Filenews 18 August 2025
By James Stavridis*
Vladimir Putin came to Alaska with all honours, with a red carpet welcome along with a flight of fighter jets and a warm handshake from President Trump. The state's choice for the summit evokes ironic smiles given Russia's longstanding sense of frustration at the fact that it sold it to America in the mid-19th century. While expectations for a full ceasefire were low, most observers were hoping for at least a path to negotiations.
But as has been the case for months now, Putin simply continues to play defensively, like a tightrope boxer in the ring, avoiding both a ceasefire and an apparent willingness to negotiate. A sluggish President Trump cancelled a planned lunch that would have focused on broader economic and security issues with Russia, refused to answer questions — as is his usual — and flew back to Washington to consider next steps.
Obviously, it will take "particularly strict measures", to use Trump's words, so that Moscow not only sits at the negotiating table, but also stays for dinner. But what measures should be considered in order to persuade the maximalist Putin to reduce his demands? Is there a specific list?
Here are, based on the pain they will cause Moscow, ten options that the White House, acting in cooperation with European allies, should seriously consider:
Increase the number of F-16 aircraft in Ukraine to at least 100.
This will be three times the number of Ukrainians already undergoing training and will offer corresponding capabilities in air-to-air, air-to-ground and electronic warfare attacks. This should be done through a joint US-European Union working group led by the Supreme Commander of NATO allies.
Quadrupling the number of long-range surface weapons in Ukraine.
The U.S. High Artillery Mobility System is a gold standard, but European defense forces also have strong capabilities in this area. This is where the EU can take the lead, with supplies of both American and European weapons in the process.
Providing highly accurate targeting information on these missile systems, with a detailed focus on Russian supply systems.
The U.S. has spent decades studying how to deconstruct military supply chains to locate critical hubs and destroy them, rendering the supply chain useless. This targeting effort can be assigned to a combined offensive formation of the U.S. Transportation Command and the U.S. Strategic Command, both led by two combat commanders with deep experience.
Sharing drone technology and equipment between the EU, the US and Ukraine.
Put special emphasis on unmanned marine systems (air, surface and underwater). Target the remaining ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Use the experienced U.S. Navy's Operation 59 Group, based in the Arabian Gulf, which has experimented extensively in this type of warfare.
Seizure of 300 billion euros Dol. Russian assets held in Western banks, including $10 billion; Dol. to American institutions.
This money can then be used to create a fund whose profits will go towards financing Ukraine's defense indefinitely. The Fund's investments will be managed by a joint team of American and European financial experts, as does the board of directors of a large institution.
Immediate application of secondary sanctions on global Russian oil and gas markets.
These should be universally imposed on all countries that continue to cooperate with Russia, including China. There should be surveillance and seizure of ships of the Russian "shadow fleet" involved in such activities, with the aim of seizing at least 10 ships every month.
Providing security guarantees similar to those of NATO in Ukraine (but without fully and formally joining the alliance).
Expand cooperation with NATO in every military sector of Ukraine, especially through NATO Centres of Excellence, e.g. the NATO Cyber Defence Cooperation Centre in Tallinn, Estonia, Air Operations in Lyon, France, and Maritime Security in Istanbul.
Sending European military training forces and advisers to Ukraine.
The goal should be an initial force of 5,000 specialists, with a self-defense capability that will operate at all levels (with a higher priority than that of tactics, on the front line) in cooperation with the Ukrainian army. Attention should be paid to information, drone warfare, cybersecurity, maritime warfare and supply chains. This will be a military mission for the EU similar to the anti-piracy or Balkan security efforts regularly carried out by Europeans.
Design and implementation of a no-fly zone over Ukraine.
It would be defensive in nature but would include air means from each NATO nation and would operate under the control of the alliance's supreme commander through a working group to be set up at Ramstein Air Base in Germany. About 100 fighter jets, including NATO's Special Early Warning and Control Force (E-3 Sentry), will help maintain the zone.
Official accession of Ukraine to the NATO Alliance.
Of course, this would be a "nuclear option," and there would be difficulty getting through the formal NATO process. (Take, for example, the one-year delay in the accession of Finland and Sweden, which were obvious cases.) But as the ultimate threat to Putin, it would be strong.
As Trump and his team consider their options to put the pressure Putin needs, the items on this list could first be announced as a threat and then implemented one by one as needed. And certainly, Ukraine's concession of part of its territorial ownership, which is already in Russian hands, should be part of a final agreement. There are carrots as well as whips that can be used against Moscow, including the easing of sanctions and the return of Russian funds. But it seems that more whips are needed to convince Putin to make a deal.
*Stavridis is honorary dean of Tufts University's Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He serves on the boards of Aon, Fortinet and Ankura Consulting Group
