in-cyprus 7 December 2025 - by Xenia Tourki
How much closer are we to an agreement to end the war in Ukraine? What does the recent diplomatic activity mean, with the Americans at the centre? Are Europe and Kyiv right to worry that the peace plan largely favours Russian interests?
The question is what could force Russia to stop the war. In the absence of serious pressure, such as stronger sanctions from the Trump administration, the answer comes down to the economy and the battlefield. And recently, Moscow has been advancing again and capturing new territory, Michalis Kontos, Associate Professor of International Relations at the University of Nicosia, told fileleftheros in an interview—which shows it has no intention of making concessions. “Trump’s plan serves American interests by disengaging from the economic cost of the war. On the other hand, the willingness to recognise Russia’s territorial conquests, which is being promoted through the plan, clearly serves Russian interests,” he stressed.
The possible imposition of extensive territorial fait accompli in Ukraine could have serious consequences for Cyprus, as there is widespread concern about what will happen if Turkish expansionism is “rewarded”. Michalis Kontos explained that two interrelated issues arise at this point: the first concerns the acceptance of territorial fait accompli by the victim of foreign aggression, and the second concerns their international recognition. On the first point, he said Cyprus has nothing to worry about. “As for the second, there is concern about whether any international recognition of Russian sovereignty over occupied Ukrainian territories will also facilitate the international recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,” he noted.
We find ourselves in a particularly complex and fluid phase of the war in Ukraine. What are the decisive factors shaping this new reality, and how do they affect the course of the conflict?
From the beginning of the conflict, as in any military confrontation, the decisive factor has been and remains comparative strength. Russia is much stronger militarily and enjoys a significant degree of self-sufficiency in its military industry. Whilst it has been affected by the Western embargo—mainly regarding the import of high-technology products—it has nonetheless found alternative sources of supply which have satisfactorily served its military objectives. In recent months, it appears to have broken the stability of the territorial status quo, which had been observed for approximately 18 months, advancing again and capturing new territories. This is also due to the fatigue of the smaller Ukrainian army with fewer reserves.
How do you evaluate the American plan for peace in Ukraine? Does it serve the interests of both sides or is it a major victory for Vladimir Putin?
The American stance has changed under the Trump presidency. From the balancing strategy in the form of a proxy war, which the Biden administration had adopted, we’ve moved to an appeasement strategy: the American side is retreating from its firm commitment to Ukrainian defence and expects corresponding concessions from Moscow. The main cause of this change is clear: Trump’s different perception of the conflict. However, we should say that even if Trump had lost the election, a new Democratic administration would not have had very different options.
The war is extremely protracted—approaching four years, the length of the First World War—and the US cannot remain indefinitely in an expensive indirect war without the immediate involvement of vital American interests. From the moment Russia managed to absorb the shocks of Western sanctions and maintain an active front, one way or another, Washington would have had to find an exit door. In this sense, Trump’s plan serves American interests by disengaging from the economic cost of the war. On the other hand, the willingness to recognise Russia’s territorial conquests, which is being promoted through the plan, clearly serves Russian interests. At this stage, Russia wants to avoid a temporary de facto situation that could potentially evolve negatively in the future. Consequently, it seeks a final and agreed solution to the issue through international recognition of changes on the ground.
Can we predict what Russia’s next moves will be if it gets what it wants? Which European countries might find themselves in its crosshairs?
There’s discussion about Moldova and the Baltic countries. However, I’m personally not convinced that Russian territorial expansion in Ukraine, if and when it locks in with the end of hostilities, will signal an unstoppable campaign of westward expansionism. In Europe, narratives seem to prevail that compare Russia to Nazi Germany and Hitler’s expansionism, which was encouraged by the initial appeasement by France and Britain. Hence the EU’s shift towards the major armament programme SAFE, to avoid sending messages of weakness that would strengthen Russian expansionism.
Of course, Russia has also given significant cause with the hybrid disinformation operations of recent years, which promoted pro-Russian and anti-American and anti-European narratives amongst specific European social groups. Recently, the movements of Russian unmanned aircraft over European airports and other critical infrastructure have intensified Europeans’ sense of insecurity and strengthened the perception of the Russian threat.
How does the state of the Russian economy affect the situation?
To connect this with the previous question, I would say Russia differs fundamentally from Nazi Germany, just as that era differs from the current one. Firstly, the multi-year military adventure in Ukraine has begun to cause serious pressure on the Russian economy. The sanctions may not have pushed Russia towards exiting the war, but they have imposed economic costs, forcing it to sell energy at very low prices whilst also disrupting the supply chains of Russian industry.
Already since last June, the Russian Finance Minister had admitted that Russia is on the brink of recession. Moreover, the multi-year focus on a war economy will bring significant upheavals to the production process after the end of hostilities, with unpredictable consequences for both the country’s productive class and consumers. In contrast to the era of the Second World War, which followed the Great Depression and broke out during a period of economic nationalism and expansionism, in the contemporary environment there is a serious degree of economic interdependence.
