Filenews 3 September 2024 - by Marc Champion
For the still mostly liberal West, Turkey has become the deeply troublesome cousin that only sees him once a year for Thanksgiving. By now, the rest of the family has shut him out so well that they don't even hear him when he tries to reconnect.
As with most families who are doomed by circumstances to participate in each other's lives, this is wrong.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his government have been gradually reducing tensions with the United States and Europe in some areas, while increasing them in others, for nearly two years. This week, unconfirmed Turkish media reports suggest that another olive branch may be on its way: offering to settle a longstanding dispute with the U.S. by "putting in its packaging boxes" the S-400s it bought from Russia seven years ago and allowing U.S. inspectors to ensure it stays that way.
The S-400 system was once a huge story, a flamboyant gesture by Erdogan toward Washington shortly after surviving a coup attempt he blamed on the US. It was also a form of protection at a time when the Turkish leader felt alienated from supposed security allies, and therefore vulnerable.
Therefore, to secure against any trouble from Moscow, Turkey's historic rival for regional dominance, Erdogan agreed to buy the Kremlin's long-range missile defense system and signed gas and energy deals with Russia. If that meant upsetting the rest of the NATO family (as Russian President Vladimir Putin knew it would), so much the better.
Independence from the West also meant ending dependence on U.S.-dominated global financial markets, which Erdogan liked to describe as an "interest rate lobby." He accused this supposed gang of financiers of trying to secure higher interest rates at Turkey's expense because – in a tragic case of ideology that went beyond empirical evidence – he believed that higher interest rates would cause inflation.
This policy ended in a predictable disaster, driving inflation above 70%. So, after securing re-election for a new five-year term last May, Erdogan returned to orthodox economic policy. And after first helping Putin flout U.S. and European sanctions over Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Turkey also began to comply (emboldened by the threat of third-party sanctions on its banks).
Earlier this year, Turkey's Baykar Technologies began construction of a factory to co-produce armed drones in Ukraine. In June, unlike Brazil, India and some other regional powers seeking greater distance from Washington, Turkey signed the joint communiqué at the Geneva peace conference organized by Ukraine to support its 10-point plan to end the war on favorable terms. And on Thursday, Turkey's foreign minister attended an informal meeting of his counterparts in the European Union for the first time in five years. According to the Financial Times, the lunch meeting exceeded the planned duration and was generally seen as a positive attempt at rapprochement with Turkey.
Putin is not happy with all this. He has made this clear by repeatedly delaying an expected visit to Turkey and asking Turkish journalists to tell Erdogan that the Ukrainians are using his drones to attack a Russia-Turkey gas pipeline.
But just as rampant inflation forced Erdogan back into international financial markets, the war in Ukraine served as a reminder that Turkey has no viable security alternative to NATO: neither Russia nor China.
It is also not going to secure a top-of-the-line stealth fighter jet anytime soon, from which Turkey was expelled over its purchase of the S-400. Greece's decision in July to buy 20 of the planes made finding a solution to this problem all the more urgent.
What's worse, says Hussein Bagci, a Russia expert and founder of Ankara Global Advisory Group, is not only that the S-400s never entered service, but that Turkey also did not receive the technology for which it had refused to buy NATO equivalents. The deal was a loss for Ankara, he added, and for Russia "a gain of €2.5 billion. dollars".
It's unclear how interested the U.S. is in Turkey's S-400 system, having agreed in February to sell new F-16s and F-16 upgrade kits worth $23 billion. dollars, in exchange for Turkey's ratification of Sweden's NATO membership. Meanwhile, although Germany earlier this year lifted its ban on the sale of Eurofighter Typhoon jets to Saudi Arabia, it is unclear whether it would approve a similar sale to Turkey.
Ankara's relationship with the West has changed for good. There can no longer be any appeal to shared values anymore, as Erdogan continues – among other things – to imprison journalists.
But a transactional relationship still needs trading. Europe, too, needs to overcome Erdogan's constant verbal bombs, because the West needs Ankara at least as much as Turkey needs European markets and NATO's security umbrella. Turkey not only controls access to the Black Sea and has the potential to create or prevent future European migration crises, but it also has the ability to produce artillery shells, drones and other weapons at the scale and cost Europe will need.
"We are entering a new era," as veteran Turkish foreign policy analyst Soli Ozel puts it. "The US, regardless of who comes to power after November, will invest less in Europe, so the EU and Turkey will have to cooperate more on security issues."
There are things all sides can do to improve their relations. In Europe's case, it could ease tighter visa restrictions that make travel difficult even for businessmen visiting EU countries for business, as Turkey is a member of the EU's customs union. It should also encourage rather than block arms transfers, such as the Eurofighter, which entail long-term commitments that could help link Turkey's security interests to those of the EU. The US, meanwhile, could attempt another attempt to resolve the S-400 issue.
Erdogan, for his part, must restrain his anti-Western rhetoric, including his current attacks on Israel. But even if he doesn't, Turkey will exist for a long time here and after he leaves.
Performance – Editing: Stathis Ketitzian
