Filenews 27 March 2023
By Hal Brands
Will China and Russia form an alliance? The question arises every time Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping meet, as they did in Moscow last week - and in general this misses the point. By any reasonable historical standard, Russia and China have already entered into an alliance dedicated to transforming the global political scene - even if the Americans, blinded by their own experience, do not yet see it as such.
Alliances are as old as international politics. In the 5th century BC, Athens had coalesced the Greek city-states into the Delian League. In the 19th century, Otto von Bismarck forged overlapping, sometimes secret ties with neighbouring powers in order to preserve Germany's position in Central Europe. Since World War II, the U.S. has established a global network of alliances to deter aggression and maintain peace.
These U.S. alliances are consolidated through formal treaties and public assurances of commitment. They are deeply institutionalised and have high degrees of military interoperability. They empower but at the same time limit their weaker members: America protects countries such as Germany and Japan so that they do not feel necessary to develop their own destabilising abilities, such as nuclear weapons.
Public and secret alliances
U.S. alliances took this form because they emerged in unique historical circumstances, during a Cold War in which the U.S. sought to stifle aggression on the part of the Soviet Union, while at the same time stifling long-standing tensions within the Western world. Also, their members were mainly democracies, which made their commitments public. Nowhere, however, is it written that alliances should look exactly like that.
Alliances can be secret or overt, formal or informal, ambitious or modest in scope and objectives. An alliance is simply a combination of states working together to pursue common interests. From this perspective, Xi and Putin have entered into an alliance that is getting closer and closer every year.
The goals here are bold, even epic in nature: Moscow and Beijing seek to overthrow US power and alliances so that they can create extensive spheres of influence and create a multipolar world. They also aim to reduce the scope of democratic values so that authoritarian forms of government are safe, even dominant around the world.
There is no secret about this: the Sino-Russian joint statement of February 2022 articulates the geopolitical and ideological basis of the relationship. As far as the form of cooperation is concerned, there is much to be found.
Start with what Xi and Putin don't do: confronting each other. The long history of Sino-Russian hostility has been set aside, for the time being, so that the two countries can fight with each other's "backs" against the liberal international order. Putin can continue to fight in Ukraine because he can leave the Russian Far East practically defenceless. China will also benefit from having a secure border with Russia in any future conflict with Washington.
The lack of any aggression between Russia and China facilitates aggression against their respective enemies. And, the more each power disturbs the balance of Eastern Europe or the Western Pacific, the more difficult it will be for the US to respond decisively to either point.
Only the name is missing
Beijing and Moscow are strengthening each other and directly. Military cooperation - whether exercises in geopolitical hot spots, arms sales or the exchange of sensitive defence technology - has increased beyond the previous expectations of most Western observers. Putin and Xi are promoting a shared vision of authoritarian-friendly Internet governance. Their diplomats are working together to curb the world's perception of human rights and to weaken any prospect of pressuring repressive governments to violate them. In Central Asia, their common backyard, a combination of Russian weapons and Chinese money has helped secure authoritarian rule.
Call it an alliance or, as Xi and Putin prefer, a "strategic partnership without limits" and "no forbidden areas": rhetoric is less important than the realities created by Sino-Russian convergence.
In the short term, the war in Ukraine will push Russia and China even closer. Their economic and technological integration is increasing, due to the isolation of Russia from the West. Beijing and Moscow are increasing yuan trade in order to reduce their vulnerability to dollar dominance and foreign sanctions.
China, which is not thrilled with Putin's frighteningly brutal aggression, but also doesn't want to see him lose, could also provide artillery ammunition or other lethal assistance to Russian forces — perhaps in exchange for sensitive submarine noise reduction technology, advanced air defenses, or pledges of support if Beijing one day ends up fighting with America for Taiwan.
Beijing has not yet gone that far, because Xi's appetite for open confrontation with the West is even weaker than Putin's. And, as in any alliance between predators, friction is inevitable.
The war in Ukraine is forcing Russia into a deeper dependence on China, which Putin finds tolerable, but which may not be the case for other Russian nationalists. The more this alliance succeeds, ironically, the more difficult it can be to sustain itself: a world in which US power has weakened around the Eurasian periphery is a world in which prolonged tensions between Russia and China, the two expansionist powers at its core, may become greater and more visible.
For now, however, the U.S. faces an alliance in everything but its official proclamation between its two main competitors — a serious geopolitical challenge, whatever you call it.
Source: BloombergOpinion
