Filenews 5 August 2025 - by Michalis Hatzivasilis
A fiery report on the shortcomings in infrastructure, personnel, but also sad assumptions, was compiled by the Chief Fire Officer of the Fire Service, Nikos Longinos. As recorded in the 19-page Report given to the President of the Republic on Friday, some were decided in meetings and others were done in practice, since dry grass was never removed from communities, which was the main cause of burning.
At the same time, the Chief Fire Chief records that when at the critical hour, at 18.21, the Civil Defense was asked to undertake the evacuations, it stated that it did not have sufficient forces. That is why in some villages there is the paradox that the instructions for evacuation are given at a different time by the Fire Brigade and the P. Amyna for the same community. The report shows that in the Limassol district, on July 23, there were 21 firefighters covering six rural stations with only one vehicle.
Remarkable, which leaves the state exposed for lack of coordination, is the fact that the Fire Brigade, as it emerges from the Longinos report, did not know what the response of the Forestry Department was. As recorded, the Department of Forests, at 13.35 a.m., contacted the General Coordinator of Operations of the Ministry of Forestry reporting the existence of a fire in the village of Malia. At 13.58 the Limassol District Fire Station Manager asks for help from the Forestry Department. The Department of Forestry sends two vehicles. At 14.13 he asks for more vehicles. The Regional Governor of Troodos tells him that he needs instructions higher up to send more help. The provincial officer informs the Chief Fire Officer who contacts the Director of the Forestry Department and informed him that the fire is out of control and asked him to send more vehicles to the fire site. However, it is not mentioned what force was finally sent by the Department of Forests.
After the critical actions are recorded minute by minute in the Report as soon as the Pachna station was informed about the fire, then the agonizing appeals of the exit manager for the arrival of flying means are noted. The first call for aircraft was made at 13.36 and he was told that two aerial vehicles are in another fire in Anagia. He returns with an appeal for flights at 13.44. At 13.55 there is a report from the exit officer of the Pachna Fire Station that the fire is now uncontrollable. And while the first request for assistance from aircraft was made at 13.44, the response came at 14.20 with the first water drops from two aircraft (forest 5+6). As it emerges from the events, as recorded chronologically, if more forces were initially sent and the aircraft responded faster, we might have had a different result.
Characteristic of the speed that the fire had taken since 13.28, when the first phone call was made for smoke in Malia, is the following report:
-At 14.12 the District Officer of the Limassol Fire Stations communicates with the Service Officer, where he tells him that very strong winds are blowing in the area, the fire is expanding rapidly and is out of control, cannot calculate the extent and will need additional assistance. That is, 44 minutes later the fire was now burning uncontrollably with the sad results we experienced.
In the Longinos report, it is admitted that the expansion and spread of the fire could not have been predicted because the alternating directions of the strong winds, the microclimate created by the fire, in combination with the relief and vegetation of each area, created dynamics that in most areas the fire moved to different horizons. Priorities were set for saving lives, providing assistance to burned and injured people, evacuating the population, protecting houses from fire and then protecting property. An oil station in Kivides and the Industrial Area were protected.
Another element that emerges from the Report of the Fire Brigade is the following:
-On 23/7/2025 at 18.21, following communication between the General Operations Coordinator of the Civil Defence and the Civil Defence (Nicosia), the Civil Defence reported that it does not have sufficient forces for evacuations, after this, the GSEPI made an arrangement through the KEPIX of the Civil Defence to come to an agreement with the Civil Defence to assist in evacuations.
Responsibility to those who did not clean the grass
In his Report, the Chief Fire Chief, in the form of attribution of the failure to extinguish the fire in a timely manner, states:
Taking into account the above, despite the adversities we had to face, the best possible use was made of both aircraft and ground firefighting forces, to deal with all fires and other incidents that took place on July 23 and 24, 2025, With the primary concern of saving lives and property.
It clearly seems that there was an extremely high thermal load, due to the presence of dry vegetation, shrubs, trees, etc. throughout the fire area.
The Fire Service, he records, attended meetings that took place before and during the fire season at the Ministry of Agriculture, Rural Development and Environment, the Ministry of the Interior, the District Administrations, etc. It clearly seems that no actions have been taken or as many actions as should have been taken to clean the plots, the fields, the slopes of the roads, etc.
It is the first and largest reason for the start and spread of the fire, along with the presence of high winds, high temperature and low humidity, especially in the area where the fire broke out.
Staff increase, measures in villages
Finally, the Chief Fire Chief makes the following suggestions:
• Immediate removal of dry grass around the roads by all communities that have not done so, the responsibility of the provincial and local administrations.
• Planning of Local Authorities for the placement of "Fire Nests" at specific points within the fabric of the communities.
• Extension of the opening hours of the Rural Fire Stations on a 24-hour basis (currently these Stations work from 08:00 to 19:00 daily).
• In order to achieve the above recommendation, the staff should be increased accordingly, both in permanent and regular hourly paid personnel.
• Reinforcement of the existing fleet of fire trucks, beyond the 17, included in the Holistic Plan (Phase B), with a fleet of fire trucks with such dimensions that they can manoeuvre and move easily even in settlements with narrow roads.
