Filenews 3 August 2022
By Hal Brands
The war in Ukraine is entering its third phase and this could well be the decisive one.
The first phase was the failed blitzkrieg of Russia, which was intended to destroy the Ukrainian state. The second phase, which continues in a relentless manner, was Moscow's aggressive attempt to occupy the entire Donbass region along the Ukraine-Russia border.
The third phase will include a long-awaited Ukrainian counterattack in the south. If Ukraine can reclaim enough territory - without trying to gain too much more than it can - it may ultimately reverse the course of the war decisively in its favour. If he does not succeed, Kiev will have a cold and difficult winter ahead of him.
Putin's bet
The cold is, of course, a vital part of the strategy of Russian President Vladimir Putin. He believes that time is still flowing in Russia's favour, at least in the short term. By the end of this year, western democracies will have run out of weapons and ammunition that Kiev needs. They will also be tired of pumping more and more money into a 'dying' Economy of Ukraine.
Meanwhile, the global turbulence caused by disruptions in Ukrainian wheat shipments will intensify, even if the - loose bases - new agreement on the resumption of exports from the Black Sea port of Odessa is maintained in force.
And Europe will tremble as winter sets in and gas reserves are depleted - a shortage that Putin is securing from now on by reducing gas flows, so that European countries do not have sufficient reserves as the winter cold approaches. The bet he has made is that economic discontent will cause the West to retreat before Russia is plunged into economic ruin.
Under these circumstances, Putin reckons, the aid that Ukraine receives from the democratic world will begin to decline. The pressure on Kiev to accept the ceasefire will increase. Moscow could then declare victory on the grounds that it would occupy significantly more Ukrainian territory than it occupied before the February 24, 2022 invasion.
The Russians could also use this occupied territory to regroup for a future offensive, either next year or a few years from now, in order to expel the Ukrainian government from Kiev or to mutilate what is left of Ukraine's economy, capturing Odessa. This may be a "Pyrrhic victory" for Putin, given the losses Russia has suffered, but it would be a real disaster for a dismembered, abandoned Ukraine.
The importance of the counterattack
Here lies the importance of promoting Ukraine in the south. It is no secret that Ukraine is preparing to attack there. The government of President Volodymyr Zelensky has warned citizens to leave the region and has already begun to use long-range artillery to isolate and cut off Moscow's forces.
Ukraine is already recapturing smaller cities along the route to the southern port of Kherson, the first population-large Ukrainian urban centre occupied by Russia, while gathering units for a larger offensive.
Ukraine is fighting back, and a clever tactic would be cutting off Russian forces occupying Kherson
Although the conflict in Ukraine has slowed down into a war of attrition, there is a great and urgent need for this attack. Ukraine must reclaim territory in the south to deter Russia from annexing these areas - in clear violation of international law - which would make their eventual recovery much less likely.
A successful Ukrainian attack could eliminate the risk of a new Russian advance towards Odessa. It could also bring Russia's transport links with Crimea, as well as some key military installations there, within range of Ukrainian artillery.
However, the real urgency of the attack is of a psychological nature. As military analysts Michael Coffman and Lawrence Friedman have argued, both sides are struggling to shape perceptions — of each other, but also of the outside world — of where this war is headed. Ukraine must show its Western supporters that it can finally win so that they can stay by Kiev's side and give it the means for more attacks in the future, even though the economic and military costs will increase.
Time
If Ukraine can do so, then time will ultimately be on its side. Recent research by scholars at the Yale School of Management shows that international sanctions and the ostracism of the private sector are driving Putin's economy to the precipice. In a war that will continue into 2023, Putin will also have to take into account the exhaustion of his army, which has little motives, unless he proceeds to a large-scale mobilization of Russian citizens, which would be fraught with political risks.
The "window" for Ukraine to be able to support its case will not, however, remain open forever. As the us midterm parliamentary elections approach and other global crises erupt, the Kiev struggle could become "yesterday's" news.
Zelensky's government has a decent chance of succeeding. Russian forces occupying Kherson are stuck on the north bank of the Dnieper River, which separates them from most of the Russian armed forces in the south of Ukraine. The Ukrainian army is logically able to isolate these troops by destroying (with artillery provided by the USA) the bridges along the river. Poorly refuelled Russian units would then find it very difficult to hold an enemy city with a combination of rebel violence inside the city and a well-planned attack against them.
However, for Ukraine to succeed, it will need to temper its ambitions. Even a limited attack will most likely require Ukrainian forces to almost perfectly perform coordinated operations - synchronization of infantry, on-board divisions, artillery, air force, etc. - to a greater extent than hitherto. Moving with too much self-confidence can backfire.
Ukrainian forces could, for example, try to cross the Dnieper and advance towards Crimea after capturing Kherson - after all, this too is Ukrainian territory. However, complex river crossings against a capable adversary may prove bloody, as demonstrated by Russia's difficulties in the east, and tired, overly extensive Ukrainian forces may not do well against the reinforced enemy units.
Alternatively, Kiev could attack further east, in a advance to the south that would aim to cut the Russian "land bridge" to Crimea and trap a larger contingent of Moscow forces. This, however, could only expose Ukrainian forces to encirclement, especially as Russia shifts units from Donbass to the south.
A failed attack that would end in retreat would be a disaster for Ukraine, leaving it militarily weaker and diplomatically much more isolated in the spring. And if Ukraine throws too many of its resilient but tired forces into an advance into the south, it could become vulnerable to a new Russian offensive in the east.
Ukraine has so far fought a brave and clever war, which has allowed it to keep a stronger enemy away from its targets. The next crucial test is whether Kiev will be able to win the initiative without losing its balance.
Source: BloombergOpinion
