Filenews 28 February 2023
By Ariel Cohen
Ukrainian secret services recently revealed that Russian energy giant Gazprom is setting up its own private military company (PMC). The rationale behind the establishment of a private security agency on behalf of an energy company makes sense – albeit 'murky' – given that it needs to protect its assets in problem areas. Western companies in the industry, such as Exxon and BP, are doing the same. However, Gazprom does not establish a private army to guard some remote gas fields or pipelines, or even to send units of this force to Ukraine. Gazprom's move is likely to involve control of valuable energy resources inside Russia, and more generally fits into the context of the power struggle in the country.
In Russia there are several private military companies, militias, paramilitary organizations and other controversial armed groups. Technically, private military companies are considered illegal in Russia, but this seems to be of little importance in a country with a tradition of trampling on the rule of law. The "Wolves of the Night" (a motorbike paramilitary organization) played an important role in the occupation of Crimea in 2014 and has now turned into a militia with the blessing of the Kremlin. The famous Wagner Group has recruited convicts to fight on the battlefields of Ukraine, while in the past its mercenaries have operated in sub-Saharan Africa and Syria. Russia has armed groups for every occasion, but this situation may turn out to be the "poison in its chalice" and the destruction of the country.
Let's see why: through private military companies, Russia expands its sphere of influence worldwide, collects information, creates opportunities at the economic level and promotes its political interests. The same companies are involved in armed conflicts, disinformation and propaganda campaigns, as well as in the cybersecurity sector: they are waging normal and hybrid warfare. If "needed", they can be used to exterminate political opponents. So far, only Wagner is active in Ukraine, although there are indications of the presence of other armed groups.
Internally, the development of these military private companies is a conscious strategy to prevent a coup d'état from taking place. Within the framework of this "analogy", alternative armed institutions are established that declare loyalty to leading figures of the political scene. These groups compete with the regular army. Earlier typical examples of this practice are the Praetorians in Rome, the SS of Nazi Germany, and Saddam Hussein's Republican Guard. They are a building block of authoritarian regimes that fear a change from within. It has long been observed that repressive anti-democratic regimes channel more money to the various security forces than to the regular army. The rationale is simple: firstly, 'the people' poses a greater threat to the regime and the leader than to the foreign enemy, and secondly, the heterogeneous nature of the armed groups enables the leadership to turn against each other and itself retain absolute power. But what is the risk? These groups are not as effective in warfare, and disagreements or disobedience within them carry the risk of civil war breaking out, accelerating the decline of a state.
In Putin's Russia, there have long been forces to protect against coups d'état – and they are not limited to mercenaries or motorcyclists. In 2016, Rosgvardia was founded as a "national guard" that complements the Russian army. In practice, it operates in competition with the regular army at all levels: it acted autonomously during the failed operation to capture Kiev in the early stages of the Russian invasion, and today it "hunts down" recruits at the expense of the rest of the armed groups. The Wagner Group and Kadyrov's Muslim Chechen fighters "coexist" with the Russian army in Ukraine.
Gazprom has been approved to establish its private army, on the grounds that it will protect its energy resources from sabotage – at a time of heightened uncertainty. The irony in the case is that Russia has repeatedly launched attacks against Ukrainian energy targets and may be involved in blowing up the NordStream pipeline in the fall of 2022. Moreover, Gazprom is Putin's "deep wallet". Therefore, the move to create an army of its own suggests that the company – and the Russian president – is deeply concerned that the opposing camp will target its energy resources.
Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller belongs to the elite of Russian oligarchs with strong connections to the Kremlin. At the same time, Miller has harshly and publicly criticized the founder and head of Wagner, Yevgeny Prigozhin, even calling him a "Kremlin restaurateur." It should be noted that Prigozhin is in open conflict with Russian Defence Minister Sergei Soygu.
In addition, Miller sees Putin's powerful associate, Igor Sechin – a former KGB officer like Russia's president – as his rival. And this is not the only rivalry within Putin's inner circle of associates. It seems that the leaders of the Russian armed groups do not have good relations either with each other, or with Russia's regular army or internal security services. As in the close entourage of Stalin or Hitler (or in royal courts), everyone claims Putin's favour, while trying to overtake opponents.
Gazprom's new private army is not a "firework". Investing in soldiers, ammunition and other resources is costly and requires long-term planning. Gazprom knows full well that it has to compete with Russia's other armed groups and regular army in its attempt to attract recruits and acquire equipment – even if it pays very well in dollars. The stakes are high: Gazprom's private army will allow it to take a more active role inside and outside Russia, seeking to secure its energy resources and the Kremlin's revenues.
On top of that, the private army will provide protection for Alexei Miller himself and Gazprom's financial resources, while also acting as a deterrent to the plans of the company's rivals and its CEO. If things went well in Ukraine for the Russians, Gazprom and Miller would not need to take such drastic action. Whatever the real reason behind the establishment of Gazprom's private army, this development is indicative of the damage that Russia has suffered from its military operations.
Already Putin's invasion is proving to be a disastrous choice. The Russian president threatens the West with his nuclear arsenal, wanting to impose a peaceful settlement of the Ukrainian issue on his own terms. A victory for Moscow would be pyrrhic: the loss of human life is enormous and the economic consequences are unfavourable. Russia's best minds are leaving the country, the deficit has slipped to World War II levels, Europe's market has been permanently lost and Asia cannot make up for it.
Gazprom's new army could be a lifeboat in the coming storm. It is highly unlikely, however, to secure and salvage the assets of the energy giant.
Source: Forbes
