in-cyprus 4 January 2026 - by Costas Venizelos
Turkey is moving aggressively to reclaim “lost ground” regarding its “Blue Homeland” (Mavi Vatan) doctrine, attempting to block regional developments it views as threatening. Ankara is actively working to dismantle partnerships between Nicosia and Athens, aiming to reshuffle the regional deck with its own “marked cards.”
Using a tactic of tension and blackmail against Cyprus, Greece, and third countries, Ankara signals both irritation and an unjustified insecurity, given its constant reliance on military superiority.
Pressure on Syria for Maritime Deals
Ankara is exerting continuous pressure on Damascus to expedite an agreement for hydrocarbon exploration. This push to define a Turkey-Syria Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) began with the installation of the new regime in Damascus but was initially thwarted by moves from Nicosia and the EU, whom the Ahmed al-Shara regime wishes to appease.
The issue resurfaced following the recent maritime border agreement between the Republic of Cyprus and Lebanon. Turkey viewed this Cyprus-Lebanon deal as a direct threat to its “Blue Homeland” ambitions. Turkish Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar recently stated that Turkey aims to sign a deal with Syria in 2026 for offshore hydrocarbon exploration.
However, reports suggest:
- Discussions primarily focus on inland drilling rather than offshore.
- The Syrian regime is acting more autonomously following Ahmed al-Shara’s meeting with President Trump on 10 November 2025.
- Syria is strengthening ties with Saudi Arabia, distancing itself from Turkish demands.
Strategic Goals in the Eastern Mediterranean
Erdogan’s regime believes a deal with Syria could overturn existing maritime agreements. Turkey specifically targets Cyprus’s deals with Egypt, Lebanon, and Israel. Ankara is promoting a regional conference—including the illegal secessionist state in the north—an idea the Americans may favour to bridge energy and diplomatic gaps.
Turkey seeks to redraw maritime borders to secure a dominant role, a move Nicosia and its neighbours (Egypt, Lebanon, and Israel) refuse to accept. Despite its posturing, Turkey appears insecure. Meanwhile, it is expanding its reach elsewhere, with state-owned TPAO securing exclusive hydrocarbon rights over 5,000 square kilometres offshore Somalia, where drilling is expected to begin this year.
Cyprus Issue: Stalling and Buffer Zone Tensions
Regarding the Cyprus problem, the Turkish side maintains its demand for a “two-state solution,” a position reaffirmed by Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan to UN Envoy Maria Angela Holguín. On the ground, Ankara is provoking “mini-tensions” in the buffer zone, such as the recent calculated incident involving farmers at Mammari.
The End of “Calm Waters” with Greece
The period of “calm waters” in Greek-Turkish relations is ending. Ankara has resumed airspace violations, which Athens expects to increase. In his New Year’s message, Erdogan was notably aggressive toward Cyprus, specifically citing the Cyprus-Lebanon agreement as an affront to the “Blue Homeland.”
The Trump-Netanyahu-Erdogan Dynamic
The US administration seeks a coexistence between Israel and Turkey to ease Washington’s regional burden. President Trump recently praised Erdogan in front of Netanyahu, despite the latter’s attempts to criticise Turkey at the White House.
However, despite public rhetoric:
- Turkey remains excluded from the F-35 programme.
- CAATSA sanctions remain in effect.
- Trump feels closer to Netanyahu but views Erdogan as a necessary partner.
Stalling Until the EU Presidency Ends
Turkey is deliberately “running down the clock” on the Cyprus issue, aiming to delay any significant movement until after the Cyprus EU Presidency concludes in July. Ankara believes Nicosia will hold a diplomatic advantage during the next six months and is likely to “freeze” Euro-Turkish relations at a political level during this period.
Negotiations at the representative level continue, focusing on:
- Confidence Building Measures (CBMs): Opening new crossing points, demining, and creating a civil society advisory body.
- Upcoming Meetings: A third meeting between President Christodoulides and Turkish Cypriot leader Tufan Erhürman is expected in late January, with Maria Angela Holguín present.
The outcome of this meeting will determine if UN Secretary-General António Guterres convenes a new informal Five-Party Conference. Given that Guterres’s term ends at the end of 2026, the time for high-level diplomacy is limited. In New York, UN Representative Colin Stewart will brief the Security Council on 15 January, with the UNFICYP mandate expected to be renewed on 29 January.
