Ozersay warned on social media that if Greece did not withdraw the fighter aircraft it had sent after the crisis, a fait accompli could emerge, and Turkey might act pre-emptively to prevent that. Furthermore, Turkish analyst Emre Diner said the Turkish F-16 deployment was not only a military move but also a strong political message, intended to signal that security in the Eastern Mediterranean cannot exist without Turkey.
