Filenews 23 May 2025
It makes sense to be disappointed or worried — even disgusted — by the outcome of Donald Trump's phone conversation with Vladimir Putin this week, but you shouldn't be surprised. The U.S. president did not fail to end this war, because he never tried to do so.
From day one, he focused on achieving a reset with Russia that would bring economic benefits to the United States. U.S. involvement in the war was an obstacle that had to be removed for this to happen, even better if it was done through a peace agreement — rather than by abandoning Ukraine. It was not, however, necessary.
"This was a European situation and it should remain a European situation," Trump said on Monday. So, now that we have clarified things, what happens now?
First, if Congress doesn't force Trump, he can leave the arduous, thankless task of brokering a peace settlement to the Pope, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, or whoever else wants to take it on. In the meantime, he can focus on making money.
For Moscow, this could not have a better outcome. Putin made a new vague proposal to start direct talks with Ukraine and put his demands in a memorandum. We can guess what this will entail, because the Kremlin has repeated its peace terms many times.
Now that Trump has declared his withdrawal, Putin has even less incentive to change the terms: Ukraine will have to surrender the unconquered as well as the occupied territories that Russia has annexed, renounce all ties with NATO, and demobilize most of its armed forces.
That is why Ukrainians have no choice but to continue fighting. Without the future ability to defend themselves, their country will no longer exist as a sovereign state.
In Moscow's eyes, Ukraine is a Frankenstein country, which has been assembled by others, with Kiev and most of the territories it governs rightfully belonging to the so-called "Russian world". The country's distinct language, culture, and history are, in this view, fake.
"How can this heritage be shared between Russia and Ukraine? And why would we do it?" Putin wrote in a 6,900-word essay titled "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians" in 2021. A few months later, this treatise was given into the hands of the officers sent to lead his invasion. Essentially, it defined its casus belli.
For foreign policy "realists", this is fatal, as Russia is a great power and Ukraine is not.
The continuation of the war with or without U.S. support would entail, at best, the continuous daily sacrifice of people and territories by Ukraine, possibly for several more years, so why do it?
Whether the Ukrainians can maintain even this level of defense, instead of suffering a catastrophic rupture due to a lack of weapons and ammunition, is now up to Europe.
Will this rich but ununited continent have the political will and the industrial capacity to supply Kiev's forces with what they need?
Ukrainians know their fate if they surrender, having seen what has already happened in the Russian-occupied territories: torture, executions, rigged trials, changed school curricula, and kidnapping and brainwashing of their children.
The easy answer to both questions is no. Europe's leaders knew from Trump's election that a U.S. withdrawal was possible. They have said all the right things, but – apart from frontline states such as Poland and the tiny Baltic countries – they are falling short in action. However, this is pessimism, not a realistic approach.
What happens next is a choice, just as it was a choice for Trump not to use the tools at his disposal to pressure Putin or for the U.S. to ensure the continuation of South Korea's existence since the 1950s.
Ukrainian forces are, no doubt, in a difficult position, but they will continue to fight because they have to. And the UK, France, Germany and most of northern and eastern Europe recognize that Ukraine's defense is in many ways theirs.
These countries have the financial means. What they lack is the industrial capacity to fill the void left behind by the U.S. withdrawal, as well as a collective sense of urgency – to do whatever it takes to fix it.
Take a look at the new security agreement between the UK and the EU, which linked supposedly vital defence measures to disagreements over irrelevant issues such as youth mobility, culminating in chatter.
Europe should put its hand deep in its pocket, but it does not need to provide everything. Ukraine produced about $750 million worth of military equipment a year before the 2022 Russian invasion.
This year it has the ability, if not the funds, to build equipment worth about $35 billion, including a drone industry of global scope.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has said that 40 percent of the weapons used on the front are currently produced in his country, and this percentage continues to rise.
A Danish-led programme to finance available Ukrainian production capacity already exists and can be expanded.
Meanwhile, European governments and arms manufacturers can focus on meeting critical needs in aircraft, missiles, air defense systems, and others that Kiev cannot produce on its own. This is difficult, but it is not impossible. Companies such as Rheinmetall AG, KNDS Group and BAE Systems Plc have already opened offices in Ukraine, understanding the opportunities for research and production at lower costs in the country.
Ukraine's defence can and should be seen as a catalyst for the acceleration of European security and not an obstacle. It takes optimism to believe that the continent's leaders will look beyond outdated discussions to achieve this, but it took the same and greater optimism to believe that the Ukrainians could defeat Russia's initial offensive on Kyiv in February 2022.
There is nothing inevitable about allowing Russia to subjugate Ukraine. Trump had the resources to increase economic and military pressure on Putin until he sat down at the table of real peace negotiations – he simply chose not to use them. Now it is Europe's turn to choose.
Rendering – Editing: Lydia Roubopoulou
