Filenews 22 April 2024 - by Niall Ferguson
In J.R.R. Tolkien's great epic, Lord of the Rings, it is only gradually realized that the forces of darkness have united. Sauron, with his evil omnipotent eye, emerges as the leader of a vast axis of evil: the Black Horsemen, the corrupt wizard Saruman, the subhuman Orcs, the giant poisonous spider Shelob – are all together in the same trick, and Mordor is their headquarters.
Tolkien knew what he was writing. A veteran of the First World War, he watched in horror as a second major revival came. Drinking bitter beers and smoking his pipe in "Shire" — his idealized Middle England — he couldn't help but shudder when Nazi Germany, fascist Italy, and imperialist Japan came together to form their Axis in 1936-37, and say, "I told you so," when Hitler and Stalin joined forces in 1939.
We are witnessing the formation and consolidation of an Axis
We too are witnessing the formation and consolidation of an Axis. I was strongly reminded of Tolkien by a tweet posted by conservative broadcast journalist Mark R. Levin on Tuesday. It is worth quoting: "Appeasement is escalation. Our enemies are moving. Our allies are surrounded and are being or soon will be attacked... Conservatism and MAGA (Make America Great Again, Donald Trump's campaign slogan) are not about isolationism or pacifism. It's not about appeasement."
The significance of Levin's intervention — written by Israel, which he visited — is that it clearly puts him on a collision course with isolationist elements in the Republican Party, such as Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene, who last week threatened to oust House Speaker Mike Johnson if he pushed through a bill that would restore U.S. aid to Ukraine. "We will stand for freedom and ensure that Vladimir Putin does not march through Europe," Johnson said. "We have to show Putin, Xi, Iran, North Korea and anyone else that we will defend freedom."
For people like Greene and Levin's former Fox News colleague Tucker Carlson, the war in Ukraine is simply "a quarrel in a distant land between people we know nothing about," as British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain said of Czechoslovakia in September 1938. It seems that they are not at all ashamed to turn into "useful idiots" of Russian President Vladimir Putin, in succession to the apologists for Hitler and Stalin in the 1930s.
And not just Putin's. Because, as State Department spokesman Matthew Miller pointed out last week, the People's Republic of China's vast economic resources are behind the Russian war effort. "What we've seen in recent months is that materials have moved from China to Russia, which Russia has used to rebuild its industrial base and produce weapons that appear on the frontlines in Ukraine," Miller told reporters Tuesday. "And we're incredibly concerned about that." In Beijing earlier this month, Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen warned her Chinese counterpart that there would be "significant consequences" if China continued to support the Russian war effort in Ukraine.
Despite their protests that they wish to act as peacemakers, China's leaders gave their blessing over the invasion of Ukraine a few days ago – what else did the mutual promise of a "limitless" partnership mean? — and Chinese President Xi Jinping's support has been vital to Putin's survival since Russian forces were pushed back from the outskirts of Kyiv two years ago.
By the same token, Iran's war against Israel cannot be seen in isolation. Tehran supports Russia's war against Ukraine by supplying thousands of drones and missiles similar to those recently launched against Israel. Russia, in turn, is likely helping to bolster Iran's air defenses. China is not only one of the main buyers of Iranian oil, as Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi phoned Tehran immediately after the attack on Israel to praise rather than condemn his Iranian counterparts. Chinese propaganda has been consistently anti-Israel since the murderous attacks by Hamas on October 7 last year.
The emergence of this new axis was predicted by Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security adviser to US President Jimmy Carter, as early as 1997. In his book The Grand Chessboard, Brzezinski wrote:
Perhaps the most dangerous scenario would be a grand coalition of China, Russia and perhaps Iran. It would be reminiscent in scale and extent of the challenge once posed by the Sino-Soviet bloc, although this time China would probably have the role of leader and Russia would be the follower.