Every choice to exit the system of interdependence entails costs. Russia gambled on leaving interdependence with the West to enter the war, hoping for a change in the international order, the de-dollarisation of the global economy and the emergence of BRICS as an alternative global economic structure that would give it freedom of movement. However, this restructuring has not yet materialised, despite the strengthening of China’s international role and its economic initiatives. Instead, the middle powers on which this reversal of the post-war international economic order would be based—such as India, Saudi Arabia and Turkey—are not choosing a camp but playing with both sides.
Taking the above into account, one realises that Russia will hardly soon be in a position to finance a new, unilateral military adventure. Saying this, of course, I do not reject the importance of increasing the EU’s defence spending and developing autonomous rapid action mechanisms. However, perceptions of the Russian threat are excessive and carry the risk of creating a dangerous spiral of tension.
Do you believe that the American plan, if implemented, will ensure that Moscow will not repeat a new invasion of Ukraine in one or two years, or after the end of Donald Trump’s term?
No one can guarantee this. However, what I’ve already mentioned regarding the prospect of Russian expansionism in Europe applies, partially, to the case of Ukraine as well: Russia will need to rebuild its economy by creating post-war production lines. This will create prospects for stability for a period of time. Simultaneously, depending on the type of security guarantees Ukraine will have, the level of the cost threshold that Russia will need to overcome in order to re-enter a military adventure in Ukraine will be determined. However, small incidents and limited-scale Russian expansion along the confrontation line are likely.
Issues arise regarding territorial fait accompli
What will be the likely implications for Cyprus if, ultimately, for the first time since 1945, extensive territorial fait accompli are imposed in Ukraine? Is the fear justified that if Russian expansionism in Ukraine is rewarded, the same will happen with Turkish expansionism in Cyprus?
Two interrelated issues arise here: the first concerns the acceptance of territorial fait accompli by the victim of foreign aggression, and the second concerns their international recognition. On the first point, Cyprus is not affected because it has already accepted the territorial fait accompli of the Turkish invasion of 1974: the acceptance of the principle of bizonal federation and its incorporation into UN Security Council resolutions is a strong indication that Cyprus accepts the locking in of the territorial arrangement imposed by force of arms. What we’re discussing is the degree of sovereignty that the two territorial zones will enjoy, not their existence per se. As for the second, there is concern about whether any international recognition of Russian sovereignty over occupied Ukrainian territories will also facilitate the international recognition of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”.
Does Cyprus have the tools to react?
This possibility does indeed create risks, but these can be overcome. Firstly, international recognition does not arise as an obligation of states, but as a unilateral right. Consequently, each state chooses whether to recognise a territorial change exclusively according to its interests. Perhaps the greatest success of Cypriot foreign policy in its history is the successful containment of the recognition of the “TRNC” by third states. This is a success based on the relevant Security Council resolutions and achieved as a result of good work at the diplomatic level.
Consequently, in the event that Ukraine accepts the fait accompli as legitimate and the international community follows, Cyprus will have one more obstacle to overcome but will continue to have the tools on which its success so far has been based. In this case, it will need to find the appropriate ways to use them under the new circumstances.
In the event that the Ukrainian issue is resolved, will Russia’s relations with the West be restored to the degree they were before the 2022 invasion? What other issues remain open between the two sides?
Every major rupture leaves its wounds, the healing time of which varies according to the characteristics of each conflict. Europe is already moving dynamically towards independence from Russian energy. This may change to some extent in the future, but the creation of new infrastructure to replace the infrastructure for transporting Russian natural gas to European markets will make it difficult to restore the previous situation. This will keep interdependence between Russia and Europe at low levels for some years, which will favour mutual suspicion and the creation of tensions. However, in international politics, novel dynamics often develop quickly that have a decisive effect on interstate relations and networks of international interdependence, making accurate prediction of the future impossible.
Russia’s relationship with China remains unshakeable
How will an agreement on Ukraine affect China? And to put it more simply, will it be good or bad news for Beijing?
China has exploited the war in Ukraine by strengthening its relations with Russia, but mainly by strengthening Russian dependence on Beijing, thus creating an asymmetric bilateral relationship. Taking advantage of the two wars in recent years, China has for the first time formed an anti-American coalition, a quasi-alliance that now includes Iran. If one looks, for example, at how China and Russia vote in the Security Council on the Ukrainian and Palestinian issues, one observes that they act in complete alignment on both. Moreover, whilst Iran may have been left unassisted during the 12-day war with Israel, China and Russia subsequently strengthened it militarily to face future threats of a similar type. If Trump’s plan is implemented, then Russia will likely flirt with greater American influence, given the large economic needs it will face.
Already, before the outbreak of war in 2022, there was considerable discussion, mainly in Republican circles in the US, about the possibility of an American wedge in the Russo-Chinese coalition, attracting Moscow into a closer relationship with Washington. Supporters of this view compare their idea to the Nixon-Kissinger strategy of the 1970s, through which the People’s Republic of China was recognised and detached from the communist coalition with the Soviet Union. Of course, there was also a territorial dispute between China and the USSR then, whilst today the bilateral China-Russia relationship appears unshakeable. However, China will certainly have its eye on this possibility, whilst simultaneously continuing to project its peaceful orientation and its disagreement with the resort to the use of force and foreign interventions in states’ internal affairs.
