Winter is coming to Ukraine, and how brutal it will be — as Russia again intensifies its air war to hit cities and energy infrastructure — depends on the U.S. and Europe. Unfortunately, both seem to be losing their bearings after a period of astonishing determination and unity, and a radical adjustment is now needed in the way we set the framework for war.

Too many people seem to have lost sight of the fact that this is the largest military engagement Europe has seen since 1945, making even Israel's tough counterterrorism operation in Gaza seem dwarfish. It is a war of conquest launched by Russia in 2014, which escalated dramatically almost two years ago and is therefore not determined by the success or failure of a spring or autumn offensive by either side. This is important to repeat, as so much thought about what happens next takes as its starting point the inability of Ukraine's summer counteroffensive to secure a major recapture of territory.

Wrong assumptions

If Ukraine cannot achieve victory, says this logic, what then is the purpose of prolonging the war or continuing to accept its costs? Would it not be better to exercise the logic of 'love hurts' by forcing Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky into a negotiated ceasefire? The questions are misplaced because they arise from two flawed basic assumptions: first, that negotiating a peace depends on Ukraine, and second, that the U.S. and Europe have rallied around Kiev since 2022 to achieve some kind of "victory" over Russia.

The reality is that peace negotiations depend more on Russia – the invading force. Moreover, there is no sign that President Vladimir Putin is ready to accept a lasting ceasefire on existing battle lines. Russia's actions, not to mention the Kremlin's continued escalation of rhetoric and its declaration of "annexations" of territories it does not yet control, suggest otherwise.

Similarly, the U.S. and Europe came to Kiev's aid not so that it could defeat Russia, but so that it could defend itself, preventing a Russian expansion that promised long-term instability for Europe. These remain vital objectives, without even mentioning here more nebulous objectives based on values, such as the defence of democracy or international law. They are also more achievable than they seemed immediately after Russia's invasion in 2022.

To be fair to Putin, it would be absurd for him to abandon his goals now, at a time when funding and military support for Ukraine are at stake on both sides of the Atlantic. The White House this week warned it would run out of money to support Ukraine after late December unless Republicans in Congress drop their opposition, an eventuality one Biden administration official correctly identified would bring Ukraine's ability to defend itself against Russian attacks to its knees.

Meanwhile, Putin's ally, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, has made clear that he intends to either use it to his advantage in return or thwart both the creation of a €50 billion European Union fund for Ukraine and an EU plan to offer Kiev accession talks in December.

Most encouraging of all, from the Kremlin's point of view, is that Donald Trump — a man with a deep personal rivalry with Ukraine — is leading the polls ahead of the U.S. presidential election a year from now. Putin also has his own political agenda. He faces elections next year which, no matter how unfair and unfree, remain important in support of his power and legitimacy. Striking a deal now could push the Russians to question the huge costs they have had to pay.

Active defense

What too many in the West don't understand, says Mykola Bielieskov, a researcher at the National Institute for Strategic Studies in Kiev, is that "Russia is not going to reconcile with Ukraine" and still believes it can win by force. "They have increased arms production, mobilized new forces and need an outcome to be proud of."

The upshot of all of the above is that Ukraine cannot stop fighting, no matter what happens to the funding and supplies of weapons from allies. The only question is how many additional lives and extra ground will be lost if the West's resolve retreats, depriving the Ukrainians of the means to fight back with enough force to convince Putin that there is nothing else to be gained.

Time is what Ukraine needs now to exercise targeted rather than desperate defense. Its task is to weaken Russian forces and continue a long-range air campaign to make Crimea — and thus the supply lines of Russian forces in the south — vulnerable, while hoping for a Trump defeat. This combination could force Putin to rethink his cost-benefit analysis and negotiate a sustainable end to the war.

A tough defense offers a far less inspiring story than a counteroffensive triumph, but for now it is also a far better way forward for Ukraine and its supporters than any doomed attempt at talks. War has proven how difficult – if not impossible – it is to attack a well-established adversary without the advantage of air superiority or some other significant technological advantage – and the same is true of Russia. Since the fall, Putin's generals have committed a large volume of forces to an offensive in Avdiivka, in the east of Ukraine, losing shockingly large volumes of troops and equipment. A successful attrition defense of this kind is also a victory for Ukraine. It just takes longer to bear fruit.

This is where I disagree with two highly respected U.S. foreign policy masterminds, Richard Haas and Charles Kupchan, who also call for a review of the West's strategy in Ukraine in the latest edition of Foreign Affairs magazine. Based on the failure of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, the lack of a realistic prospect of regaining all occupied Ukrainian territory, Western fatigue and Russia's superior resources, the two men argue that the Ukrainians must be persuaded to negotiate a ceasefire now. Even if Putin refuses, which they acknowledge as likely, they argue that Ukraine will gain moral ground and perhaps prevent a worse fate for itself later.

Haas and Kupchan correctly appreciate the dangers of continuing to fight back for victory, but this is also an unnecessary scarecrow. The military commanders of the Ukrainian forces have already accepted the need to turn to defense. They are no longer asking for more tanks, but for longer-range missiles, artillery shells, anti-aircraft launchers and aircraft needed for a strategy of attrition. The article also ignores the dangers inherent in its own proposal. Putin would probably not refuse a ceasefire, as he has not done in the past, and instead set conditions that he knows Ukraine could only refuse.

Doing so would trigger an inevitable debate among Kiev's allies over whether Ukraine should accept them — and when it ultimately didn't, the situation would breathe new life into those (like Orban) who argue that all support for Ukraine should cease.

The reality is that stability in Europe still depends on the continent showing Putin that it cannot achieve his historically grandiose goals of regaining Russian territory and spheres of influence lost in 1918, then regained by Stalin, and lost again with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. The Kremlin has by no means finished its efforts. Few empires have accepted collapse without a fight, and Russia is no exception.