Brzezinski was prophetic. Looking back over the past three years, however, it's hard not to conclude that his successors in the Biden administration did a lot, both unintentionally and intentionally, to make this coalition turn into a reality, starting with leaving Afghans at the mercy of the Taliban in 2021, then failing to prevent Russia from invading Ukraine in 2022 and, finally, failing to prevent Iran from unleashing its proxies against Israel in 2023. Yes, Biden stepped in to help Ukraine and Israel when they came under attack, but an earlier show of force could have prevented both emergencies.
Levin and Johnson have realized, as former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has long argued, that certain conflicts in faraway lands ultimately concern us. They are part of a single war waged by a new Axis against the fundamental values that are dear to us: democracy, the rule of law, individual freedom. I predict that the isolationists' counter-arguments will be refuted.
For now, fortunately, we are in the Second Cold War and not in the Third World War. However, the Second Cold War is progressing rather faster than the First Cold War. If the Russian invasion of Ukraine is our equivalent of the 1950-53 Korean War, we have (so far) skipped a second Cuban missile crisis – over Taiwan – and have already entered a period of de-escalation, a series of developments that took two decades last time. Since last November's summit in Woodside, California, the Chinese have shown a real willingness to avoid conflict and want to engage in serious, if frozen, dialogue with their American counterparts, reminiscent of the 1969-72 period.
But Hamas' surprise attack on Israel last October took us all the way to 1973. And it's worth remembering that appeasement didn't last long since Henry Kissinger's successful claim to U.S. primacy in the Middle East after that year's Yom Kippur War. In short, in the Second Cold War we seem to have the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s squeezed together into a somewhat confusing patchwork.
Then, as now, the Cold War has an ideological dimension: At least some Republicans talk about defending freedom. For Putin and Xi, this is just a message about the CIA-backed "colour revolutions." Then, as now, the cold war is a technological race, although today the limits of innovation are artificial intelligence and quantum computing, as well as nuclear weapons and "star wars" (missile defense).
Then, as now, the cold war is causing divisions within the country. Then, as now, it matters a lot whether China and Russia are united. Their current unity is a real headache for the US and its allies, who find themselves in the situation – envisioned more than a century ago – of Nicholas Spykman's "Rimland". Then as now, there are not just two, but three axes, because a significant number of countries prefer to be neutral rather than have to choose a side.
So what are the biggest differences between the First and Second Cold Wars?
First, China is a much bigger economic competitor than the Soviet Union ever was. Second, the West is economically intertwined with China, through a vast network of supply chains, in a way we never had with the USSR. Thirdly, we are much weaker in terms of production capacity. With China flooding the world with cheap green stuff, the West has no choice but to revive protectionism and industrial policy, turning the clock on economic strategy back to the 1970s. Climate adviser John Podesta made this clear last week at Bloomberg's BNEF Summit. Janet Yellen reported last month that China's "spare capacity ... in 'new' industries — such as solar power, electric cars, and lithium-ion batteries" — "hurts American businesses and workers, as well as businesses and workers around the world."
Fourth, U.S. fiscal policy is on a completely unsustainable path. Maintaining a deficit of 7% in a period of full employment is not, to put it mildly, what macroeconomic textbooks recommend. Most importantly, as the Congressional Budget Office has just pointed out, the incessant growth of federal debt-to-GDP in public hands — from 99 percent this year to a projected 166 percent by 2054 — will inevitably constrain future administrations, for the simple reason that an increasing share of revenue will have to go toward debt service.
Any great power that spends more on debt service (interest payments on national debt) than on defense will not remain great for long. This was the case for Habsburg Spain, for France under the old regime, for the Ottoman Empire, for the British Empire, and this law is going to be tested by the US from this year, when (according to the CBO) net interest expenditure will be 3.1% of GDP, while defence spending will be 3%. Assuming defence spending remains stable at 48% of total discretionary spending (the 2014-23 average), the gap between debt service and defence will widen rapidly in the coming years. By 2041, according to CBO projections, debt payments (4.6% of GDP) will be twice as high as the defense budget (2.3%). Between 1962 and 1989, for comparison, debt payments averaged 1.8% of GDP and defence spending 6.4%.
