Filenews 29 May 2023
By Andreas Kluth
In recent days, Ukraine may or may not have begun to bring war for the Russians into the territory of their own country — or it may not. Let's say he did – or that he intends to do it. Would that be a good idea?
Last week, paramilitary forces crossed from Ukraine into Russia and caused quite a stir — though the roost quickly subsided. The Russians, as usual, immediately blamed the invasion on "Ukrainian terrorists" and "fascists." You can ignore the relevant cries – especially those coming from the Kremlin, whose specialty is lies.
Russian volunteers
The groups claiming credit for the attacks are Russians who defected from their president, Vladimir Putin's army, and are now fighting against him and for Ukraine. Such a group calls itself the "Legion of Freedom" of Russia. Another is the ultranationalist "Russian Volunteer Corps".
Little is known about these Russian paramilitaries fighting Putin — namely, whether they take orders from Kiev or act autonomously. They appear to be at least loosely linked to the "International Legion" of Ukraine, a force of foreign volunteers comparable to the "International Brigades" that fought in the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) on the side of the Spanish Republicans against the nationalists of General Francisco Franco.
Kiev, for its part, denies involvement in cross-border attacks. Maybe he's telling the truth. Let us put that aside, however, and ask a broader question: would it make strategic sense to carry out attacks on Russia - and I mean more than just skirmishes?
The lure of the strategy Scipio the African
Some of the greatest military minds in history have won defensive wars in just this way. The idea is to threaten an attacker's base by forcing them to withdraw, in whole or in part, from the original front line in order to protect their back.
On a large scale, this is what the Roman commander Scipio Africanus did between 210 and 202 B.C. Hannibal, the most formidable enemy the Romans had ever encountered, terrorized Italy with his Carthaginian invasion force for eight years. So Scipio led a Roman army into Iberia in order to capture Hannibal's bases there. A few years later, Scipio crossed into North Africa to threaten Carthage itself. Only at that point did Hannibal leave Italy to defend his homeland. Scipio defeated him and Rome won the war.
In the same way, Ukraine could open new fronts inside Russia. Then Putin would have to withdraw parts of his invading forces from Ukraine and send them back to Russia. This would weaken Russian positions in Ukraine and help Ukrainians regain their territories. Putin would also begin to look weak at home and become politically or personally vulnerable to coups.
Ukraine, however, is not ancient Rome, and Russia is not Carthage — and Putin is certainly not Hannibal, one of the greatest military geniuses in history, despite his eventual defeat. The strategic situation is quite different.
Nuclear and the Global South
The first difference is that Putin, unlike Hannibal, has nuclear weapons and has repeatedly threatened to use them if he is pushed into a corner. For now, the world — including its perceived ally China — has convinced him that a nuclear escalation would not be tolerated. Russian defense doctrine, however, does provide for the use of atomic weapons when the Russian state itself is in danger. As long as Putin equates this state with himself, he may decide that he has nothing to lose and strike a blow.
Another difference is that Ukraine, although it currently has the most hardened army in the world, relies on the constant support of the West. It defends its skies with American anti-missile systems, will launch its counterattack with German tanks and may even dominate the air with F-16 fighter jets.
All this aid so far has been based on the assumption that Ukraine is simply defending its own territory. The biggest fear in the West is that NATO could be dragged into a war with Russia, which could escalate into World War III. Some Western countries — possibly even the U.S. after the 2024 elections — could stop supporting Ukraine if it adopted aggressive tactics. The so-called Global South, which is already in a position of general neutrality in the war, would probably turn against Kiev in such a case.
The key is Crimea
A more nuanced version of the "Skipionist" strategy would therefore be to attack Crimea. This peninsula is Ukrainian territory under international law, although Putin "annexed" it as early as 2014 (he illegally occupied part of four other Ukrainian provinces in 2022). Psychologically, Putin and the Russians consider Crimea part of their country, but the rest of the world does not. So it's a fair game.
Retaking Crimea would cost a lot of Ukrainian blood. Kyiv has no long-range missiles, air power or amphibious forces to encircle Russian troops in two other partially occupied Ukrainian regions, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia. So he would have to pass through these areas, crossing the Dnieper River and attacking the Russians, who are well fortified.
A more effective approach could simply be to cut off Crimea from Russian supply lines. To do so, the Ukrainians would use their new Western tanks and other weapons to pierce Russian lines from Zaporizhzhia to the Sea of Azov, cutting the "land bridge" the Russians built for themselves between Luhansk and Crimea. If this offensive succeeds, the Ukrainians could make Russian positions in Kherson and the Crimean peninsula indefensible in the long run.
With any luck, Putin would decide "so far" at that point and enter, albeit reluctantly, into peace negotiations, somehow characterizing his "special military operation" as a success at home, albeit with the utmost coercive propaganda. Conversely, if Putin came under military pressure inside Russia, he could not pretend to have gained anything. He should persist and reinforce his narrative that he is defending Russia from external enemies.
Therefore, Ukrainians should not attack Russia itself, nor encourage allies such as Russian anti-Putin paramilitaries to do so on their behalf. Better to make it clear to the world that they are purely and only defending their country. The strategy must remain firm to win global support and then lead Ukrainians to regain as much of their occupied homeland as possible.
