Filenews 4 April 2024 - by James Stavridis
Throughout Russia's history, the tsars have sought ways to dominate what they called the "near exterior" of their extensive empire. In today's world, President Vladimir Putin's illegal invasion of neighbouring Ukraine follows this strategic pattern. If he emerges victorious, it makes sense for him to turn his attention to Moldova, the next stop on his way to Eastern Europe – where a pro-Russian separatist enclave, Transnistria, is already occupied by Russia.
But there is another very attractive target nearby: the Western Balkans. The troubled stretch of territory in Europe's southeast includes four stable members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): Croatia, Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia. But the Kremlin has its eyes elsewhere: Serbia, Kosovo and the ethnically divided country of Bosnia and Herzegovina. How can Putin seek to expand Russian influence and undermine the commitment of NATO and the European Union to this important corner of Europe?
I know this region well from my days in NATO and as U.S. military commander general in Europe. Before that, I served during the Balkan wars of the 1990s as a destroyer commander off the coast of the former Yugoslavia, enforcing the arms embargo against its aggressive regime. Over the years, I have met most of the region's senior leaders, including Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic, former Croatian President Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic, and Milorad Dodik, leader of Republika Srpska (the Serbian entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina).
In the aftermath of the breakup of Yugoslavia, the incredibly bloody Balkan wars between 1991 and 2001 claimed the lives of up to 105,000 people, many of them civilians (8,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys, for example, were massacred in Srebrenica in July 1995). Tensions remain today between Roman Catholics in Croatia, Orthodox Christians mainly in Serbia and Muslims in Albania, Kosovo and Bosnia.
Distraction
Putin is seeking to capitalize on this unfinished story. He knows that if NATO member states are dragged back into policing the restive Balkans, they will be distracted from their focus on supporting Ukraine.
There are still several thousand NATO troops in Kosovo, a former autonomous province of Serbia that neither Serbs nor Russians recognize as an independent state. Last year, the Serbian army was put on high alert following riots by Serb protesters inside Kosovo in which nearly 100 NATO soldiers were wounded. This forced the alliance to send several hundred additional soldiers to the peacekeepers there. Putin is clearly encouraging Serbia to put pressure on Kosovo's NATO-backed government.
He is also working to destabilize Bosnia and Herzegovina's shaky government, which is divided into a bizarre tripartite presidency with one representative for each of the country's three major ethnoreligious communities (Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats). The most experienced political actor there is Dodik, who is closely associated with Moscow. Even a decade ago, he was talking to me about the need for Republika Srpska to secede, which would effectively destroy the country. This entity would then inevitably unite with Serbia, creating a state of Greater Serbia, which Putin would gladly support.
As retired Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery, who was my staff officer in U.S. European Command, has said: "This is the same challenge we faced a decade ago — Putin benefits from shuffling the deck elsewhere in Europe, trying to weaken NATO's credibility and distract us from supporting Ukraine."
There are options
Fortunately, the West has options. For now, the idea of deploying NATO battalions to Ukraine is unlikely. Thus, increasing the level of troops deployed in Kosovo today and preventing the turmoil that Putin is trying to foment is feasible and makes strategic sense.
This would be an example of effective regional effort-sharing within the alliance: NATO countries in and near the Balkans (e.g. Greece and Italy) can focus on this region. Eastern European members and the Scandinavians can lead the way in favour of Ukraine. The major countries in the west – France, Germany, the UK and the US – have sufficient resources to participate in both efforts.
Alongside stabilization forces, NATO must be mindful of Russia's use of so-called hybrid warfare. Putin is good at using social media, disinformation campaigns and pro-Russian propaganda to create tensions outside his borders.
NATO must use its own intelligence networks to expose and counter these false narratives. If the Russians decide to escalate, they may use cyberattacks against power grids and other critical infrastructure in Kosovo and non-Serb parts of Bosnia. This would create confusion and increase social discontent. NATO can provide better cyber defence systems to its allies and friends in the Balkans.
Finally, there are economic incentives that can counter Russian actions. Serbia desperately wants EU membership, as does Bosnia and Herzegovina. Their leaders want to be able to cooperate with the West and avoid sanctions. The Serbian ambassador to the US recently wrote a letter claiming that Serbia only wants peace. Serbs can prove they are sincere by rejecting Putin's manipulation of them and allowing the West to remain focused on the biggest challenge before it: Russia's immoral war in Ukraine.
James Stavridis is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist, retired U.S. Navy admiral, former supreme NATO allied commander, and dean emeritus of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. He is also vice president of global affairs at the Carlyle Group. He serves on the boards of American Water Works, Fortinet, PreVeil, NFP, Ankura Consulting Group, Titan Holdings, Michael Baker and Neuberger Berman and has advised Shield Capital, a cybersecurity investor.
Performance – Editing – Text Selection: G.D. Pavlopoulos
