Filenews 2 February 2026
By James Stavridis
As a former commander-in-chief of NATO, I never thought that the US would withdraw from the most important security alliance in the world. However, the crisis of recent weeks over Greenland's sovereignty has made me think seriously about what NATO would be like without its most important member.
NATO was founded after World War II by twelve countries, ten European and two North American. Lord Ismay, the first secretary general, had famously said that NATO exists to "keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down." He saw the development of the Cold War, the threat posed by the Soviet Union to Western Europe, and the danger of an uncontrollable Germany. He also knew that the U.S. might repeat the mistake it made after World War I: simply withdraw from the continent after hostilities ended.
From 1949 to the present, the alliance has largely maintained Ismey's goals: during the Cold War, the collapse of communism and the reunification of Germany, the endless disputes over burden-sharing, and the NATO mission in Afghanistan after September 11, which I led for four years. Despite many internal conflicts, the alliance has grown in 32 countries and remains vital for security not only in Western Europe, but also in the Balkans, the Middle East, the Arctic and the waters of Europe and Africa.
However, the dispute over Greenland is just as intense as any previous rift in the alliance. Nearly 10 European countries have sent small troops to the island in the past two weeks, ostensibly to inspect defense capabilities against an invasion by Russia and China, but mainly to prevent the U.S. military intervention threatened by President Donald Trump. So far, the coolest voices have prevailed, but the issue is not closed and there are many other issues with which the Trump Group seems ready to threaten transatlantic unity.
It is worth asking: What would NATO be like without the US?
Washington has by far the alliance's largest military budget, amounting to about $900 billion, while Trump recently floated the idea of increasing it to $1.5 trillion. However, Europe's total defence budget is quite large – the second in the world – and amounts to around $400 billion. To get an idea, Russia has about $140 billion and China about $250 billion. And with new commitments by European countries reaching 5% of GDP (3.5% for net military spending and 1.5% for related infrastructure and cyber capabilities), a lot of money is being used for defense from one side of the Atlantic to the other.
Another major loss for the alliance that the withdrawal of the US would cause would be the reduction of the defense industrial base and all related technological capabilities. Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Boeing, General Dynamics and RTX (formerly Raytheon) are huge project contractors, and about half of the world's top 25 defense companies are located in the US. However, Europe has a fairly strong industrial base, with eight of the top 25 contractors, including BAE (UK), Leonardo (Italy), Airbus (France/Germany), Thales (France), Saab (Sweden) and Rheinmetall (Germany).
The US produces the highest levels of technology, including the largest share of fifth-generation fighter jets, such as the F-35, the best long-endurance drones for reconnaissance and attack, the leading air defense systems, including the Patriot and THAAD, and the best satellites, which are key to the overall provision/exchange of information. However, Europe builds warships and submarines that are faster and with capabilities that rival many categories of American ones. And thanks to recent support for Ukraine, Europeans are quickly overtaking the US in the production of tanks, mortars and ammunition.
Europe would be able to quickly catch up on lower-tech systems such as less-endurance drones, small arms, helicopters and transport aircraft, as well as short-range air defence systems and surface-to-surface missiles. How quickly could European companies replicate the American military technology that is leaving? It probably takes five years to grow, but it's not elusive.
In terms of military might, while the U.S. can rely on a force made up entirely of volunteers, many European members of the alliance are considering some form of conscription. Nine countries are already implementing it, including both Nordic members, while Germany is set to reinstate it.
There is, of course, the important problem of the nuclear shield. Although the UK and France have small (but well-trained) nuclear powers, Europe will no longer have the strategic protection provided by Washington. Thus, European states may be forced to strengthen their own capabilities, with Germany and Poland possibly joining the nuclear club. Or they could potentially negotiate a framework with the U.S. to maintain a joint nuclear force for some time.
A huge ace up Europe's sleeve is that a NATO without the US will not have the same global responsibilities – driven by US priorities – that drove the alliance to wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. NATO could focus more on its neighbourhood, particularly on protecting Ukraine – which is more likely to eventually join a NATO without the US. The alliance would still have six countries in the Arctic.
If the U.S. moves to a narrower focus on the Western Hemisphere – as both the new National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy suggest – I suspect that the remaining 31 NATO member states will eventually be... Fine. And with the addition of Ukraine – with 40 million inhabitants and a highly experienced army – the alliance will return to 32 members.
Hopefully the US will remain steadfast in its commitment to the Organization, but I suspect that the Europeans are starting to think about other options for their defense. Many people keep asking me: "Who will win the war in Ukraine, the Russians or the Ukrainians?" The real winner could be the Europeans, if they unite and create a stronger pan-European defense. Let's hope that this will be done within the framework of NATO and together with the USA. But if needed, I think they could do it on their own.
Adaptation – Editing: Lydia Roubopoulou
*Stavridis is dean emeritus of Tufts University's Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He serves on the boards of directors of Aon, Fortinet and Ankura Consulting Group.
