Filenews 19 August 2025
Paul Iddon
After the fall of President Bashar al-Assad in December 2024, the future of the Russian military presence in Syria looked bleak. About nine months later, Moscow maintains a military presence in Syria, in the west of the country, and is taking measures that suggest it wants to have a presence in Syria's northeastern territory as well.
In a report published this month, Arabic-language Syria TV revealed that the Russian military has taken steps to strengthen its presence at Qamishli airport in northeastern Syria. In recent weeks, it has reportedly expanded the facilities where military personnel reside, fortified the perimeter of the base and raised the Russian flag. Evidence suggests that the Russian military does not intend to withdraw anytime soon. Russian transport planes carry out regular flights carrying troops and equipment between Qamishli and the Khmeimim air base in Latakia province, on Syria's west coast, which is Russia's main air base in the country.
"These operations often take place at dawn or night so as not to attract media attention and coverage for their movements in the area," the report said.
In addition to the small military presence and armoured vehicles, it is believed that the Russians have stationed Ka-52 attack helicopters at the airport. In addition, Russia strengthened its presence in Kamishli after the fall of Assad by deploying Pantsir-S1 medium-range air defense systems and electronic warfare units.
"Despite the collapse of the Assad regime, Russia maintains its presence in Qamishli," Anton Mardashov, a fellow at the Middle East Institute and an expert on Russian military issues, told me.
"The Russian army transported some of the military equipment to Libya by transport aircraft using the runway of this facility," he said. "However, it is clear that the base is not well protected. That's why fighter jets would hardly be transported there."
Unlike Khmeimim, Qamishli does not host fighter jets or transports. In October 2021, at least one Su-35 Flanker fighter landed at the airport for the first time. However, no more fighters nor a permanent deployment of Russian warplanes followed.
"To do this, there must be fortification works, expand the perimeter and, most importantly, develop a staggered air defense," Mardashov stressed. "The radars of this defense system will scan not only Turkey's sensitive southeastern zone, but also part of Iraqi territory."
Syria TV's latest report on Russian activities in Qamisli coincides with escalating tensions between the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces, which control much of northeastern Syria, and the new government in Damascus. In recent clashes in Aleppo, a Syrian soldier was killed.
Syrian President Ahmed al-Saraa was the leader of the Islamist opposition Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, an armed group that led the overthrow of Assad. Today, Saraa demands that the SDF hand over the weapons and allow government forces to gain full control of the northeastern and eastern regions of Syria controlled and administered by Kurdish militias and their affiliated Democratic Autonomous Administration of Northern and Eastern Syria (AANES). The SDF and AANES are seeking a decentralized Syria.
Russia had previously bombed HTS's northwestern stronghold of Idlib, supporting Assad during the civil war. Since December, Moscow has been seeking to establish relations with the new government in an effort to maintain its strategic military bases in the region, particularly the Tartus naval base.
Kyle Orton, an independent analyst on the Middle East, believes Syria TV's report may be accurate, arguing that it would be reasonable for the Russian military to strengthen its presence there, given its "precarious position" in Khmeimim. However, it does not see any information suggesting that the current Russian activity in Qamishli is more than measures to protect its military forces.
"The timing of the report's publication, while the Syrian government shows that it is losing patience with diplomacy and will soon move militarily against the SDF, cannot be overlooked," Orton said. "During the civil war, the presence of Russia – and Iran – at Qamishli airport was the most visible symbol of the SDF's keeping channels open with Assad's allies. After the fall of the regime, the Russian presence served much the same purpose: to give options to the SDF while the Americans were leaving."
Moreover, it could prove "politically beneficial" for Sarah's government, which recently received President Trump's backing, to overstate the SDF's ties with Russia to "soften any U.S. reactions" that may follow an armed conflict between Damascus and the SDF.
"However, if the SDF thinks this way, they are likely to be disappointed," Orton commented. "The Russians have never been able to do much in Syria, now their capabilities have been further reduced, especially if Turkey supports the Saraa government in an attack against the 'Autonomous Administration'.
However, the Russian army in Qamishli could play a mediating role if tensions between Damascus and the SDF escalate.
"The Pantsirs provide minimal protection at the Qamishli facility, which currently serves as a base for organizing ground patrols with aerial cover by helicopters," Mardashov noted.
"Therefore, it makes sense for Moscow to strengthen its presence there, planning to play some kind of mediating role between the SDF and Damascus, apparently with the consent of the latter."
Orton pointed out that Russia has been in constant contact with all sides in Syria in order to position itself as a mediator and "intermediary" of power since 2015, in a country that has suffered immensely from the war. Despite the overthrow of Assad, Russia maintains the same approach.
"While maintaining open lines of communication with the SDF, Russia is negotiating with Damascus over Khmeimim and, consequently, Khamisli — which is why Moscow will hardly help the SDF if and if Damascus conquers the northeastern part of Syria," he added.
"Russia's participation in an unsuccessful SDF attempt to preserve their territories means that it loses Qamishli and perhaps Khmeimim. Remaining uninvolved as Damascus' military forces enter the region may be in exchange for Saraa's signature allowing the Russians to maintain their bases in Syria."
Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani has reportedly asked the Russian military police in Syria to deploy to southern Syria to act as a regulator and mediator with Israel, which has expanded its military presence in the region since December.
Orton doesn't think this is "completely unexpected," noting that Saraa has used the "Russian paper" as a lever of pressure in negotiations with the United States.
"Since Trump's only real interest is for Saraa to prevent an Afghanistan-style collapse during the U.S. withdrawal, this has left a lot of room for Damascus to have both: and American support and to test what it can get from the Russians, who plan to stay in the country after the Americans leave," he said. said Orton.
Therefore, it is possible that Russia has decided that the best option to maintain its military presence in Syria is to cooperate with Damascus, since the future of the SDF may not be viable after the US withdrawal.
Moscow has probably concluded that it is better to come to an agreement with Saraa on the right to establish bases and develop military and economic relations in order to "regain some of its political influence" in Damascus, especially if it has concluded that Saraa seeks to become the ruler of all of Syria.
"It remains unknown what this means for Iran's influence in Syria, given how inextricably linked the Russian position in the country is with the Iranians," Orton noted.
"It does not seem a coincidence that reports — however vague they may be — of the activities of the IRGC [Iran's powerful paramilitary Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps] in Syria since the fall of Assad have been concentrated on the coast and around the Qamishli region, in areas where Russia still has a presence."
