Filenews 21 February 2023
By Minxin Pei
A year ago, the "limitless friendship" that Chinese President Xi Jinping proclaimed with Russian President Vladimir Putin seemed to many in Beijing like a diplomatic masterpiece. United in their fear and dissatisfaction with American power, the leaders of China and Russia seemed to have entered into a partnership that could effectively counter the U.S. and its allies.
Xi, however, probably did not expect Putin to invade Ukraine before the ink of the "Joint Statement on International Relations" dried. The geopolitical dynamics sparked by the war have since upended the Chinese leader's strategic calculations, while the expected benefits of a Sino-Russian alignment may never materialise.
Losses
China may not be fighting in Ukraine. However, even so, it suffers losses.
Consider the arguments, including from prominent Russian analysts, who argue that China has gained enormous strategic advantages from Putin's aggressive war. They note, firstly, that a Russia weakened by war and Western sanctions is now more dependent than ever on China.
In addition, they claim that the conflict has proved to be a costly distraction for the US, both in terms of attention and aid (which has exceeded $ 100 billion). The situation is reminiscent of the years after the attacks of 11 September.
At the time, the administration of George W. Bush Jr. also intended to confront China, which it had called a "strategic competitor." Then the unfortunate US invasion of Iraq and the quagmire in Afghanistan consumed all the energy of policymakers in Washington. China thus enjoyed a strategic window of opportunity that lasted almost two decades.
Both arguments are flawed. True, Russia's dependence on China will likely increase if Putin remains in power. But no one should expect the Sino-Russian strategic alignment to endure after Putin's departure, now 70 years old, which is sure to happen within the next two decades, if not much sooner.
In addition, a weakened Russia is unlikely to withstand a long war, so its ability to distract the US may be short-lived. And, in any case, the U.S. isn't going to make the same strategic mistake twice.
In hindsight, the Bush administration was wrong because of its overly optimistic assumptions. As the world's only superpower, America could supposedly take Iraq a "walk" and then quickly return to the unfinished business of containing China, which at the time had a GDP of about one-eighth of America's economic output.
Today, with China's economy at three-quarters of the U.S. economy, American leaders can no longer afford to ignore their main adversary. The cries of indignation from Democrats and Republicans alike over the flight of a Chinese spy balloon over the US are proof of how targeted the US political establishment remains.
Price
If the gains from Putin's war are difficult to trace, the price China has paid for its stance is real and substantial.
At the strategic level, the Sino-Russian partnership has caused irreparable damage to China's ties with Europe. Before the war, China may have had a realistic chance of keeping major European countries neutral in its escalating competition with the US. But as soon as Russia fired the first shot, European countries understandably saw China as complicit in Russia's aggression.
At the same time, Washington's unwavering support for Ukraine has once again demonstrated its indispensable role in terms of peace and security in Europe. The war has driven the EU closer to the US and further away from China.
Russia's invasion has also undermined China's position in Taiwan. Before the outbreak of war, few considered an unprovoked Chinese attack on the island possible. Putin's aggression escalated fears that the same unthinkable disaster could happen in Taiwan.
How realistic such concerns are does not matter. The subsequent attention to Taiwan's fate was extremely damaging to China's interests. Westerners, eager to show their support, have elevated Taiwan's international visibility and status, something China had worked tirelessly to avoid. Worse, the prospect of a war in the Taiwan Strait has triggered U.S. efforts to strengthen Taiwan militarily and diplomatically, further weakening the "one-China policy."
Fears of a possible Chinese invasion of Taiwan also prompted Japan to double its military spending over the next five years — a policy change no sensible Chinese leader wanted to see.
Disconnection
Cumulatively, the change in Europe's attitude towards China and the prospect of a war between mainland China and Taiwan, which would certainly destroy world trade, have injected an urgent and powerful boost into the West's "economic disconnection" with China. Worried business executives no longer need encouragement from Washington's hawks to reduce their dependence on mainland China's supply chains.
The strategic and economic costs for China are set to rise. Xi has no alternative but to stand by Putin. His abandonment would now be considered an unforgivable betrayal on the part of Moscow, while having a marginal positive effect on the correction of ties with Europe. The withdrawal of Chinese support for Putin could also hasten the latter's defeat in Ukraine, which would allow the US to focus its full attention on China an hour earlier.
Xi finds himself trapped in a strategic dilemma, at the mercy of events. His once-masterpiece increasingly looks like a losing bet.
