Filenews 31 August 2025 - by Christakis Hadjilaou
It is with disappointment and dissatisfaction that Cypriot citizens are watching the situation in which European Cyprus has been led in the electricity sector in the summer of 2025.
It is tragic, but true, that the state cannot meet its basic competence for the uninterrupted provision of safe electricity to the Cypriot consumer, resulting in electricity cuts due to inadequacy in electricity production in the midst of a heatwave and in the heart of the tourist season.
Although the competent authorities had been warned in good time about the possibility of insufficiency in electricity production from March 2025, with interventions in the print and television media, things were left to reach the situation as it was in the summer of 2025.
As a result, the country has been driven to power shortages, with rotating power cuts for the first time since the Marie explosion in 2011.
Why did we get this far?
The electricity crisis in the summer of 2025 is not an isolated incident, but the result of long-term failures and omissions of the competent authorities in the electricity sector. The lack of long-term strategic planning for power generation, as is the case with the planning for the Ten-Year Transmission System Development Program, is the root cause of the crisis and is reflected in the following key points:
* The failure to ensure adequate and safe electricity production.
* The failure of new conventional units to operate in the electrical system.
* The uncontrolled penetration of renewable energy sources without storage.
* The timeless fiasco for the advent of natural gas.
* The failure to implement the Great Sea Interconnector in a timely manner.
The failure in the above critical electricity issues, as a result of the lack of long-term strategic planning in power generation, has led to excessive dependence on the old, stressed and faulty conventional units of the Cyprus Electricity Authority (AHK), putting the power generation system on a trajectory of unreliable behaviour.
The result was the cause of several failures in conventional production units, resulting in a shortage of electricity production, since the available generation could not meet the maximum electricity demand.
Competences for adequacy
According to the current legal framework, CERA (Cyprus Energy Regulatory Authority) is responsible for long-term electricity adequacy, while the Cyprus Transmission System Operator (TSO) is responsible for the operational adequacy and safety of the electricity system.
CERA, based on its own Decision 144/2017, must ensure a margin of reserve (i.e. additional available installed capacity beyond the maximum electricity demand) ranging between 20 – 40%.
According to our technocratic estimate, the margin in the summer season 2025 should exceed 30%. The reasons for choosing a margin of such magnitude are due, on the one hand, to the isolated – without interconnections – electricity system of Cyprus and on the other hand to the ageing, large size and continuous strain of the conventional units of the EAC. This margin exists to effectively cover electricity needs in cases of increased production failures and/or increased demand due to extreme weather conditions. However, in the summer of 2025, the margin is estimated to be around 18%, i.e. insufficient to meet peak demand and address the potential for increased failures in the power generation system.
Therefore, according to our estimates, CERA had not made available to the TSOO a sufficient margin of reserve, i.e. sufficient capacity of conventional units, to be able to adequately address electricity demand in the summer 2025 season.
Weather conditions and production failures
The particularly high temperatures of this summer have worsened the already burdened situation for the electricity system of Cyprus, but they are not the main cause of the electricity crisis. On the contrary, they highlighted in a strong way the timeless and structural weaknesses of the electricity production system.
Damages to the ageing and stressed units of the EAC increased significantly and, in combination with the increased demand for electricity due to the heatwave, contributed decisively to the creation of the crisis with the cuts in electricity. The further deterioration of the situation was prevented - fortunately - by the cyclical decrease in consumption due to the summer holidays in August.
The legislation exists – Why was it not implemented?
Article 34 of the Law on the Regulation of the Electricity Market (2021) is clear: when the forecasts show a lack of adequacy, CERA must inform the Minister of Energy in order to assess the situation and, if necessary, to take the necessary measures to boost production.
Despite the warnings of technocrats, from the assurances given by the President of CERA to the House of Representatives in March 2025, it is obvious that those responsible had estimated that there were no reasons for concern about inadequacy in electricity production during the summer season 2025.
The result of this erroneous assessment: rotational power cuts, resulting in malfunctions in critical infrastructure, dissatisfaction from citizens and businesses and a blow to the country's prestige and tourist image.
Inference
The electricity crisis of the summer of 2025 highlighted the need for a change of course with substantial reforms in the electricity sector of Cyprus.
The lack of long-term strategic planning, delays in critical projects and erroneous estimates led to the downfall of electricity cuts due to insufficient electricity production amid a heatwave and in the heart of the tourist season.
And the next crisis is not a question of whether it will be repeated, but when it will be repeated, if the approach to the country's energy policy does not radically change with the introduction of proper strategic planning on a long-term basis for electricity production.
* Electrical engineer, with many years of experience in the operation of the Electrical System
