Filenew 27 February 2022 - by Kostas Venizelos
The rapid developments in the Ukrainian issue are de facto touching on the Cyprus issue, in addition to the other consequences that our country will have from the war that has been going on since last Thursday, with Russia's invasion of Ukraine. It is obvious that on an international issue, which has been on the agenda for years and for a long period has not made progress, developments such as those that are happening may put it deeper on the shelf and in the immobility. Unless executable planning of actions and initiatives is formulated.
At the same time, however, it is clear that what is happening on the Russian-Ukrainian front should cause concern, as it may set a precedent. Mainly on the ground in view of the fact that the so-called international community, the 'Western world', is reacting, but its deterrent tools have not, so far, had any effect.
Is there a parallel between the Ukrainian, as shaped by the invasion of Russia and the Cyprus problem? Although no problem is the same as another, however, some common elements exist if one attempts to look at the big picture. The invasion, the occupation of territories and the annexation of territories, as in the case of Crimea, suggest some parallels. The two Russian-speaking communities on the one hand and the Turkish Cypriot on the other, called for help from the... motherlands. Or rather they were instructed to ask for help (in the case of Cyprus there was not even a call for intervention). Furthermore, in both cases, the logic of the strong prevails. Imposition by force. This, after all, is the brutal reality in international relations.
Russia, for geostrategic reasons, in order to prevent NATO from encircling, attempted to send a message to the "opposites" by force. Any commitments that existed after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the so-called real socialism, not to extend NATO to the borders with Russia (this informal agreement is disputed by the Western powers), have been abandoned and Moscow considered that it should suppress militarily and in this way send a powerful message of deterrence of the type "so far and so good". It is also obvious that Russia is aiming for what the US wants for itself, namely for Ukraine to become a 'satellite' state, having as a precedent the tried and tested Soviet method of Finnisation, which worked successfully for the USSR during the Cold War era.
Ankara is also flirting with the Finnish model. The occupying power believes that its strategic objectives can be achieved through the control, the Finnisation, that is, of Greece and Cyprus. The easiest route to full control of Cyprus.
At the same time, there are differences. An important difference is this:
As far as Turkey is concerned, there are convictions by the Security Council for the proclamation of the separatist entity as a 'state' in November 1983. In the case of Russia, in view of the fact that it is a permanent member of the Security Council, it is impossible without its consent to have a decision of the International Organisation, since its exercise of its right of veto is certain.
Developments in Ukraine may also be an opportunity for Nicosia to bring the Cyprus issue back to the international political stage. It will be an opportunity, in the midst of the tough debates on the war in Ukraine, to put the Cyprus question on a proper footing. However, in order to do this, it obviously also needs a design and revision of approaches. As is well known, Nicosia had chosen the instrument of sanctions, which, admittedly, did not work as expected. However, it was a political choice that kept the issue of Turkish illegal actions and provocations on the European Union table. It was a constant nuisance to both Turkey and the huge German lobby in the EU. This policy was revised to bring back the MOUs, knowing that they would have no luck. The proposed package, which was hauled from the government's drawers, remains in limbo as it was rejected before being tabled by the Turkish side.
The discussion by our European partners of the sanctions against Russia, the decisions that have been taken, makes it possible — if there is a political will — for this issue to come up again for the occupying Turkey as well. In fact, this can be done in a way that shows that "for reasons of goodwill the sanctions were withdrawn, the CBMs were proposed, they were rejected by the Turkish side and we are forced to reinstate them". When sanctions are discussed for the attack on a third state, this cannot fail to be taken for granted for a Member State of the European Union, which continues to be the victim of a similar raid. It is clear that the latest, rapid, developments are shaping a new scene that may change balances and the redistribution of power.
WHAT WAS SAID TO THE COUNCIL OF CHIEFS ON SANCTIONS IN BELARUS
At the Council of Chiefs on 6 October 2020, President Anastasiades briefed the participants, among others, on the issue of Belarus. It was also then the issue of sanctions against this country by the EU. We are not against sanctions, he said to add that the 'Rule of Law' (principle of the rule of law) concerns not only Belarus but also Turkey. He noted that the double standards approach applied to Turkey and Cyprus, in contrast to Belarus, which acted immediately. Cyprus, he noted, has been calling for sanctions for two years, but there is no will from our partners. Everything that was said at that meeting now applies to Russia. They also apply to Cyprus. The President said at the time that if the EU threatened with "strict measures" for Cyprus as well, the situation would be different today. There was support from EU member states, but there were a number of states that insisted that "we had to give diplomacy a chance...". For example, Spain, Italy, Malta insisted that a two-month extension be granted and that we find them in the dialogue. In the end, the President did not persevere.
Erdogan studies Putin's moves
The Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, is holding both ropes in relation to the Ukrainian crisis. Deliberately, it is trying to play a mediating role in order to maintain an attitude of equal distance. Some reports say Ankara does not intend to implement the sanctions, citing the fact that it had sold military equipment to Kiev, despite the fact that it was even in violation of the Minsk agreement. At the same time, it is obvious that Erdogan is watching closely and studying Vladimir Putin's moves. It also monitors the reactions of the so-called international community. In the equation of the Turkish President, all the elements are put in order for him to consider some moves. Of course, Turkey is not Russia, which withstands pressure and sanctions. On the other hand, Erdogan has stretched the rope many times, he has committed serious violations of international law (only war in the conventional sense he did not do).
All this, from the Turkish point of view, is being considered in the run-up to 2023, which has a double significance for Erdogan: Both the hegemonic celebrations of 100 years of the Turkish state and the elections.
