Filenews 10 October 2024 - by Malik Kaylan
There is much talk of peace negotiations behind the scenes to end the war in Ukraine. For allies, the picture looks bleak as Russia gains ground in the east, destroys Ukrainian settlements and kills civilians, while the Ukrainian military has dispersed its forces and remains underarmed. And not only because Western allies, such as the US and Germany, have not sent sufficient aid to Kiev in time. As a result, the power grid has collapsed while winter is approaching and will find Ukrainians without heating, the population is fleeing abroad and the picture looks bleak for Ukraine.
The ceasefire under discussion would allow Russia to temporarily hold occupied territories while Moscow agreed to Ukraine's NATO membership. Let's see if such an agreement can bring some stability and the secret risks that have been built into the alleged negotiations. The deal seems simple. But Moscow is well aware that "the devil is in the details." In fact, if Putin pushes into the gaps in the deal, then he can block its implementation at every stage.
Under Alliance law, NATO does not accept new member states in the midst of conflict – even if military operations are frozen. Therefore, Ukraine's accession will take time and Russia will not stand idly by. Even if we assume that Ukraine will join NATO, what is the guarantee that its members, if invited, will be actively engaged in a direct military confrontation with Russia, when they do not do so now? And what happens if Trump is elected president in the US? Unfortunately, however you look at it, there is a good chance that any kind of compromise made now will simply lead to bigger problems in the future. The scenario of Russia moving toward a peace plan is even bleaker than you think.
The seasoned observer of the Kremlin knows that Moscow has already made its plans for this situation, with details that the West has not yet touched – a parameter self-evident to anyone who pays attention to the details of the Kremlin's post-Soviet revanchism. One only needs to examine the highly revealing experience of events in Armenia and Georgia. When the Russians invaded Georgia in 2008, they consolidated their dominance in Georgia's separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Georgia's then-president, Saakashvili, seeing Western indecision, announced a unilateral ceasefire, withdrew from the front lines and saved his country from being razed to the ground like Ukraine.
The peace terms offered by Moscow to Tbilisi, conveyed by French President Sarkozy, were so one-sided that Saakashvili rejected them by saying - and this is important - 'there will be a people's coup against me if I accept them'. Putin had demanded, among other things, that Georgia permanently renounce its sovereignty from the separatist zones, and Saakashvili ... be put aside. Instead, Moscow seized separatist zones and pushed its troops into other areas. What was the result for Georgia? Russia continued to roam Georgian territory and engineered regime change in 2013, interfering in national elections and promoting the election of a conservative nationalist oligarch in place of Saakashvili.
This oligarch, Ivanishvili, is still in power (as a puppet behind the scenes) and now openly presents himself as pro-Russian. Nationalist AND pro-Russian? How is it democratically possible in a country that hates Russia? Ivanishvili, ahead of the country's October elections, has publicly stated that Georgia must apologize for the Russian invasion. Yes, you read that right. He had initially come to power by offering a quiet life to Georgians, relief from strife and confrontation, shattering the unstable support and values of the West, presenting a kind of unbridled Georgian mirage. He eventually granted Moscow his country's independence. You might see the hints of how things could go in Ukraine if Moscow strikes a favorable peace deal there.
But let's also look at Armenia. After winning the first Nagorno-Karabakh war against Azerbaijan in 1992 and declaring a kind of republic close to Armenia, veterans of this victory began to dominate the Armenian political scene. Cliques, "cronies" and "dealers" were created: the perfect candidates to be seduced by the Russian influence of black money, military bribes and easy power. They ended up Moscow's plenipotentiaries in Armenian internal affairs. In fact, Armenia gradually lost its independence and any semblance of democracy. Thus, the most militant ultra-nationalist faction, the war heroes, who were unable to stand politically against them, turned into a corrupt oligarchy sold out to Moscow.
It was only when the people were fed up with the nonsense of the pro-Russian faction that they elected – in 2018 – a true democrat, Nikol Pashinyan, despite the obstacles. He immediately and repeatedly accused Russia of its interference in Armenian affairs. Thus, in 2020 Armenia was punished, after Russian peacekeepers did nothing to defend the Armenian side during the second war in Karabakh. Moscow was bound by the treaty to help. It stood idly by. This time Azerbaijan was the winner. Moscow had taken its revenge for Armenia's "democratic intransigence."
Pashinyan had led the movement to disengage Armenia from Moscow's influence – now saddled with the shame of losing Karabakh. Moscow felt it fatally weakened him: a new "Saakashvili story" in the works. The lesson was clear to everyone: if you want to keep your territory intact, you will let Moscow do it for you. Otherwise you will lose them. In the same vein, Putin recently "made noise" by talking about reinstating separatist regions in Georgia if they don't vote for the Kremlin man in the upcoming elections.
How does all this relate to the supposed peace agreement in Ukraine? The Kremlin's plan is similar. Zelensky is forced to temporarily cede Russian-occupied territory in exchange for a promise to join NATO. Until accession materializes, ultranationalist elements of the army revolt and stage a coup against Zelensky for ceding Donbas and Crimea. The West reacts strongly, alienating the military coup plotters. Putin floods Ukraine's airwaves with propaganda about the West's perfidy, its slow and inadequate support for Ukraine, the West's apparent desire to bloodshed Ukraine as its proxy, Zelensky's undemocratic concentration of power, and the like.
Recall that Saakashvili had refused the Kremlin's conditions for ceding the separatist regions because there would be a coup against him. This could happen in Ukraine after a peace agreement. In Armenia, ultranationalists submitted to Moscow. The same could be done by a military clique in Ukraine. And in the long run? They will lose Western support and will not resume hostilities. Moscow has manoeuvred all this before.
It all starts with the temptation and illusion of easy peace. In Georgia, a populist authoritarian regime took power promising relief from fear. The people of Georgia have cowered at the sight of the carrot and stick held by Moscow. Be docile, be ruled by oligarchs and Russian money, and you will be safe in a deep national sleep. Russian protection. Cohesion. Continuity. In contrast to Western indifference and indecision, in contrast to disorientation and frustration, chaos and shrinking freedom. And so it will be with Ukraine. In the wake of a peace agreement.
