Filenews 20 December 2024 - by Marc Champion
Imagine you're an average Iranian. Statistically, it's very likely that you're under 35, born after the 1979 Islamic revolution and the Iran-Iraq war that forged your aging leaders. You are not an Islamist, you do not go to the mosque, you did not vote in the last elections, you do not feel secure or financially secure – and, 92%, you may think that the country is heading, irretrievably, in the wrong direction.
This follows from the leaked results of the "fourth wave of the national survey of the values and attitudes of Iranians" conducted by the government itself. The poll of nearly 16,000 people was conducted in November 2023, before Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei turned his arrows against Israel, spending at least $200 billion that he could have spent on civilians but ultimately preferred to give to Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, President Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria and other members of the so-called "Axis of Resistance." This policy of "vanguard" has now collapsed, leaving the country in a vulnerable position and in search of a new deterrent.
This is in itself a good reason to be unhappy. However, things seem to be getting worse and the country's leaders seem less capable by the day. A cold snap has led to blackouts and official calls for savings in heating — this, from a government willing to spend on technology to enrich uranium to the levels needed to produce weapons, but does not appear to be able to tap into the world's second-largest natural gas reserves to ensure its citizens don't get cold in winter.
Last week, the regime published its political "response" to the issue that dominated the international press about the Middle East (before the Gaza war): protests against modesty laws, so violent that, in 2022, a young woman arrested for wearing her hijab incorrectly died while in custody. Hundreds died in the repression that followed. The proposed new law amounts to a plan to re-educate all Iranians in religious worship, while introducing harsher penalties for those who do not respect the dress law. It was due to take effect on Friday, but the backlash was so angry that, on Monday, President Masoud Pezeskian withdrew the bill for review.
All of this paints a picture of a regime in dire straits both at home and abroad, creating an opportunity for the US, Israel and others as they try to prevent the Islamic Republic from acquiring a nuclear arsenal that would cause proliferation in an unstable region. At the same time, Iran is now closer than ever to obtaining the enriched uranium it needs, and the incentive to do so has been greatly enhanced by Israel's severe degradation of the "Axis of Resistance" – which Tehran regarded as its main deterrent – by Israel.
The U.S. and its allies absolutely must seize this moment of opportunity — and threat. The question is how.
Destroying Iran's nuclear program through bombing is an option, but the task remains difficult as major enrichment facilities are buried under Iranian mountains — even after Israel destroyed much of the country's air defense system. Consequently, the full success of such an operation is still unlikely, and the most important asset for Iran's nuclear arsenal, the know-how and experience needed to produce highly enriched uranium, will be saved. The program could be rebuilt quickly and could even be accelerated as the regime abandoned pretences.
Moreover, although Iran's ability to fight back has declined, it has not emerged. Both Hezbollah and Iran maintain significant ballistic and other missile capabilities that could cause serious damage to both Israel and the Gulf. In 2019, drones and cruise missiles were enough to hit Saudi Arabia's vast Abqaik oil processing facility.
"Let's look at the actors on the ground," Neissan Rafati, senior Iran analyst at Washington-based International Crisis Group, told me. "There is a difference between the best chance (for a strike on Iran's nuclear facilities) and a favorable opportunity."
Rafati argues that Iran's current weakness should be used to put pressure on the regime to accept the nuclear deal Trump always said he wanted. A new Trump-style deal would also cover conventional military threats and circumvent the expiration clauses of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) that would ultimately legitimize the regime's dubious nuclear fuel program. There is a risk that Iranian negotiators will use the talks to buy time while the regime continues enrichment with the aim of producing weapons, but a test does not hurt.
Trump would have Europe's support. The so-called E3 – Britain, France and Germany – have been angered by Iran's military support for Russia in Ukraine and are already threatening to "reinstate" international sanctions lifted by the JCPOA – unless Iran cooperates on its nuclear fuel programme. Iran has accumulated a quantity of enriched uranium with a purity of up to 60%, a level of enrichment for which there is no explanation other than the pursuit of reaching the 90% necessary to produce nuclear weapons. This stock must be eliminated.
Perhaps the best question Trump advisers should ask themselves, though, is how the average Iranian would react to the possibility of a bombing. The idea of an Iranian nuclear deterrent is not unpopular in the country. But sanctions, isolation and clerics are. The Iranians are less likely to support an attack on a business that would certainly risk polluting the air with harmful substances.
Instead of weakening a regime already facing deep internal problems, a major airstrike on its nuclear stockpiles and facilities could well strengthen it. For although any popular rally in support of the regime would likely be temporary, the state of emergency created by the airstrikes would allow the state to justify further repression and characterize any preference for cooperation with the West not only as anti-regime, but also as anti-Iranian.
Trump's "maximum pressure" campaign was designed to force Iran to agree to long-term nuclear restrictions, as well as less aggressive missile and foreign policy policies. Once back in power, Trump will be able to secure such a deal and should make the most of it. Air strikes against Iran's nuclear facilities, by contrast, should be considered only when all other means have failed – the costs will be high, success difficult, and the consequences unpredictable.