As Michael Boskin and Kiran Sridhar recently argued, the Biden administration's proposed defense budget for 2025 is already "grossly inadequate." The Department of Defense must spend more if we are to deter our adversaries. Under current conditions, it seems certain to spend less.
Fifth, our alliances may prove weaker than they were in the First Cold War. In Europe, Germany is even more divided over U.S. leadership in the Atlantic alliance than it was in the days of Ostpolitik. In Asia, the US may believe that the Quad has turned India into an Asian ally, but I very much doubt that Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi would pick up the phone if Washington asked for help in a crisis in Taiwan.
For all these reasons, we should not be overly sure of the outcome of the Second Cold War. In particular, as Elbridge Colby has consistently warned, a crisis in Taiwan — if China blockades or invades this year — will find the U.S. unprepared. And Beijing may not move according to estimates from U.S. intelligence agencies that expect it to wait until 2027 to make its move.
One more similarity
However, there is one final resemblance to the First Cold War that I omitted above. Now, as then, there is bipartisan consensus in Washington that the communist superpower poses a serious threat. The political question that remains to be answered this year is who is best placed to deal with this threat.
In a way, Joe Biden and Kamala Harris personify the Democratic Party's post-Vietnam approach, which lasted from Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton to Barack Obama. This approach almost always prioritizes "de-escalation" over deterrence (even in Ukraine that was the reality) and tends to cut the defense budget. Instead, the Donald Trump has oscillated between bellicose rhetoric and isolationism, clearly preferring trade wars over actual wars. But he is good at deterrence because our adversaries find him so unpredictable. Under Trump, defense spending increased.
By launching their barrage of drones and missiles into Israel, the Iranians have unwittingly given many Republicans permission to follow Pompeo down a path that is anything but isolationist. Read the new Foreign Affairs report from outgoing Wisconsin Representative Mike Gallagher and former Trump adviser Matt Pottinger to get a taste. "China," they argue, "supports expansionist dictatorships in Russia, Iran, North Korea and Venezuela." To counter this, "greater friction in U.S.-Chinese relations will be needed" and "a rapid increase in U.S. defense capabilities." They accept my long-standing argument that we are in the Second Cold War." In short, Pottinger and Gallagher want to take this new cold war quickly into the 1980s.
Will Trump himself heed this advice? If he chooses to insist on isolationism, I suspect this may hurt his chances of re-election. But if he dismisses this delusion, there could suddenly be a 1980s atmosphere — and not just because Trump rediscovered Ronald Reagan's question: "Are you better off than you were four years ago?" Biden looks weak right now. He was not only disappointing in deterring America's enemies. It can't even convince a close U.S. ally — Israel — to do as it asks.
Perhaps, then, the historical significance of the Iranian attack on Israel is its effect not on the Middle East but on Republican sentiment in the US.
Tolkien's hobbits are also isolationists, in their own way. However, despite their strong preference for the quiet life, Frodo and Sam realize that they must fight to reach Mordor and risk their lives to destroy the Ring of Sauron. When they return to the Shire, they find that it too has been overrun by the Enemy. But it is not too late to save the day. Symbolically, the evil wizard Saruman dies on the doorstep of Frodo's beloved home:
"And that's the end," Sam said. "A bad ending, and I wish I didn't have to see it, but to the heck."
"And the end of the War, I hope," Merry said.
"I hope so," Frodo said and sighed. "The last blow. But little did we think it would end here, at the door of Bag End! Amidst all my hopes and fears, at least I never expected this."
"I won't say it's the end until we clean up the mess," Sam said somberly. "And that's going to take a lot of time and work."
Words for isolationists to think about in 2024.
Performance – Editing: S. Ketidjian
