Filenews 6 November 2023 - by James Stavridis
I spent much of my professional life in the Arab-Persian Gulf and met Iranian naval forces there on many occasions.
They were uniformly unprofessional, confrontational, and clearly engaged in making life as difficult as possible for both the legitimate merchant marine and navy ships of the many countries with which the Iranians have intractable differences. They are cowardly in front of opposing military forces, but at the same time dangerous and unpredictable.
Odds
As I watch the escalation of the situation in Gaza, I fear that the chances of Iran intervening by firing the 130,000 missiles that Hezbollah has stored in the north of Israel are increasing. Immediately after Hamas' shameful and disastrous attack on Israel on 7 October, I would have estimated the chances of an immediate or proxy intervention by Iran at around 10%. But as world opinion begins to turn against Israel in the wake of the inevitable civilian casualties in Gaza, Iran is becoming increasingly bold.
They are conducting exploratory attacks from the north, trying to assess whether the Israelis have maintained a strategic reserve sufficient to deal with a second front coming from Lebanon. They have also carried out about 20 proxy attacks against U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria, seeking to determine what the U.S. response might look like.
Iranian-backed Houthi rebels recently fired missiles from the southern Arabian Peninsula – which were shot down by a US destroyer. They have been involved in cyberattacks targeting Israel and others in the region. It is clear that Iran is testing the waters to see if an escalation would be effective.
I have seen this series of events in the Arab-Persian Gulf before. When I headed a division on an Aegis cruiser in the late 1980s, I watched them harass legal tanker traffic, anonymously drop mines at the critical point of the Strait of Hormuz, and try to overfly and target American warships like mine.
Eventually, we were forced to destroy a significant chunk of the Iranian navy in Operation Praying Mantis in April 1988. The navy sank one Iranian frigate and mutilated another. They also sank a gunboat, three speedboats and destroyed a number of platforms in the Gulf from which the naval forces of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps were operating.
Iran is increasingly likely to put hot pressure on Israel and the US, and I would say that the chances of a serious attack by Iran have increased unpleasantly, to over 20%. It could close the Strait of Hormuz, send oil prices soaring and proceed in unpredictable ways, especially with two U.S. airlift strike groups, multiple Air Force attack aircraft squadrons and a Marine strike group currently stationed in the area. It is not excluded that there will be a direct military confrontation between US and Iranian forces.
Options
What further options are available to US President Joe Biden if Iran miscalculates his blunt warning to the ayatollahs – which was simple: "Don't do it"?
If Iran decides to attack either through more proxy actions — particularly by Hezbollah — or even directly, Biden will receive a detailed list of options for what he can do in response. I've been involved in preparing such lists over the years, and it's scary to do, knowing that you're developing, essentially, a doomsday menu.
To be sure, the Pentagon already has detailed lists of Iranian facility targets based on years of confrontation dating back to the 1979 Iranian hostage crisis. Some of the options that may be considered include:
Cyberattacks by the U.S. Cyber Command, with backup support from the National Security Agency (NSA), targeting critical Iranian infrastructure: oil and gas facilities, refineries, shipping terminals, and possibly the power grid of both Lebanon and Iran. All would be legitimate military targets if hit in response to Iranian adventurism in the current crisis.
Special forces operations against Hezbollah, which may include joint missions with Israeli counterparts, aimed at undermining the command and control interface between Tehran and Hezbollah. Special Forces could also be significantly effective if used against both Hezbollah and Iranian logistical support, arms shipments (both at sea and on land), and supply efforts to help Hamas.
Long-range strikes, possibly using Tomahawk missiles from the cruisers, destroyers and submarines accompanying the two aircraft carriers already in the area. With a range of more than 1,500 nautical miles and incredible accuracy, these strikes could be constructively deployed against critical Iranian military targets, such as the sprawling Bandar Abbas naval station from which much of the Iranian navy operates (both the classic navy and the naval units of the Revolutionary Guards).
Air strikes by F/A-18 Hornets or Joint Strike Fighters from the deck of the USS Eisenhower in the North Arabian Sea. The U.S. Air Force could augment them with strikes from across the Arabian Gulf against Iranian coastal infrastructure. Both naval and air force attack aircraft are minutes away from key Iranian targets. In addition to coastal targets, U.S. airstrikes could destroy Iranian infrastructure in the Gulf region, including sea platforms or gas and oil pipeline well heads.
These targets would not cause significant collateral damage to civilians, but would have both a profound military impact and a crippling economic impact. The above list, in fact, is only the beginning in terms of U.S. capability with the force currently deployed in the region. Iran's leaders are extremists, but not insane. Hopefully they read things carefully.
James Stavridis is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist, retired U.S. Navy admiral, former Supreme Allied Commander of NATO, and dean emeritus of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. He is also vice president of global affairs at the Carlyle Group. He serves on the boards of American Water Works, Fortinet, PreVeil, NFP, Ankura Consulting Group, Titan Holdings, Michael Baker and Neuberger Berman and has advised Shield Capital, a cybersecurity investor.
